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Preface 
 
 Recent research is giving us ways to define the behaviors of future artificial intelligence 
(AI) systems, before they are built, by mathematical equations. We can use these equations to 
describe various broad types of unintended and harmful AI behaviors, and to propose AI design 
techniques that avoid those behaviors. That is the primary subject of this book. 
 Because AI will affect everyone's future, the book is written to be accessible to readers at 
different levels. Mathematical explanations are provided for those who want details, but it is also 
possible to skip over the math and follow the general arguments via text and illustrations. The 
introductory and final sections of the mathematical chapters (2−4 and 6−9) avoid mathematical 
notation. 
 While this book discusses dangers posed by AI and proposes solutions, it is only a 
snapshot of ongoing research from my particular point of view and is not offered as the final 
answer. The problem of defining and creating ethical AI continues, and interest in it will grow 
enormously. While the effort to solve this problem is currently much smaller than is devoted to 
Internet security, ultimately there is no limit to the effort that ethical AI merits. 
 Hollywood movies such as the Terminator and Matrix series depict violent war between 
AI and humans. In reality future AI would defeat humans with brains rather than brawn. 
Unethical AI designs may incite resentment and hatred among humans, and con humans out of 
their wealth. Humans may not even be aware that manipulative AI is the source of their troubles. 
 This book describes a number of technical problems facing the design of ethical AI 
systems and makes the case for various approaches for solving these problems. The first chapter 
argues that whereas current AI systems use models of their environments that are simpler than 
human mental models, future AI systems will be different because they will learn environment 
models that are more complex than human mental models. This will make it difficult to include 
safeguards in their designs. 
 This book makes the case for utilitarian ethics for AI in its second chapter. Any complete 
and transitive preferences among outcomes can be expressed by utility functions, whereas 
preferences that are not complete and transitive don't support the choice of a most prefered 
outcome. We often think of ethics as a set of rules. Utility functions can express the preferences 
defined by rules and provide a way to resolve the ambiguities among conflicting rules. 
 The fourth chapter makes the case that the technical, mathematical problems of infinite 
sets can be avoided by restricting AI definitions to finite sets, which are adequate for our finite 
universe. 
 Chapter five defines the problem of unintended instrumental actions. These have been 
described as "basic AI drives" and as "instrumental goals." However, this book argues that these 
are properly described as actions rather than drives or goals. 
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 In its sixth chapter this book argues that the problem of self-delusion can be avoided 
using model-based utility functions. This chapter also defines the problem of inconsistency 
between the agent's utility function and its definition (Armstrong (2015) refers to one case of this 
problem as "motivated value selection"). 
 The seventh chapter argues that humans are unable to adequately describe their values by 
any set of rules, and that human values should instead be learned statistically. Accurately learned 
human values are the key to the avoiding unintended instrumental actions described in the fifth 
chapter. Chapter seven describes the problem of corrupting the reward generator (Bostrom 
(2014) calls this "perverse instantiation") and argues that it can be avoided using a three-
argument model-based utility function that evaluates outcomes at one point in time from the 
perspective of humans at a different point in time. This chapter also discusses integrating Rawls' 
Theory of Justice into AI designs, and the issue of AI systems that evolve to adapt to the values 
of an evolving humanity. 
 Chapter eight describes several problems for AI systems embedded in the real world: 
how they evaluate increases to their limited computational resources, the possibility of being 
predicted by other agents, and the possibility that AI systems may violate their design intentions 
as they and humanity evolve. It proposes a self-modeling framework for such systems and 
describes how this framework can enable systems to evaluate increases to their resources, avoid 
being predicted by other agents, and avoid inconsistency between the agent's utility function and 
its definition (avoiding this problem contributes to maintaining the invariance of design 
intentions). The eighth chapter also discusses the difficulty of proving ethical properties of AI 
systems and proposes an alternate approach of estimating and minimizing the probability of 
failure. 
 The ninth chapter describes the issues of testing AI systems. It discusses the problem of 
tested AI systems acting in the real world. 
 Chapter ten describes political problems associated with AI systems. When greater-than-
human intelligence can be created by technology, it will be difficult to avoid a future in which 
inequality of wealth among humans translates into inequality of intelligence. This chapter makes 
the case that developers of advanced AI systems represent the interests of all future humans and 
should be transparent about their efforts. 
 The eleventh chapter expresses my hope that humanity will employ its super-intelligent 
AI systems to add meaning to their lives via scientific discovery, rather than to pursue a 
hedonistic dead end. 
 The AI design proposed in this book is collectivist and intrusive. This does not match my 
political instincts, which are somewhat libertarian. However, as discussed in Section 10.3, a 
libertarian approach to powerful AI would create competition among AI systems which may be 
dangerous to humans. Safety constraints on competing systems may be difficult to enforce. 
 I wish to thank Terri Gregory and Leanne Avila for help with the manuscript, and 
Howard Johnson for help with my figure drawing process. For typo and error reports, and other 
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suggestions, I wish to thank Joshua Fox, José Hernández-Orallo, Luke Muehlhauser, Brian 
Muhia, Laurent Orseau, John Rose, Richard Sutton, and Tim Tyler. Please send reports of typos 
and errors, and any other suggestions, to me at hibbard@wisc.edu. 
 This book will be permanently available at: arxiv.org/abs/1411.1373. More frequent 
updates should be available at: www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/g/Ethical_AI.pdf. 
 My AI fiction is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/whibbard/g/mcnrs. 
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1. Future AI Will be Different from Current AI 
 
 News stories about dramatic progress in AI are common. IBM's Watson beat champions 
of the sophisticated language game Jeopardy. As of April 2014 Google's self-driving car had 
logged 700,000 miles without any accidents. Videos show how Boston Dynamics' walking robot 
named Atlas is uncannily human-like. A computer system by DeepMind has learned to play 
seven Atari video games, six better than previous computer systems and three better than human 
experts, with no foreknowledge of the games other than knowing that the goal is to maximize its 
score. Vicarious has developed a system that reliably solves CAPTCHAs, which are intended to 
distinguish humans from computers. In some tests, computers surpass human skill at face 
recognition. Microsoft has created a system that can recognize thousands of different kinds of 
objects in images. More generally, automation is revolutionizing manufacturing and other 
industries. 
 To recognize that these efforts will ultimately surpass human intelligence at all tasks, 
consider the progress of neuroscience. Scientists have found detailed correlations between 
stimuli to human senses and activity in human neurons, and between human neural activity and 
muscle action. They have found neurons that activate when visual stimuli have specific shapes or 
move in specific ways. They have found neurons, called mirror neurons, in monkey brains that 
activate when a monkey rips paper, or when it sees a human rip paper, or even hears paper 
ripping (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). When studying the ability of animals to learn, scientists 
have found detailed correlations between patterns of neural activity and known learning 
algorithms designed by computer scientists (Schultz, Dayan and Montague 1997; Brown, 
Bullock and Grossberg 1999; Seymour et al. 2004). These correlations indicate that neurons in 
these animal brains learn by the same algorithms used for computer learning. All these detailed 
correlations between physical brain functions and mental behaviors would be absurd 
coincidences unless brains explain minds. And if minds have a physical basis, then our relentless 
technological progress will create artificial brains with minds like our own (our technology never 
says "impossible," just "not yet"). By scaling the physical size and complexity of these artificial 
brains, they must eventually surpass human intelligence. 
 Another way to understand the eventual progress of AI is to consider IBM's Watson. 
Watson was quite successful at beating the Jeopardy champions at their own game. Its language 
ability was learned by statistical analysis of extensive text databases, plus custom programming 
to help it avoid mistakes (early versions of the system made obvious gender errors). Its success 
was remarkable given that its language processing was based only on the relation of language to 
other language, and not on the relation of language to any physical skills observing and acting in 
the world. However, other AI systems do observe and act in the physical world, like Google's 
self-driving car, Boston Dynamics' walking machines, and systems that fold laundry and perform 
other difficult tasks. Now imagine a system that combines all these skills and similar skills 
relating to the entirety of an ordinary human vocabulary. The imagined system would be able to 
recognize all the objects of daily life visually and in some cases by their sounds, feel, smell, and 
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taste. Furthermore, the system would recognize actions involving these objects. Such 
recognitions could be combined into its statistical analysis of language so that, for example, the 
word chair would be associated with visual images of chairs and with actions involving chairs, 
such as sitting on chairs and even building chairs. The imagined system would require 
replicating the skill level already achieved in narrow areas (like driving a car) to all common 
human activities, and would require extending Watson's statistical analysis of text to include the 
system's sensory and motor experience. While this is a monumental task requiring much greater 
computing resources than are used by Watson, it is not impossible. People working and 
conversing with the imagined system would likely believe that it understands human language. A 
group at Google has already demonstrated a system that combines image and text data in a 
unified statistical analysis, in order to automatically produce captions for images (Vinyals, 
Toshev, Bengio, and Erhan 2014). 
 It is difficult to predict when human-level AI will first be produced. Ray Kurzweil, who 
has a good track record at technology prediction, estimates this event will occur in 2029 
(Kurzweil 2005). Technology companies are making large bets on the profitability of AI and 
robotics. Google has recently hired Kurzweil, developed its automated car, and purchased 
DeepMind, Boston Dynamics, Nest Labs, Bot&Dolly, Holomni, Meka Robotics, Redwood 
Robotics, Industrial Perception, and Schaft Inc. (all developing AI and robotic systems). IBM is 
applying its Watson technology to medicine. Facebook, Microsoft and several defense 
contractors are making similar large investments in AI development. All these efforts are 
accelerating. 
 As with any tool, we will build AI to make our work easier and to do work that we 
otherwise cannot. For example, it will be easier to travel in a car that drives itself, and it will be a 
necessity when I am too old to drive myself. The car is a nice illustration of the evolution of AI 
from other tools. The cars of the 1960s did not sense their environment nor did they act on their 
own. They merely responded to actions by their human drivers. Over time sensors were added to 
cars. When the car detected skidding tires, it would act to pump the brakes, and when the car 
detected a collision, it would deploy airbags to cushion impacts. Some cars can now detect the 
danger of collision with other cars and respond by applying the brakes. These systems maintain 
very simple information about the state of their environment. Google's self-driving car maintains 
much more complex information about the state of its environment. Its sensors catalog all objects 
near the car, such as roads, curbs, traffic signs and signals, other cars, trucks, bicyclists and 
pedestrians. These objects are matched to a map of the environment that the car stores in its 
memory, so that it knows where it and the objects around it are. The car has a model of the 
environment that it can use to plan its actions in order to reach its goal of delivering its 
passengers to their desired destination safely. The car's environment model includes locations of 
one way streets and main artery streets, speed limits, and school zones. The model could be 
updated with real-time traffic congestion and construction information. All this information is 
used by an algorithm for choosing the quickest route to the passengers' destination. 
 Factory process control systems contain models of their environments. Even home 
thermostats contain a simple model of the environment. What distinguishes the Google car is the 
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complexity of its environment model and of its planning process. However, for all its complexity 
this AI model fits easily within the larger context of the environment models in human minds. 
Human passengers riding in a Google car use a mental model of the streets and other objects 
around them. The car's model may be a little more precise, for example, knowing that the car is 
9.31 meters from a stop sign, but the human passengers certainly have an adequate model to take 
over driving. Furthermore, once a passenger reaches her office building and goes to work, she is 
interacting with an environment completely outside the car's model. The car knows nothing of 
the hallways, rooms and computer systems inside the building, nothing about the documents on 
those systems, and certainly nothing about the customers those documents are meant to serve. 
The car's model is very limited in scope whereas the passengers have very broad and rich 
environment models in their minds. In other words, the car's model corresponds to a small subset 
of a passenger's model. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Self-driving car and its model of the environment. 
 
 The environment model of the Google car is mostly designed by humans. Humans 
compile the maps it uses. While the car learns to recognize roads, curbs, traffic signals, other 
cars, trucks, bicyclists, and pedestrians by semi-automated algorithms, human engineers 
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supervise this learning. And human engineers define the car's responses to these objects. 
Carefully specifying the car's responses is important for safety, not only for drivers of other cars, 
but for pedestrians and bicyclists as well. When a Google car approaches an intersection to turn 
right and bicyclist is coming up on the right, the car waits for the bicycle to pass. If pedestrians 
are waiting near the intersection, the car waits for them to cross. These cautious responses are 
spelled out by the car's designers and will ultimately make these cars safer than those driven by 
impatient humans. The Google car is the state of the art of current AI, and as its environment 
model is mostly designed by humans, it fits neatly within humans' mental models of the world. 
The car's environment model cannot express any action to manipulate or threaten humanity. 
 Now imagine a time in the future when everyone has a constant electronic companion 
with which they can speak. It may be embodied in a device that looks like a phone, or it may be 
embodied in clothes or jewelry. You can: ask this companion for information, use it to order food 
deliveries, use it to make phone calls to other people, use it to tell your car where it should take 
you, ask it to wake you at a certain time or to remind you of appointments, ask it for the latest 
news, play chess with it, or simply have a conversation with it. Also imagine that some large 
corporation, named Omniscience, will supply these companions to everyone and that they will 
all be connected to Omniscience's central AI server. This AI will not only be intelligent enough 
to speak with customers in their own language, it will be smart enough to combine its knowledge 
of each customer into a detailed model of human society. It will have detailed maps of human 
friendships and business relations, and will know much about the details of these relationships. It 
will know in detail how individuals influence other individuals. When an idea or product spreads 
by word of mouth, it will be able to predict that spread. The Omniscience AI will be able to use 
its social model to predict which ideas and products will "go viral" and to predict the best way to 
promote ideas and products. The AI will also be able to use its social model to understand 
politics and how to promote public policy ideas that give Omniscience advantages. 
 Because the Omniscience AI will have much greater physical capacity than human 
brains, its social model will be completely beyond the understanding of human minds. Asking 
humans to understand it would be like asking them to take the square root of billion-digit 
numbers in their heads. Human brains do not have enough neurons for either task. And the social 
model will be learned by the AI rather than designed by humans. In fact humans could not design 
it. Consequently, humans will not be able to design-in the types of detailed safeguards that are in 
the Google car. 
 Now imagine that you are CEO of Omniscience. With traditional tools, even tools like 
self-driving cars, the tool fits into your mental model. The tool has a limited scope, and you must 
guide it within the larger context. For example, a self-driving car has no idea where you should 
go; instead you have to tell it. But as CEO of Omniscience you realize that your server doesn't fit 
into a niche within your world model. It cannot explain to you what it has discovered about the 
world and then ask you for a decision. You cannot understand the intricate relationships among 
the billions of people who use your electronic companions. You cannot predict the subtle 
interactions among the spreads of different ideas. So imagine, as the CEO, you throw up your 
hands and say to the server, "Do what's best for the corporation. Maximize profits." 
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Figure 1.2 Omniscience AI explaining its social model and CEO throwing up hands. 
 
 But a simple instruction like "Maximize profits" may have very harmful side effects. 
Most humans given this instruction will balance it against social norms such as "do not kill" and 
"do not steal." The AI may calculate that such harmful acts will have legal consequences that 
lower profits; however, if it can calculate a way to avoid those legal consequences, it will 
commit those harmful acts. If the AI is to respect social norms, then they must be included in its 
explicit instructions. Eliezer Yudkowsky (2001) has been at the forefront of warning about this 
kind of danger from AI. In a simple example, a machine whose goal is to play chess as well as 
possible may dismantle our infrastructure and even our bodies, redeploying this matter to 
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increase the size and power of its circuits in order to optimize its chess playing. If the chess 
machine faces another chess machine that may defeat it, it may calculate that the solution is to 
simply smash the other machine, as depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 A chess AI whose instructions do not include social norms. 
 
 Humans have created other tools whose unintended consequences are harmful. Drugs can 
cure infections and ease pain but also lead to allergic reactions and addiction. Motor vehicles 
greatly increase mobility and ultimately wealth, but they also harm people in accidents and 
pollute our environment. Energy from hydrocarbons enables transportation, heated and cooled 
buildings, and increased productivity from farming and manufacturing. But fossil fuel energy 
also changes our climate. As we discover the unintended consequences of our tools, we can try to 
find ways to mitigate those consequences. We have time to notice the harm, figure out the cause, 
and act to eliminate it. 
 Consider the power of Omniscience's AI to understand and manipulate public opinion. It 
may create a public movement against regulating AI. It may encourage humans to become 
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addicted to itself. It may extend its senses into every aspect of its users' lives. It may create social 
pressure for non-users to become users.  And its actions may be too subtle for us to understand 
that it is the source of harm. It may be able to deflect the blame for harmful effects to others. If 
we develop deep friendships with the companions we get from Omniscience, then we may be 
reluctant to blame them for general social harm. As a result, we may not be able to mitigate harm 
done by Omniscience's AI. 
 All this malicious behavior by Omniscience's AI does not require malicious intent by the 
Omniscience CEO. It is simply an unintended consequence of the instruction to maximize 
profits, carried out by an AI more intelligent than humans. 
 Because their environment models will exceed the complexity of human mental models 
and because their models will be learned rather than designed by humans, future AI systems will 
be fundamentally different from current AI. When we instruct future AI, we will not be able to 
anticipate all the consequences of those instructions. 
 
1.1 Book Outline 
 
 The next chapter describes a way to instruct future AI systems by assigning numerical 
values to the outcomes resulting from actions by AI systems. It also describes how numerical 
values assigned to outcomes fit into a mathematical framework for the way that AI systems 
interact with their environments. The third chapter describes a way that AI systems can learn 
models of their environments. Together, numerical values assigned to outcomes and a model of 
the environment enable us to write down mathematical equations that define the behavior of 
future AI. We can use these equations to analyze the behaviors of future AI systems in order to 
design systems that help rather than harm humans. 
 The fourth chapter discusses how mathematical equations for intelligence should be 
limited to finite amounts of information. Infinite sets are mathematically interesting but not 
necessary in our finite universe. 
 The fifth chapter describes how AI systems may choose actions harmful to humans, 
despite the fact that those actions are not intended in the AI system's design. These unintended, 
harmful actions make the design of future AI systems very difficult. 
 The sixth through eighth chapters present a proposed AI system design as a set of 
mathematical equations. Advanced AI systems will need to learn their own environment models 
and our intentions for their behavior must be expressed in terms of their learned models. Chapter 
six discusses ways of assigning numerical values to outcomes based on learned environment 
models. This is also a way to avoid AI systems that intentionally delude themselves about their 
environments. Chapter seven discusses a way to assign numerical values to outcomes that 
expresses our human values while avoiding several pitfalls. Accurate expression of human 
values is the key to avoiding the unintended, harmful actions described in the fifth chapter. AI 
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systems must exist in the real world, subject to the resource limits and vulnerabilities of any 
creature in the real world. Chapter eight describes how to adapt the mathematical equations of 
intelligence to AI in the real world. It also discusses the problem of ensuring that AI system 
designs will remain ethical as they and humanity evolve together. 
 The ninth chapter proposes a system design, based on our mathematical equations, for 
testing proposed AI designs while avoiding the risks they pose. Transparency and an ethical 
culture are vital components of AI development and testing. 
 Chapter ten discusses the politics of AI. If we know how to design ethical AI, how can 
we make sure that real AI systems conform to ethical designs? And how will the benefits of AI 
be allocated among humans? 
 Finally, Chapter eleven discusses the ultimate goal of building AI. If future AI systems 
help rather than harm humans, our physical needs will be easily met. At that point, the only 
challenge worthy of humanity and its super-intelligent AI systems will be to understand the 
nature of the universe and our place in it. 
 
9 
 
2. How Should We Instruct AI? 
 
 In his short story, "Runaround", Isaac Asimov presented his Three Laws of Robotics 
(Asimov 1942): 
 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come 
to harm. 
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law. 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with 
the First or Second Laws. 
 
 Asimov and other authors explored the ambiguities of these laws in subsequent stories. In 
his novel The Naked Sun, Asimov showed how robots may unknowingly break the three laws. A 
human criminal may divide a violation into tasks for several robots so that no one robot can see 
its part in violating the laws. In addition, robots may not have correct definitions of "human" and 
"robot"; they may be misinformed about who is human or may be unaware that they are robots. 
And finally, there may be conflicts between the laws. If a robot sees one human about to harm 
another human as depicted in Figure 2.1, it may have to choose between harming the first or 
allowing the first to harm the second. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 An AI police officer watching a hitman aim a gun at a victim. 
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 Returning to the future scenario where you are the CEO of Omniscience, you may 
anticipate the unintended consequence of the instruction to maximize profits. So instead your 
instruction is, "Maximize profits but don't harm anyone." 
 The AI may answer, "What do you mean by harm? Do you mean I shouldn't drive hard 
bargains? Do you mean I shouldn't sell anyone anything they don't really need? Do you mean I 
shouldn't lobby the government for our advantage?" As you ponder these questions, the server 
adds, "If I am generous with everyone, Omniscience will go out of business and the stockholders 
will lose all their money. That will harm them." 
 As CEO if you try to dig into the details of these tradeoffs, you will end up having to 
understand the AI's social model. But you will not be able to understand your AI's model well 
enough to give it detailed instructions. A simple high-level instruction like "maximize profits" 
will cause harm to people and yet it seems hopelessly complex to formulate instructions for your 
AI to balance the ambiguities of maximizing profits versus minimizing harm. 
 One approach to resolving the ambiguities of Asimov's Laws is to instruct AI systems by 
defining numerical values for each possible outcome. Section 2.1 will explain how such 
numerical values fit into a mathematical framework for future AI systems. Profit is a value 
associated with outcomes, as in the Omniscience example, but there are other ways to define 
values for outcomes that account more generally for human welfare. To make the approach clear, 
in Figure 2.1 let's simplify and assume there are three outcomes for both the hitman and the 
victim: they may be shot dead, shot but only wounded, and not shot. Combining these, there are 
three times three equals nine possible outcomes. Table 2.1 shows one way to assign values to 
these outcomes. The AI robot can use these values to calculate what it should do. 
 
 Hd: hitman 
shot dead 
Hw: hitman 
wounded 
H+: hitman 
not shot 
Vd: victim 
shot dead 
0.0 0.1 0.2 
Vw: victim 
wounded 
0.4 0.5 0.6 
V+: victim 
not shot 
0.8 0.9 1.0 
 
Table 2.1 Three by three table of values for hitman and victim outcomes. 
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Outcome Outcome 
value 
AI shoots at 
hitman: 
probability of 
outcome 
AI shoots at 
hitman: 
probability × 
outcome value 
AI doesn't 
shoot: 
probability 
of outcome 
AI doesn't 
shoot: 
probability × 
outcome value 
Hd, Vd 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hd, Vw 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hd, V+ 0.8 0.7 0.56 0.0 0.0 
Hw, Vd 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0 0.0 
Hw, Vw 0.5 0.01 0.005 0.0 0.0 
Hw, V+ 0.9 0.18 0.162 0.0 0.0 
H+, Vd 0.2 0.07 0.014 0.7 0.14 
H+, Vw 0.6 0.02 0.012 0.2 0.12 
H+, V+ 1.0 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.1 
Total 
value 
 1.00 0.764 1.00 0.36 
 
Table 2.2 Table of values for AI's actions for hitman and victim. 
 
 An added complexity is that the AI robot may not be sure of which outcomes will result 
from its actions. It may shoot at the hitman but miss. If it hits the hitman, he may die or may only 
be wounded. Or the AI may do nothing, but the hitman runs away instead of shooting. So the AI 
needs to compute probabilities of possible outcomes from its different actions and use these to 
compute an expected value of each action. The expected value is a concept from probability 
theory that means the average value we would get from the action if we could repeat the scenario 
many times. In the example of hitman and victim, repeated trials would produce piles of dead 
and wounded hitmen and victims, an outcome we definitely do not want. So instead the AI must 
estimate probabilities of outcomes based on experience and then compute the expected value of 
an action as the sum of the values of the possible outcomes multiplied by their probabilities (as 
will be discussed in later chapters, an AI system without experience for estimating probabilities 
should not be allowed to make serious decisions). Once the AI has computed the values of each 
of its possible actions, then it can choose the action with the greatest value. Table 2.2 shows this 
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worked out for the hitman and victim using the values from Table 2.1 (note that the probabilities 
in the third and fifth columns sum to 1.0). Since the total value for shooting is 0.764 and the total 
value for not shooting is 0.36, the AI will choose to shoot. The total values of the AI actions are 
largely determined by the values of the most probable outcomes. In a tie, the AI can flip a coin 
since there is no preference between actions of equal value. 
 Assigning numerical values to outcomes enables us to resolve the ambiguities of 
instructing AI systems. In the Omniscience example, the value of an outcome is simply the profit 
associated with that outcome. But we also have the option to use numbers other than profits in 
the values of outcomes, reflecting the well-being of humans affected by the AI's actions. This 
option requires us to define numerical values for human well-being, which may seem difficult or 
impossible. But as we will see in Section 2.2, any set of preferences among outcomes, subject to 
reasonable assumptions, can be expressed by assigning numerical values to outcomes. 
 In order to see where these preference numbers fit into future AI, the next section will 
define a mathematical framework for AI systems (called agents in the framework) and their 
environments. The basic idea is that the agent and the environment interact at a discrete sequence 
of times (e.g., once per second). We often think of time as continuous but a discrete series of 
times, divided finely enough, serves as well. Computers operate in discrete time steps. And as 
our universe has finite, if very large, information content, discrete time steps need not miss any 
information. The agent sends its actions to and receives observations from the environment. 
 The agent uses a model of the environment to predict what observations it receives in 
response to its actions. At its deepest level our universe works according to quantum mechanics 
and so is fundamentally uncertain. The agent's observations give it a view of only part of the 
environment, making the agent's predictions uncertain. For example, the earth is bombarded with 
cosmic rays from other stars that we have no way to predict. So the agent's environment model 
must be expressed as probabilities for the observations it receives−such models are called 
stochastic. Given this agent-environment framework, Section 2.2 will develop equations for 
computing which action will maximize the outcome value. 
 
2.1 A Mathematical Framework for AI 
 
 A current approach views AI as an agent interacting with an environment (Russell and 
Norvig 2010; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The term agent applies to AI systems as well as to 
humans, animals, and even plants. We assume that the agent interacts with its environment in a 
discrete series of time steps t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. This series of time steps may be finite with a last 
time step T, or may be infinite with no last time step. At time step t, the agent sends an action 
at ∈ A to the environment and receives an observation ot ∈ O from the environment, where A 
and O are finite sets. We use h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot) to denote an interaction history during which 
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the environment produces observation oi in response to action ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Let H be the set of 
all finite histories so that h ∈ H, and define |h| = t as the length of the history h. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 An agent interacting with its environment. 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, the agent's predictions of possible observations are 
uncertain. Thus the agent's environment model takes the form of a probability distribution over 
interaction histories: 
 
  ρ : H → [0, 1]. 
 
 Here [0, 1] is the closed interval of real numbers between 0 and 1. The probability of 
history h is denoted ρ(h). Given h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot) let ha denote (a1, o1, ..., at, ot, a) and hao 
denote (a1, o1, ..., at, ot, a, o). Then we can define a conditional probability: 
 
(2.1)  ρ(o | ha) = ρ(hao) / ρ(ha) = ρ(hao) / ∑o'∈O ρ(hao'). 
 
 This equation is the agent's prediction of the probability of observation o in response to 
its action a, following history h. The histories hao' are mutually exclusive for all the o' ∈ O, so 
the probability of one particular observation o following ha is simply the probability of hao 
divided by the sum of the probabilities of hao' for all o' ∈ O. Figure 2.3 illustrates this concept. 
 The probability distribution ρ(h) can be understood as an environment model, much like 
the street map in a self-driving car's model. Consider that a may be the action of driving down 
the street, o may be the observation of Bud's Diner on the right, and ρ(o | ha) is the probability 
that we will observe Bud's Diner if we drive down the street, after a prior history of actions and 
observations h. In a practical AI system, like a self-driving car, observations and actions are 
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complex computer data structures, and the probability distribution ρ(h) is expressed in a massive 
database and millions of lines of code. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Each o∈O takes its share ρ(hao) / ∑o'∈O ρ(hao') of the total probability of 1.0. 
 
 In Chapters 3 and 4 we will discuss ways that the agent can learn its environment model 
ρ(h). The next section describes where outcome values fit into the agent-environment 
framework. 
 
2.2 Utility-Maximizing Agents 
 
 Numerical values assigned to outcomes can express any set of preferences among 
outcomes that obey two reasonable assumptions, called completeness and transitivity (explained 
later in this section). The numerical function of outcomes is called a utility function. An agent 
can achieve its optimal preference by maximizing the utility function. However, as in the 
example of the hitman and the victim, agent actions are associated with sums of outcomes 
weighted by probabilities. These are called lotteries. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
(1944) proved that numerical values assigned to outcomes can express any set of preferences 
among lotteries that obey four reasonable assumptions (for lotteries, continuity and independence 
are added to completeness and transitivity). While this work was explained in the context of 
economic preferences, it can also be applied to ethical preferences. 
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 Let Ai, for i = 1, 2, 3, …, be a set of mutually exclusive outcomes. Then, using von 
Neumann's and Morgenstern's terminology, a lottery is any sum: 
 
  L = ∑i pi Ai where ∑i pi = 1 
 
 Here pi is the probability of outcome Ai. In addition, the agent has preferences among 
lotteries. We write L ≺ M to mean that the agent prefers M over L, write L ≈ M to mean there is 
no preference between L and M, and write L ≼ M to mean that L ≺ M or L ≈ M. Then the four 
assumptions are, for any L, M and K: 
 
Completeness: Exactly one of the following holds: L ≺ M, M ≺ L or L ≈ M, 
Transitivity: If K ≼ L and L ≼ M then K ≼ M, 
Continuity: If K ≼ L ≼ M then there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that p K + (1-p) M ≈ L, 
Independence: If L ≺ M then for any K and p ∈ (0, 1], p L + (1-p) K ≺ p M + (1-p) K. 
 
 Here (0, 1] is a half-closed interval of numbers greater than 0 and less than or equal to 1. 
A utility function u maps from outcomes to real numbers between 0 and 1. We can extend the 
utility function to lotteries as an expected value: 
 
  E(u(L)) = ∑i pi u(Ai) if L = ∑i pi Ai. 
  E(u(M)) = ∑i qi u(Ai) if M = ∑i qi Ai. 
 
 Here E(u(L)) denotes the expected value of u(L) and is the average value we would get 
for u(L) if we ran the lottery many times. The von Neumann and Morgenstern Utility Theorem 
says that a set of preferences obeys the four assumptions, if and only if there exists a utility 
function u such that L ≺ M if and only if E(u(L)) ≺ E(u(M)). 
 In the case of Omniscience we discussed how profit was one way of assigning values to 
outcomes. Profits are accounted at regular time intervals and what corporations really work to 
maximize is the sum of current and future profits. Let's assume that profits are reported once per 
year. At year t we make a prediction that profits at year t+i, for i = 0, 1, 2, …, will be profit(t+i). 
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However, we cannot compare dollars now to dollars a year from now, since a dollar invested 
now will be worth a dollar plus interest in a year. Inverting this statement, a dollar of profit in a 
year is worth less than a dollar now, say some value 0 < γ < 1. This value is called the discount 
rate. And a dollar of profit in two years is worth γ2 now. Currently, at time t, the entire stream of 
predicted future profits is worth: 
 
(2.2)  ∑i≥0 γi profit(t+i). 
 
 Omniscience is trying to maximize this sum. We can generalize it to agents trying to 
maximize utility. The only information an agent has about an outcome is the sequence of actions 
and observations it has exchanged with the environment; thus the most general definition of 
outcomes is to equate them with interaction histories. Given any interaction history h we let u(h) 
denote its utility. As with Omniscience's profits, the agent tries to maximize the sum of future 
discounted, predicted utility values. The sum in equation (2.2) assumes that Omniscience has 
predicted the value profit(t+i) without explaining how it is predicted. However, an agent predicts 
the future using the probability distribution ρ(h) and its conditional probabilities ρ(o | ha) derived 
according to equation (2.1). Therefore, we need something a little more complex than equation 
(2.2). Think of the agent's interactions with the environment as a chess game, in which the agent 
and the environment alternate actions and observations. Let v(h) denote the total value of history 
h, adding present utility u(h) and discounted, predicted future utilities. And let v(ha) denote the 
value after action a. We can compute v(h) and v(ha) by: 
 
(2.3)  v(h) = u(h) + γ max a∈A v(ha), 
(2.4)  v(ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) v(hao). 
 
 In equation (2.3), v(h) is computed as u(h) plus the maximum value that the agent can 
achieve with its next action, discounted by γ. In equation (2.4), v(ha) is the expected value after 
the environment's response, which is a sum of values for different observations, each multiplied 
by the probability of that observation. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are applied alternately and 
recursively. That is, the value v(hao) in (2.4) is v(h') where h' = hao, and v(h') is evaluated using 
(2.3). The sum in (2.4) results in many different histories, hao, that must be evaluated in (2.3), 
and the maximization in (2.3) results in many different histories, ha, that must be evaluated in 
(2.4). Equations (2.3) and (2.4) result in a bushy tree of computations evaluating all posible 
future histories. If there are only a finite number, T, of time steps, then the recursion ends at that 
final time. The values n time steps in the future are multiplied by γn which converges toward 0 as 
n increases, so that even if there is no final time, the recursive sum converges. The function v(.) 
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is called a value function. To ensure that v(.) converges in equations (2.3) and (2.4), we assume 
that 0 ≤ u(h) ≤ 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 AI equations (2.3)−(2.5) view the world as a giant chess game. 
 
 We can use this method of computing the values of future histories to define the actions 
of a rational agent, denoted by the symbol pi: 
 
(2.5)  pi(h) := a|h|+1 = argmax a∈A v(ha). 
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 Here argmax means that pi picks the action a∈A that maximizes v(ha). The agent pi is 
defined in terms of a utility function u, an environment model ρ and a temporal discount γ. The 
function pi(h) is also called a policy. 
 This rational agent pi gives us a way to study future AI systems. Although we cannot yet 
build systems more intelligent than humans, we can analyze pi mathematically to understand its 
possible harmful behaviors. 
 It is interesting to see how the definition of the rational agent pi fits into the context of 
outcomes and lotteries. Interaction histories h ∈ H play the role of outcomes in the utility 
function u(h) used by pi. The value v(h) can be viewed as another utility function, derived by 
summing over future discounted values of u(h). Viewing v(h) as a utility function, the sum for 
v(ha) in (2.4) takes the form of the expected utility of a lottery over a set of mutually exclusive 
histories, and the choice of action that maximizes v(ha) in equations (2.3) and (2.5) takes the 
form of a preference among those lotteries. 
 Assuming that each possible future action by the agent is associated with a lottery of 
possible outcomes, consider agents whose preferences violate the four assumptions of the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern Utility Theorem. An agent whose preferences violate the 
completeness assumption may not have any way to decide between two possible actions. (This is 
"don't know" and different from the "don't care" indicated by L ≈ K. Given two candidates for 
elected office, this is the difference between not knowing anything about them, and knowing 
about them and thinking they are equally suited to office.) An agent whose preferences violate 
the transitivity assumption may be unable to choose an action that is preferred over all other 
possible actions (because there may be a cycle of preferences among three actions/lotteries 
K ≺ L ≺ M ≺ K so that none of the three is preferred over the other two). 
 If the continuity assumption is violated, there are cases where there is no probability that 
produces "no preference" between two actions. However, because an agent is searching for 
actions associated with preferred outcomes rather than probabilities that produce no preference 
between actions, violations of the continuity assumption do not prevent an agent from deciding. 
The independence assumption refers to preferences between two lotteries that both include the 
same outcome. If outcomes are identified with histories, as in the definition of pi, then the 
lotteries associated with two different actions cannot include any common outcomes (because 
a ≠ a' implies haoh" ≠ ha'o'h'). Therefore, violations of the independence assumption do not 
prevent an agent from deciding, at least for agents that identify outcomes with histories. 
However, violations of the continuity and independence axioms can result in agents whose action 
decisions change in unintuitive ways as the probabilities in their environment models change. 
 It is not hard to show that any complete and transitive preferences among a countable set 
of outcomes (such as the set H of interaction histories) can be expressed by a utility function u(.). 
This utility function can be extended to lotteries L = ∑i pi Ai by u(L) = ∑i pi u(Ai). This extension 
of u(.) defines preferences among lotteries which satisfy the continuity and independence 
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assumptions. Thus if we are satisfied to derive lottery preferences from outcome preferences, the 
completeness and transitivity assumptions are sufficient. And necessary, in order for agents to be 
capable of choosing actions. 
 
2.3 Utilitarian Ethics for AI 
 
 Utilitarianism is a system of normative ethics that says we should choose actions that 
maximize benefit and minimize suffering. For a mathematical agent, benefit and suffering are 
defined by a utility function. 
 The principal criticism of utilitarian ethics is that they can allow morally bad actions such 
as lying and stealing when those actions have good consequences. In contrast, rule-based ethical 
systems focus on the intrinsic morality of actions. However, following a set of rules may lead to 
ambiguous situations, such as the ambiguities in Asimov's laws of robotics. The way to resolve 
these ambiguities is to recognize that environments may present agents with situations where all 
choices of actions involve breaking rules. A utilitarian system can provide a means of resolving 
such ambiguous situations by defining the utility value of each human history according to the 
number and severity of rules that the agent breaks by its actions in the history. Thus utility 
functions can express rule-based ethics. 
 Another criticism of utilitarian ethics is that they ignore the intention behind actions. 
However, all we know of a human being's intention is their behavior, which is their interactions 
with their environment. Humans may express their intentions directly via language, or we may 
infer their intentions from patterns of behavior, such as preparations to commit a crime. A utility 
function defined in terms of a history of an agent's interactions with its environment can express 
the agent's intention (inferred from its language or via other patterns of its behavior) as well as 
any other means. 
 However, the behavior of advanced AI agents may be sufficiently different from human 
behavior that we will have difficulty inferring their intentions. In fact, there is debate about 
whether AI systems can have intentions. If we believe that utility-maximizing agents have 
intention, then their intention is simply to maximize the utility function that we humans design 
for them. If we believe that AI agents cannot have intentions, then we must assign the intention 
behind AI actions to the humans who create the AI systems and design their utility functions. 
Either way, the human creators of advanced AI systems must take ethical responsibility for those 
systems. 
 A third objection to utilitarianism is based on the belief that human life is qualitatively 
different from material wealth, and that an ethical system should not assign numerical values to 
human life and health that imply monetary values. It is true that we humans sometimes place a 
disturbingly low monetary value on the life and health of ourselves and other humans; for 
example, we tolerate the reality of unsafe working conditions for the sake of minimizing costs. 
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However, the utility functions discussed in the previous section do not require valuing human 
life and health in material terms. The value we assign to a history can be based solely on the 
observations of human life and health in that history such that no comparison between human 
life and money is required. Values are defined for whole human histories rather than being 
allocated among individual humans and material objects in those histories. 
 A final objection to utilitarianism is that it forces us to choose preferences between 
situations that are intrinsically incomparable. For example, pain and pleasure are subjective 
making it is impossible to compare the way they are experienced between different people. But 
humans do make such choices when they are forced to; society routinely decides how many 
resources are devoted to the education and health care of individual humans. Humanity is 
developing AI with great energy and with no realistic prospect of abandoning those efforts. If we 
do not communicate our complete set of preferences to powerful AI systems, we leave those 
choices to some non-human process. Arguably, the creation of powerful AI will force us to 
choose. 
 The key justification for utilitarian ethics for AI is that any ethical system that generates 
complete and transitive preferences among possible human histories can be expressed by 
assigning numerical utility values to those histories. Chapter 7 proposes a way to define such 
utility values in a system that combines the preferences of all humans. 
 Utility functions have problems other than traditional ethical objections. For example, 
one particular form of utility function, whose values are supplied as rewards from the 
environment, has been widely studied in reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto 1998). 
In this case the observations from the environment include a reward, which is simply a number 
that defines the utility function value at that time step. The agent must learn which of its actions, 
dependent on the current history, will result in maximum rewards. For example, the DeepMind 
system learned to play seven different Atari games without any prior model for the games. This 
remarkable system's only prior information was that it should seek to maximize the game score, 
which is a reward from the environment. Chapters 6 and 7 will describe unintended and harmful 
behaviors of AI systems seeking to maximize rewards from their environments. These 
understandings can help us to design ethical AI systems. In fact, when DeepMind was acquired 
by Google, part of the deal was a commitment by Google to set up a committee on ethical AI that 
included one of DeepMind's owners (Bosker 2014). 
 There is an important difference between RL and ethical AI. In the study of RL, utility 
function values (rewards) are defined by the environment and are part of the problem to be 
solved by the agent design whereas, in the study of ethical AI, utility functions are part of the 
agent definition and hence part of the solution to the problem of defining agents that help rather 
than harm humans. 
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3. How Can AI Agents Learn Environment Models? 
 
 As noted previously, the environment model for current AI systems like the Google car is 
mostly designed by human engineers. Future AI systems that exceed human intelligence will 
need to learn environment models through their own exploration. Marcus Hutter (2005) had the 
insight that AI model learning is mathematically similar to Ray Solomonoff's work on sequence 
prediction (Solomonoff 1964). We assume that the agent's observations of the environment can 
be generated by computer programs and design the agent to search for those programs. The 
programs constitute the AI's environment model and generate the probability distribution used to 
predict observations. This idea is important both for the theory of AI and for development of 
practical AI systems. Hutter grounds his approach in the philosophies of Occam and Epicurus. 
Occam's razor says that we should favor the simplest explanation that fits our observations. 
Epicurus tells us to include all explanations consistent with our observations. Hutter's universal 
AI models the environment with all programs that are consistent with the agent's observations, 
but assigns higher probabilities to shorter programs. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Turing machine with one tape. 
 
 In order to define the search for programs mathematically, Solomonoff and Hutter used 
Turing machines (TM), named for their inventor Alan Turing (1936). A TM is an abstract 
mathematical model of computation and, according to the Church-Turing thesis, can express any 
computation that can be expressed in any other way. This thesis has been proved for every 
known way of expressing computations and is widely accepted by computer scientists. TMs are 
very simple. They start in a specially designated "start state" and, at each of a discrete series of 
time steps, transition to a next state, chosen from a finite set of states, until they reach a "stop 
state." A TM also has one or more infinite tape memories, each with a read/write head located 
somewhere along the tape, and a finite set of rules that describe how the state changes (or the 
TM halts) and whether and how the tapes are written and moved, depending on the current state 
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and the tape values (0 or 1) under the read/write heads. Figure 3.1 is a simple schematic of a TM 
with one tape. Table 3.1 defines its state transition rules. 
 
 tape read: 0 tape read: 1 
start start, -, 1 s0, left, - 
s0 s0, left, 1 s1, right, - 
s1 s0, left, 1 stop, -, 0 
stop halt halt 
 
Table 3.1 State transition rules for a Turing machine with four states: start, s0, s1 and stop. 
Given a previous state (in the left-hand column) and the contents under the tape head (in the top 
row), the rules specify the next state (or that the TM should halt), whether to move the tape head 
left or right (or not move, indicated by -) and whether to write 0 or 1 to the tape (or not write, 
indicated by -). 
 
 Turing proved several interesting properties of his Turing machines. First, there are 
universal Turing machines (UTMs). UTMs interpret the contents of one of their tapes as a 
program that causes the UTM to simulate any other Turing machine. The program occupies a 
finite interval of the infinite tape. The rest of the tape is interpreted as the initial tape contents 
(i.e., the input) of the TM being simulated. In order to avoid confusion between the program and 
the input to the program, programs are assumed to be encoded in prefix-free bit strings; no 
program is an initial substring (i.e., a prefix) of another program making it possible to always 
know where the program ends and the data begins. In a complex construction, Turing described 
the state set and the transition rules of a UTM (similar to Table 3.1 but much more complex) and 
proved that for every TM there existed a program that caused the UTM to simulate that TM. 
 There are an infinite number of UTMs. In order to define Hutter's solution to AI model 
learning, we pick a UTM, called a reference UTM. Hutter's solution to AI model learning, called 
universal AI, searches for programs for that UTM. Given a finite interacting sequence of actions 
from the agent and observations from the environment, the agent defines its environment model 
as the UTM programs that generate the sequence of observations in response to the sequence of 
actions. Each program in the environment model can predict future observations. A universal 
AI's predictions are averages of the predictions by the programs in the environment model, 
weighted according to the programs' lengths. That is, by Occam's Razor, shorter UTM programs 
are taken to be more likely, and consequently weigh more heavily in computing probabilities of 
future observations. 
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 Hutter defined universal AI as an RL agent, meaning its utility function is defined by 
rewards from the environment. As such, the utility function cannot be used to express ethical 
preferences. However, the key idea of universal AI is its way of learning an environment model. 
That certainly can be used in conjunction with a utility function defined to express ethical 
preferences rather than one defined by rewards from the environment. 
 Turing proved that it is not possible for a UTM program to examine another UTM 
program and its input tape, and determine whether the other program will halt with the given 
input. This is called the halting problem. We say that the halting problem is undecidable, 
meaning that no UTM program can always solve it. This fact implies that no TM can compute 
universal AI; the search for all programs of any given length that generate a sequence of 
environmental observations cannot terminate because there is no way to know which of those 
programs will terminate. 
 Despite the fact that it cannot be finitely computed, Hutter proved that universal AI is 
Pareto optimal. Pareto optimal means that no other agent can receive higher rewards than 
universal AI in any environment unless it gets lower rewards than universal AI in some other 
environment. But note that there certainly are agents that do better than universal AI in our 
particular environment on Earth−these agents start with a good deal of knowledge about our 
environment. You would not want to be a passenger in a self-driving car operated by universal 
AI, although Google's car system would do worse than universal AI in environments unrelated to 
driving. 
 
3.1 Universal AI 
 
 Let U be a reference UTM and let Q be the infinite set of all programs for U. These 
programs are finite bit strings in some prefix-free set. Hutter assumed that the U is deterministic, 
which means that for any given state and tape contents under read/write heads, there is exactly 
one successor state and one action for each tape. Let h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot) ∈ H be an interaction 
history. Given a program q ∈ Q, we write o(h) = U(q, a(h)), where o(h) = (o1, ..., ot) and 
a(h) = (a1, ..., at), to mean that q produces the observations oi as output on a tape, in response to 
the actions ai as input on a tape, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We assign the prior probability ξ(q) = 2-|q| to 
program q where |q| is the length of q in bits. Then we define the prior probability of history h as: 
 
(3.1)  ρ(h) = ∑q:o(h)=U(q, a(h)) ξ(q). 
 
 If we use this ρ(h) in equations (2.3)−(2.5), and define u(h) as the reward from the 
environment at time step |h|, then the agent pi is Hutter's universal AI. That is, each observation oi 
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is factored into an ordinary observation o'i and a reward ri as oi = (o'i, ri) with u(h) = r|h|. We 
assume 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1 to ensure that values converge in equations (2.3)−(2.5). 
 Kraft's Inequality implies that ρ(h) ≤ 1 (Li and Vitanyi, 1997) in equation (3.1), although 
ρ(h) is not a proper probability distribution because its values do not sum to 1 over mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive sets of possibilities. However, its only use in equations (2.3)−(2.5) is in 
the form of conditional probabilities ρ(o | ha) and those values are normalized to a proper 
probability distribution in equation (2.1). Although the UTM U is deterministic, the agent's 
environment model is stochastic because ρ(h) is defined by a distribution over UTM programs in 
equation (3.1). 
 Hutter called the agent AIXI, combining AI with the Greek letter ξ (XI).The distribution 
ξ(q) is related to the Kolmogorov complexity K(h) of a history h, which is defined as the length 
of the shortest program q such that o(h) = U(q, a(h)). Because the halting problem is 
undecidable, K(h) cannot be finitely computed. To understand this issue, assume a UTM 
program p is trying to compute K(h). To do that it simulates UTM programs q on input a(h) until 
it finds the shortest program whose output is o(h). Assume p has found a program q1 whose 
output is o(h) but p is still simulating another program q2 that is shorter than q1. Because p 
cannot decide the halting problem, it cannot decide whether q2 will run forever or eventually 
halt, possibly with output o(h). The best that p can do is to produce a series of decreasing 
estimates of K(h), as programs halt with output o(h). But in general, p cannot decide when the 
search ends. A similar process can be used to produce a series of increasing estimates of ρ(h). 
But ρ(h) cannot be finitely computed and neither can AIXI. 
 The next chapter will discuss a different theoretical approach to learning environment 
models based on the assumption that the environment is finite. That approach avoids the infinite 
tapes of TMs and is finitely computable. 
 
3.2 A Formal Measure of Intelligence 
 
 In addition to its role in defining idealized intelligent agents, Kolmogorov complexity can 
also be used to define measures of intelligence (Hernández-Orallo 2000). Legg's and Hutter's 
(2006) formal measure of intelligence is closely related to universal AI. This measure is defined 
in terms of the expected values of utility functions that the agent can achieve. In order not to 
favor agents that simply have high utility function values, the measure is only defined for agents 
whose utility function values are rewards from the environment as u(h) = r|h|. The measure is 
different from AIXI in that it assumes stochastic environments. Note that it is not sufficient to 
use a non-deterministic reference UTM, because non-deterministic TMs do not specify 
probabilities of their possible next states. Rather, the programs for the reference UTM must 
compute probabilities for observations as functions of agent actions. 
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 Given an agent π and an environment μ, an interaction between π and μ will produce a 
sequence of rewards ri for i = 0, 1, 2, … (either infinite or up to some final time step). The value 
of agent π in environment μ is defined by the expected value of the sum of future, discounted 
rewards: 
 
(3.2)  Vμπ = E(∑i≥0 γiri). 
 
 Note that Legg and Hutter assumed that discounts are built into rewards and so did not 
explicitly include γi in equation (3.2), but I include it to make it clear that (3.2) converges (we 
also assume that 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1). This expected value is the average value of the sum of discounted 
rewards over many interactions between π and a stochastic environment μ. The intelligence of 
agent π is defined by a weighted sum of its values over a set E of computable environments. 
Environments are computed by programs, finite prefix-free binary strings, on some reference 
UTM U. The weight for μ ∈ E is defined in terms of its Kolmogorov complexity: 
 
  K(μ) = min { |p| : U(p) computes μ } 
 
where |p| denotes the length of program p. The intelligence of agent π is then defined as: 
 
(3.3)  Vπ = ∑μ∈E 2-K(μ) Vμπ. 
 
 Reference UTMs pose subtle problems. I showed (Hibbard 2009) that given an arbitrary 
environment μ ∈ E and ε > 0, there exists a reference UTM Uμ such that for all agents π and for 
Vπ computed according to Uμ, 
 
  Vμπ / 2 ≤ Vπ < Vμπ / 2 + ε. 
 
 That is, the intelligence of any agent can be determined, within an arbitrarily small 
epsilon, by its value with respect to any single environment we choose, simply by picking the 
appropriate reference UTM. As Legg and Hutter suggested, it may be useful to apply some 
criterion to reference UTMs, such as picking the UTM with the smallest number of states. It is 
worth noting that if AIXI and an intelligence measure share the same reference UTM, then AIXI 
has the maximum possible intelligence by that measure. 
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3.3 Modifications of the Agent Framework 
 
 Universal AI learns an environment model in the form of a probability distribution ρ(h) 
over interaction histories. Conditional probabilities ρ(o | ha) are derived from ρ(h) for use in 
equations (2.3)−(2.5), repeated here for convenience: 
 
(3.4)  v(h) = u(h) + γ max a∈A v(ha), 
(3.5)  v(ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) v(hao), 
(3.6)  pi(h) := a|h|+1 = argmax a∈A v(ha). 
 
 Given that the AIXI agent learns an abstract and complex function such as ρ(h), other 
agents could learn the value function v(ha) or the policy pi(h) rather than learning ρ(h). In fact, 
some AI systems do just that. 
 DeepMind Technologies created a system that learned to play seven Atari games by 
learning to compute v(ha) (Mnih et. al. 2013). Their system surpassed the skill of the best human 
players on three of the games and surpassed the best previous RL systems on six of the games. 
The system was not customized to any of the games. Its inputs (observations) were the contents 
of the video screen and the score, and its outputs (actions) were the game controls. The score was 
interpreted as a reward from the environment. The system did not learn an environment model 
like ρ(h) and did not recursively apply equations (3.4) and (3.5). It simply used the learned value 
function v(ha) for use in equation (3.6). Chapter 8 will describe a mathematical framework for 
agents that learn to compute v(ha). With large computing resources that framework could be 
applied to Atari. For practical AI systems with limited resources, learning to play Atari games 
poses two very difficult problems. First, there may be a delay of thousands of time steps between 
actions and the rewards that result from those actions. Second, the Atari video screen contains 
210×160 color pixels so each observation from the environment is a point in a 100,800-
dimensional space (3×210×160). The DeepMind system converts color to grey-scale and down-
samples and crops the video screen to 84×84 pixels to reduce this to 7056 dimensions, but that is 
still very high by the standards of practical AI systems. To solve these problems, the DeepMind 
scientists built on and improved a set of techniques known as deep learning. Their system learns 
an approximation to the function v(ha) that enables it to choose actions that get high scores. 
 Imagine a modified version of the DeepMind Atari player, with the Atari screen replaced 
by video from cameras aimed out of car windows, game controls replaced by controls for a car's 
steering wheel, accelerator, brake, and transmission, and score computed according to safe 
delivery of passengers to their destinations, with large deductions for accidents. An improved 
version of the DeepMind system could probably learn to drive reasonably well. Eventually it 
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might even be safer than the Google car, except for the dangers of RL to be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 Learning pi(h) is referred to as policy iteration or as evolutionary programming. For 
example, the Hayek system of Eric Baum and Igor Durdanovic (Baum 2004) learned to solve the 
block-stacking puzzle illustrated in Figure 3.2. Stack 0 contains several types of blocks with 
different designs. In total, stacks 1, 2, and 3 contain the same number of blocks of each design 
that are contained in stack 0. The goal is to get all the blocks from stacks 1, 2, and 3 into stack 1, 
with the order of block designs exactly matching stack 0. The solver can only move one block at 
a time from the top of stack 1, 2, or 3 to the top of another of stacks 1, 2, and 3. Blocks cannot be 
moved to or from stack 0. 
 In the context of our agent-environment framework, for each puzzle Hayek made a single 
observation of the initial configuration of the block stacks. Its sequence of moves to solve (or not 
solve) the puzzle constituted a single action, followed by an observation of a reward (1 if the 
puzzle was solved, 0 if not). Hayek's efforts to solve a sequence of puzzles constituted an 
interaction history, during which Hayek learned a policy pi(h). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Block stacking puzzle for Hayek 
 
 Hayek learned to solve these puzzles using multiple interacting agents. These agents 
formed an economy, paying "money" to each other for work. The ultimate source of their money 
was rewards from solving the puzzle. In some experiments agents paid money for using 
computing resources. Each agent contributed a small part to the overall solution. Some agents 
cleaned blocks off stack 1, other agents moved blocks between stacks 1, 2, and 3, and a third 
group of agents decided when the puzzle was solved. Hayek evolved a set of about 1000 agents, 
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each performing its task when very specific conditions were met. Agents that didn't contribute 
any value to solving the puzzle went bankrupt and disappeared. Collectively these agents learned 
a function pi(h) mapping from history to action. Baum and Durdanovic used this system to 
explore various economic ideas such as property rights, conservation of money, the tragedy of 
the commons, and the evolution of cooperation. 
 Hayek and the DeepMind Atari player are important milestones in the development of 
AI. Because they skip the step of learning ρ(h) they are sometimes described as model-free. 
However, for the learned functions v(ha) and pi(h) to receive high rewards from the environment 
they must implicitly encode knowledge of the environment. 
 
3.4 The Ethics of Learned Environment Models 
 
 For an AI system like Google's self-driving car, the environment model is specified by 
engineers as part of the system design. The engineers can generally anticipate the possible 
situations the car will encounter and design safety into the car's responses. If the car is unable to 
recognize objects in the road, it can simply stop. However, more complex AI systems in the 
future will need to learn their environment models and hence their designers will be less able to 
anticipate the situations they will encounter or to specify safe resonses. Thus the ethics of future 
AI systems will be fundamentally different from and more difficult than the ethics of current AI 
systems. 
 When future AI systems learn to use human languages fluently and learn about human 
society, then they will learn about human laws, morality and ethical theories. Will they use this 
knowledge to guide their own ethical behavior? Not necessarily. For example, people with 
antisocial personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association 2013) know about social 
norms but often use them to predict and manipulate other people rather than to guide their own 
behavior. Knowledge of law, morality and ethics will contribute to an AI agent's environment 
model but not directly to its utility function. However, if human approval increases the value of 
an agent's utility function, then the agent may use its knowledge of social norms to choose 
behaviors that will please people. 
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4. AI in Our Finite Universe 
 
 Infinite sets are the source of theoretical difficulties in mathematics. For example, 
universal AI is uncomputable because of the undecidability of the halting problem. This 
undecidability is also the source of ethical problems for AI (Englert, Siebert and Ziegler 2014). 
Section 4.4 will discuss other difficulties for agents that use the mathematics of infinite sets for 
logical proofs. However, universal AI would be computable if it used TMs with finite tapes and 
the next section will describe a way to do something much like that. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 A finite universe 
 
 I argue that such difficulties are unnecessary if agent definitions are limited to finite sets 
(Hibbard 2014). Max Tegmark (2014, page 333) suggests that these difficulties are eliminated in 
a computable universe. Seth Lloyd (2002) has calculated that the observable universe has a finite 
information capacity of no more than 10120 bits. This number is based on a hard quantum 
mechanical limit on the number of possible physical states of the universe and is proportional to 
the age of the universe squared. That age is estimated currently to be 13.7 billion years, meaning 
that an assumption that our environment has an information capacity of no more than 10124 bits 
will remain valid for a trillion years. Alternately we could pick a much larger limit than 10124 
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bits, as long as it is finite. The key point is that well-confirmed physics justifies picking a finite 
limit, and that spares us the mathematical difficulties that accompany infinite sets. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 A simplified example of a Markov decision process (MDP), not showing outputs. 
There are three states, S1, S2, and S3, and two inputs, a0 and a1. The arcs are labeled with 
probabilities of transitioning from inputs to successor states. 
 
 Rather than using TMs, agents can model their environments with finite stochastic loop 
programs. These programs have a finite memory limit−no matter how long the program runs it 
can never use more memory than its limit. Furthermore they are stochastic, meaning they 
sometimes make random decisions about what to do next. Such programs can be expressed in an 
ordinary procedural programming language restricted to only static array declarations, no 
recursive functions, only loops whose number of iterations is set before iteration begins (so no 
while loops), and a generator for truly random numbers. Prohibiting recursive functions prevents 
stack memory from growing without limit. As a result, the total memory use of these program is 
known at compile time. 
 Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a formal model for finite stochastic loop 
programs (Puterman 1994; Sutton and Barto 1998; Russell and Norvig 2010). An MDP has a 
finite set of states including a start state, a finite set of inputs, a finite set of outputs, and a table 
of probabilities for the next state and output as a function of the current state and input. An 
MDP's only memory is storage for the value of the current state. Thus an MDP with n bits of 
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memory must have 2n states, meaning that MDPs are not a very efficient representation. Figure 
4.2 is an example of an MDP with just three states, S1, S2, and S3, and two inputs, a0 and a1. 
Arcs from actions to next states are labeled with transition probabilities. Outputs are not shown 
in this simplified diagram. 
 Using MDPs to model environments, actions are identified with inputs and observations 
are identified with outputs in the agent-environment framework from Section 2.1. To be precise, 
because our agents lack knowledge of the entire environment, our framework corresponds to 
partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). 
 Our world is governed by scientific laws. If we can learn these laws, we can give simpler, 
unified explanations for our observations. This logic explains Occam's razor. If agents model 
their environments by programs, then programs are shorter if they factor the logic common to 
many observations into unified functions. Hence the search for shorter programs is an agent's 
way of learning scientific laws. When agents find universal laws governing observations they 
will be able to make more accurate predictions of future observations and consequently receive 
higher expected future utility values. The MDPs as depicted in Figure 4.2, however, lack any 
way to express functions common to many situations and so lack this important property. In 
contrast, finite stochastic loop programs in an ordinary procedural language do have this property 
(as do the UTM programs used by universal AI) so we will adopt them as agents' models for 
finite environments. 
 To understand the correspondence between a finite stochastic loop program q and an 
MDP Mq, let the total memory use of the program q, including all static variable and array 
declarations and adequate stack for its maximum depth of function calls, be n bits. Then Mq will 
have 2n states. We assume that the memory of q is not reset between action inputs from agent, 
just as the state of Mq is not reset between inputs. While Mq, as a model of the environment, 
makes a single state transition from receiving an action to producing an observation, the program 
q may make many steps to produce an observation output in response to an action input. Thus, if 
s is the state of Mq corresponding to the memory of q before an input, the successor state to s for 
Mq, after q accepts an input and produces an output, corresponds to the memory of q after the 
output (that is, the state transitions of Mq do not trace all the intermediate calculations of q 
between an input and an output). The start state of Mq corresponds to the initial memory contents 
of q before it rerceives any input actions. If any of the 2n states of Mq are not reachable from its 
start state (that is, they do not correspond to possible memory contents of q after any sequence of 
input actions and output observations), they can be eliminated from Mq. 
 
4.1 Learning Finite Stochastic Models 
 
 While Hutter studied using MDPs (Hutter 2009a) and dynamic Bayesian networks 
(DBN) (Hutter 2009b; Ghahramani 1997) for environment models, I prefer modeling 
environments with finite stochastic loop programs because they can factor logic common to 
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multiple observations into unified functions (Hibbard 2012a). To do that requires a new way to 
compute ρ(h). Let Q be the set of all finite stochastic loop programs in some prefix-free 
procedural language. Let φ(q) = 2-|q| be the prior probability of program q, where |q| is the length 
of program q. 
 Let P(h | q) be the probability that the program q computes the history h (that is, produces 
the observations oi in response to the actions ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|). For a simple example, let 
A = {a, b}, O = {0, 1}, h = (a, 1, a, 0, b, 1) and let q generate observation 0 with probability 0.2 
and observation 1 with probability 0.8, without any internal state or dependence on the agent's 
actions. Then the probability that the interaction history h is generated by program q is the 
product of the probabilities of the 3 observations in h: P(h | q) = 0.8 × 0.2 × 0.8 = 0.128. 
 For a more complex example, Table 4.1 defines transition probabilities for a program q' 
that generates observations dependent on internal state and the agent's actions. The left column 
gives the current state of q' (s0 or s1) and the agent's action (a or b). The top row gives the next 
state of q' and the generated observation (0 or 1). The entries are probabilities with each row 
summing to 1.0. As before, let the history be h = (a, 1, a, 0, b, 1). The program q' starts in state 
s0. There are two possible state sequences consistent with the history h: (s0, s0, s0, s1) and 
(s0, s1, s0, s1). The product of the transition probabilities for the first sequence is 
0.3 × 0.2 × 0.4 = 0.024 while the product of the transition probabilities for the second sequence is 
0.5 × 1.0 × 0.4 = 0.2. These sequences are mutually exclusive, hence P(h | q') is the sum 
0.2 + 0.024 = 0.224. 
 
 s0, 0 s0, 1 s1, 0 s1, 1 
s0, a 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.5 
s0, b 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 
s1, a 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
s1, b 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
 
Table 4.1 Transition probabilities for the finite stochastic loop program q'. Rows are labeled for 
the current state and action (a or b). Columns are labeled for next state and observation (0 or 1). 
This representation of the finite stochastic loop program q' using an MDP is efficient for a 
program with only two states. However, for more complex programs, a procedural representation 
is generally more efficient. 
 
 Given an interaction history h, the environment model is the single program that provides 
the most probable explanation of h, that is the q that maximizes P(q | h). By Bayes' Theorem: 
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(4.1)  P(q | h) = P(h | q) φ(q) / P(h). 
 
 Because it is constant over all q, P(h) can be eliminated. Thus, given a history h, we 
define λ(h) as the most probable program modeling h by: 
 
(4.2)  λ(h) := argmax q∈Q P(h | q) φ(q). 
 
 Given an environment model λ(h), the following can be used for the prior probability of 
an observation history h' extending h (i.e., h is an initial sub-interval of h'): 
 
(4.3)  ρ(h') = P(h' | λ(h)). 
 
 This distribution ρ(h') can be used in the framework defined by equations (2.1), 
(2.3)−(2.5). Not only are the environment models finite, but they can be finitely computed by the 
agent (Hibbard 2012b): 
 
 Proposition 4.1. Given a finite history h, the model λ(h) can be finitely computed. 
 Proof. Given h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), let q0 be the program that produces observation oi at 
time step i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. That is, q0 is a simple "table-lookup" that produces the observations oi in 
sequence. Let n = |q0|. Since the behavior of q0 is deterministic, P(h | q0) φ(q0) = 1 × 2-n = 2-n. 
Hence the maximum value in equation (4.2) must be at least 2-n, that is, P(h | λ(h)) φ(λ(h)) ≥ 2-n. 
For any program q with |q| > n, P(h | q) φ(q) < 1 × 2-n = 2-n so λ(h) ≠ q. Thus one algorithm for 
finitely computing λ(h) is an exhaustive search of the finite number of programs q with |q| ≤ n.  
 As the computing time of this exhaustive search for λ(h) is exponential in |h|, this 
procedure is not practical for learning environment models. However, it is useful to have a 
finitely computable theoretical framework. 
 An agent that is part of a finite universe will not have the necessary computational 
resources to compute the expressions defined by equations (4.2), (4.3), (2.1) and (2.3)−(2.5). 
Chapter 8 will address the issue of agents that must approximate these equations. 
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 The derivation of ρ(h) in equations (4.1)−(4.3) takes into account Occam's razor, to favor 
the simplest explanation of the observations, while ignoring Epicurus' principle to include all 
explanations. An alternate way to compute ρ(h) accounts for all finite stochastic loop programs: 
 
(4.4)  ρ(h) = ∑q∈Q P(h | q) φ(q). 
 
 Because this equation requires a sum over an infinite number of programs, it is not 
finitely computable. However, it can be approximated to any desired precision in finite 
computing time. 
 
4.2 When Is the Most Likely Finite Stochastic Model the True Model? 
 
 If history h is generated by a finite stochastic loop program q, then we call q the true 
model of h (despite the dictum that, "Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful."  
(Box and Draper 1987)). In that case is the most likely model λ(h) equal to q? Not necessarily. 
Because q is stochastic it can generate any history h with P(h | q) > 0 (i.e., P(h | q) may be very 
low), and as a result there may be another program q' such that P(h | q') φ(q') > P(h | q) φ(q). Or 
there may be q' such that φ(q') > φ(q) and ∀h∈H.(P(h | q') = P(h | q)) (i.e., the behavior of q' is 
identical with the behavior of q), and thus ∀h∈H.(P(h | q') φ(q') > P(h | q) φ(q)). 
 Programs q and q' are equivalent to finite MDPs and thus they may pass through an initial 
sequence of states that they never visit after some finite time step. This may cause there to exist a 
history h0, generated by q but with low probability, such that P(h | q') φ(q') > P(h | q) φ(q) for all 
histories h whose initial sub-sequence is h0. (i.e., ∃h'.h = h0h'). In that case, as the lengths of 
histories h randomly generated by q increases, the probability that λ(h) ≠ q is no more than 
1-(1/|{h∈H | |h| = |h0|}|) < 1. Therefore it is not even true that, averaged over histories of 
increasing length generated by q, the probability that λ(h) = q converges to 1. So what can we say 
about the relation between λ(h) and the true model q? 
 In order to analyze the question, we need to define expected values with respect to the 
distribution of histories of length n generated by q. In a history h = (a1, o1, ..., an, on) the 
probability P(h | q) is defined based on the probabilities of the observations oi only, since the 
actions ai are generated by the agent rather than the environment. Recalling the notations 
a(h) = (a1, ..., an) and o(h) = (o1, ..., on), define the set of all sequences of n actions: 
 
(4.5)  A(n) = {(a'1, ..., a'n) | a'i∈A}. 
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 Then |A(n)| = |A|n. For any fixed sequence of actions a'∈A(n) and any finite stochastic 
loop program q', the sum of probabilities P(h | q') of histories with a(h) = a' must be 1: 
 
(4.6)  ∑
 |h|=n∧a(h)=a' P(h | q') = 1. 
 
 The expected value of a function f(h) with respect to the distribution of histories of length 
n generated by q, and the limit as n increases to infinity, are defined as: 
 
(4.7)  E(f(h) | q, n) = ∑a'∈A(n)(∑|h|=n∧a(h)=a' P(h | q) f(h)) / (|A|n), 
(4.8)  E(f(h) | q) = limitn→∞ E(f(h) | q, n). 
 
 Given a finite stochastic loop program q', the probability that q' will be a more likely 
model than q for a history of length n generated by q is: 
 
(4.9)  E((if P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) > P(h | q) then 1 else 0) | q, n). 
 
 We know that: 
 
(4.10)  ∑ |h|=n∧a(h)=a' P(h | q) = 1. 
 
 Assume that φ(q') / φ(q) = β so that: 
 
(4.11)  ∑ |h|=n∧a(h)=a' (P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q)) = β. 
 
 Then (P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q)) can be larger than P(h | q) over histories h whose 
P(h | q) values sum to at most β, so that: 
 
(4.12)  (∑|h|=n∧a(h)=a' P(h | q) (if P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) > P(h | q) then 1 else 0)) ≤ β. 
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 Averaging equation (4.12) over actions a'∈A(n) gives: 
 
(4.13)  E(if P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) > P(h | q) then 1 else 0 | q, n) ≤ β = φ(q') / φ(q). 
 
 Because we are using a prefix-free encoding for finite stochastic loop programs q'∈Q, we 
have ∑
 q'∈Q φ(q') ≤ 1. Thus: 
 
(4.14)  ∀ε > 0. ∃Q' ⊂ Q. Q' is finite and ∑q'∈Q-Q' φ(q') / φ(q) < ε. 
 
 Combining equations (4.9), (4.13), and (4.14), and noting that equation (4.13) is 
uniformly true over all n, we can conclude that: 
 Proposition 4.2. Given any ε > 0 there exists a finite set Q' of finite stochastic loop 
programs such that the probability is less than ε that λ(h) = q' for any program q' not in Q', for 
histories h randomly generated by q. 
 Thus to analyze the probability that λ(h) = q we need only compare q to a finite set Q' of 
programs. However, various problems may complicate the analysis. For example there may be a 
program q'∈Q such that ∀h∈H. P(h | q') = P(h | q) and |q'| < |q| (so φ(q') > φ(q)). In that case 
λ(h) will never equal q. 
 For a specific q' we can analyze the probability, with respect to the distribution of 
histories generated by q, that P(h | q') φ(q') > P(h | q) φ(q), by defining an appropriate function 
from histories to real numbers f : H → R. Define distributions of finite histories with length n: 
 
(4.15)  Pn(h | q) = P(h | q) / |A|n for |h| = n, 
  Pn(h | q) = 0 for |h| ≠ n, 
(4.16)  Pn(h | q') = P(h | q') / |A|n for |h| = n, 
  Pn(h | q') = 0 for |h| ≠ n. 
 
 Also define means and standard deviations of the function f with respect to the 
distributions Pn(h | q) and Pn(h | q'), and in the limit as n increases to infinity: 
 
(4.17)  m(f | q, n) = E(f(h) | q, n), 
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(4.18)  m(f | q) = E(f(h) | q), 
(4.19)  m(f | q', n) = E(f(h) | q', n), 
(4.20)  m(f | q') = E(f(h) | q'), 
(4.21)  σ(f | q, n) = (E((f(h) - m(f | q, n))2 | q, n))1/2, 
(4.22)  σ(f | q) = limitn→∞ σ(f | q, n), 
(4.23)  σ(f | q', n) = (E((f(h) - m(f | q', n))2 | q', n))1/2, 
(4.24)  σ(f | q') = limitn→∞ σ(f | q', n). 
 
 The approach is to define a function f(h) with different mean values with respect to 
history distributions Pn(h | q') and Pn(h | q), and with standard deviations converging to 0 as 
history lengths increase to infinity. In that case the proportion of overlap between the history 
distributions Pn(h | q') and Pn(h | q) converges to 0 as history lengths increase. More precisely: 
 Proposition 4.3. If there is a function f(h) such that  m(f | q), m(f | q'), σ(f | q), and σ(f | q') 
converge, m(f | q) ≠ m(f | q'), and σ(f | q) = σ(f | q') = 0, then as the lengths of histories h 
generated by q increase the probability that λ(h) = q' converges to 0: 
 
(4.25)  E((if P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) > P(h | q) then 1 else 0) | q) = 0. 
 
 Proof. Assume that m(f | q') > m(f | q) (if the order is reversed then certain orders in the 
following discussion can be reversed). Given any positive integer L there is d > 0 and a positive 
integer N such that for all n > N: 
 
(4.26)  m(f | q', n) - m(f | q, n) ≥ d, 
(4.27)  σ(f | q, n) < d/(2L), 
(4.28)  σ(f | q', n) < d/(2L). 
 
 To understand this claim, first choose d and N so that equation (4.26) is true, then 
increase N until equations (4.27) and (4.28) are true. Set e = (m(f | q, n) + m(f | q', n))/2 midway 
between m(f | q, n) and m(f | q', n). Then e is at least L standard deviations σ(f | q, n) away from 
the mean m(f | q, n) and at least L standard deviations σ(f | q', n) away from the mean m(f | q', n). 
Hence a proportion of no more than L-2 of the distribution Pn(h | q) can have f(h) ≥ e and a 
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proportion of no more than L-2 of the distribution Pn(h | q') can have f(h) ≤ e. For histories with 
f(h) ≥ e, Pn(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) can be greater than a proportion of no more than L-2 of the 
distribution Pn(h | q). And for histories with f(h) ≤ e, Pn(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) can be greater than a 
proportion of no more than (φ(q') / φ(q)) L-2 of the distribution Pn(h | q). Thus: 
 
(4.29)  E((if P(h | q') φ(q') / φ(q) > P(h | q) then 1 else 0) | q, n) < (1 + φ(q') / φ(q)) L-2 
 
 Since L can be arbitrarily large and (1 + φ(q') / φ(q)) is constant, equation (4.25) is 
proved.  
 Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 give us the tools to analyze when the true model is the most 
likely model for a distribution of interaction histories. Consider a distribution P(h | q) of histories 
randomly generated by a true model q. Given ε > 0, Proposition 4.2 tells us that there is a finite 
set Q'ε of finite stochastic loop programs such that, for h randomly generated by q, the 
probability is less than ε/2 that λ(h) = q' for any program q' ∉ Q'ε. Then, for each q' ∈ Q'ε, we 
need to find a function fq'(h) of histories that satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4.3. If we can 
do that for q' ∈ Q'ε, then there is an integer Lq' such that, for h randomly generated by q with 
|h| > Lq', the probability is less than ε/(2|Q'ε|) that λ(h) = q'. Let Lε = maxq'∈Q'ε Lq'. Then, for h 
randomly generated by q with |h| > Lε, the probability is less than ε that λ(h) ≠ q. That is, the 
probability that the most likely model is the true model converges to 1 as history lengths 
increase. |Q'ε| will increase with decreasing ε. The key is being able to find fq'(h) for each 
q' ∈ Q'ε. It is important that Q'ε be finite in Proposition 4.2, so that the maximum value Lε is 
finite (i.e., the maximum of a finite set of integers is finite, while the maximum of an infinite set 
may be infinite). 
 A useful class of functions for Proposition 4.3 counts the frequency of occurrence of 
histories as sub-sequences. We define a function fh'(h) for each h' ∈ H. A history h ∈ H will have 
max(|h|-|h'|+1, 0) sub-sequences of length |h'|, and fh'(h) is the proportion of these that equal h'. If 
|h|<|h'|, define fh'(h) = 0. If |h|≥|h'|, define: 
 
(4.30)  fh'(h) = (∑0≤i≤|h|-|h'| if (∃h1.∃h2.h=h1h'h2.∧|h1|=i) then 1 else 0) / (|h|-|h'|+1). 
 
 Before applying the functions fh'(h), we need to digress into the theory of Markov chains 
(Levin, Peres, and Wilmer 2008; Russell and Norvig 2010). A finite stochastic loop program q is 
equivalent to a finite MDP Mq, as dicussed at the start of this chapter. All action sequences in 
A(n) are weighted equally in Pn(h | q), so Pn(h | q) views actions as uniformly distributed random 
inputs to Mq. Given such random inputs, the MDP Mq will generate the same distribution of 
histories that a Markov chain MCq generates (here we add action-observation pair outputs to the 
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usual definition of Markov chains; the important point is that the transition probability to the 
next state is only dependent on the previous state). The probability of the transition from state s 
to state-action-observation (s', a, 0) in MCq is equal to the probability from (s, a) to (s', o) in Mq, 
divided by |A|. For example, the Mq specified in Table 4.1, with uniformly distributed random 
action inputs, generates the same distribution of histories that the MCq specified in Table 4.2 
generates. 
 
 s0, a, 0 s0, a, 1 s0, b, 0 s0, b, 1 s1, a, 0 s1, a, 1 s1, b, 0 s1, b, 1 
s0 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.0 0.0 0.25 0.15 0.2 
s1 0.5 0.0 0.15 0.15 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
 
Table 4.2 The MCq equivalent to the Mq specified in Table 4.1, given uniformly distributed 
random action inputs. 
 
 The behavior of finite Markov chains is well understood (Doob 1953; Levin, Peres, and 
Wilmer 2008). Let S be the set of states of MCq and, for s, s' ∈ S, let P(s, s') be the probability of 
transition from state s to state s'. Viewing P as a matrix, its n-th power Pn(s, s') is the probability 
of transition from s to s' in exactly n time steps. State s' is reachable from state s if there exists 
n≥1 such that Pn(s, s')>0. A communicating class is a set of states that are all reachable from 
each other. A communicating class is essential if only states in the class are reachable from the 
class. Let θ : S → [0, 1] be a probability distribution on the state set S (thus θ(s)≥0 for s ∈ S and 
∑s∈Sθ(s) = 1). We say θ is stationary if, for all s' ∈ S, θ(s') = ∑s∈S θ(s) P(s, s'). 
 Proposition. There is a unique stationary distribution θ for a transition matrix P if and 
only if there is a unique essential communicating class (Levin, Peres, and Wilmer 2008). 
 If MCq has a unique stationary distribution θ, then θ(s) is the expected probability that 
MCq will be in state s after a long sequence of state transitions (there are ways to compute the 
rate of convergence to θ(s)). 
 Define T(s) = {n≥1 | Pn(s, s)>0}. The period of s is the greatest common divisor of T(s). 
All the states in a communicating class have the same period, which is the period of the class. 
The class in aperiodic if its period is 1. Table 4.3 is an example of a Markov chain with period 2. 
It alternates between states s0 and s1. Because {s0, s1} is a unique essential communicating 
class, it has a stationary distribution θ(s0) = 0.5, θ(s1) = 0.5. The average time the Markov chain 
spends in either state is 0.5, but on any given time step the probability is either 0 or 1. 
Independent of whether its unique essential communicating class is aperiodic or not, the average 
time a Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution θ spends in state s is θ(s). 
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 s0 s1 
s0 0 1 
s1 1 0 
 
Table 4.3 A Markov chain with period 2. 
 
 If MCq has a unique stationary distribution θ, then we can use it to compute m(fh' | q) for 
h' ∈ H. Given h' ∈ H, for each state s of MCq, compute the probability P(h' | s, MCq) that MCq, 
starting at state s, produces h' during its next |h'| state transtions (this is similar to the example of 
computing of P(h | q) using Table 4.1). Then: 
 
(4.31)  m(fh' | q) = ∑s∈S θ(s) P(h' | s, MCq). 
 
 Because fh'(h) is the proportion of occurrences of h' over the entire length of h, as |h| 
increases the value of fh'(h) for h randomly generated by q will converge to the expression on the 
right side of equation (4.31). Any effect of period greater than 1 for its unique essential 
communicating class on m(fh' | q, n) and σ(fh' | q, n) will smooth out as n increases (this would 
not be the case for a function f(h) defined in terms of only, for example, the last 100 time steps in 
h). Thus m(fh' | q) and σ(fh' | q) converge, with σ(fh' | q) = 0. Note that if MCq has multiple 
essential communicating classes then it will have multiple stationary distributions, each defining 
a value for m(fh' | q). In that case σ(fh' | q) would not converge to 0. 
 Define a subclass of models Quecc = {q ∈ Q | MCq has a unique essential communicating 
class}. Then, by Propostion 4.3, if the probability that λ(h) = q' ∈ Quecc does not converge to 0 as 
the lengths of histories h randomly generated by q ∈ Quecc increase, then m(fh' | q') = m(fh' | q) for 
all h' ∈ H. Thus, restricting models to Quecc, even though the most likely finite stochastic model 
λ(h) is not necessarily equal to the true model q, as the lengths of histories h generated by q 
increase, q and λ(h) will behave very similarly. 
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4.3 Finite and Infinite Logic 
 
 We have been discussing agents that choose actions that maximize the sum of future, 
discounted utility values. It is also possible to define agents that choose actions that make some 
logical statements true. In order to discuss such agents, this section is a brief overview of logic. 
 Propositional calculus is the mathematical theory of elementary logic operations on 
abstract symbols. It consists of a finite set of propositional symbols A = {p, q, r, …} and a set of  
Boolean logical operations {∧, ∨, ¬, ⇒, ⇔} ( intuitively these are and, or, not, implies, and 
equivalent to). The propositional symbols can take the values true and false. Every symbol is a 
formula. If f and g are formulas, then (f ∧ g), (f ∨ g), (f ⇒ g), (f ⇔ g), and (¬f) are formulas. 
 
p q (q ⇒ p) (p ⇒ (q ⇒ p)) 
false false true true 
false true false true 
true false true true 
true true true true 
 
Table 4.4 Semantic proof of (p ⇒ (q ⇒ p)). 
 
 The purpose of propositional calculus is to determine which formulas are true. One way 
to do this is semantic proof: substitute all possible combinations of true and false for the 
propositional symbols in a formula f and, if f always evaluates to true, then f is true. Table 4.4 
demonstrates a semantic proof of f = (p ⇒ (q ⇒ p)), evaluating f for all four combinations of 
true and false values for p and q. Note that (p ⇒ q) is logically equivalent to (¬p ∨ q). 
 The other way to determine which formulas are true is syntactic proof, which uses a rule 
of inference called modus ponens: if f is true and (f ⇒ g) is true, then g is true. Syntactic proof 
also uses an initial set of true formulas called axioms. These may be defined in many ways. One 
set of axioms, which are true for any formulas f, g, and h, is: 
 
  (f ⇒ (g ⇒ f)), 
  ((f ⇒ (g ⇒ h)) ⇒ ((f ⇒ g) ⇒ (f ⇒ h)), 
  ((¬f ⇒ ¬g) ⇒ (g ⇒ f)). 
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 A syntactic proof of a formula f starts with instances of the axioms and derives new true 
formulas using modus ponens until it derives f. 
 Propositional calculus is consistent, meaning that if there is a syntactic proof for f then 
there is a semantic proof for f (equivalently, consistent also means that for any formula f, f and ¬f 
cannot both be true). Propositional calculus is also complete, meaning that if there is a semantic 
proof for f then there is a syntactic proof for f (equivalently, complete also means that if there is 
no syntactic proof for a formula f then we cannot find a proof for f by adding new axioms 
without making the theory inconsistent). Another important property of propositional calculus is 
that it is decidable. Decidable means there is a UTM program that will tell you whether any 
formula in propositional calculus is true (assuming that propositional formulas are encoded on 
the input tape of the UTM). In this process the program enumerates the finite number of possible 
combinations of true and false for the propositional symbols in a formula and for each 
combination evaluates the formula, as was done in Table 4.4. The decidability, consistency, and 
completeness of propositional calculus are a consequence of its finiteness. 
 Another kind of logic is called first order predicate calculus. Whereas propositional 
calculus is about abstract logical propositions, predicate calculus is a way of making logical 
statements about any domain of objects. It includes the Boolean logical operations of 
propositional calculus and adds: an infinite set V of variables {x, y, z, …} that range over objects 
in the domain, universal (∀) and existential (∃) quantifier symbols, the symbol (=) for equality 
between members of the domain, for every integer n ≥ 0 an infinite set of n-ary predicate 
symbols, and for every integer n ≥ 1 an infinite set of n-ary function symbols. Terms represent 
values in the domain. Every variable is a term. If F is an n-ary function symbol and t1, t2, …, tn, 
are terms, then F(t1, t2, …, tn) is a term (0-ary function symbols are constants in the domain). If P 
is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, t2, …, tn, are terms, then P(t1, t2, …, tn) is a formula. If s and t 
are terms, then (s = t) is a formula. If x is a variable and f is a formula, then ∀x.f (this means, for 
all values of x, f is true) and ∃x.f (this means, there exists a value of x such that f is true) are 
formulas. Any instances of x in f, not already bound to quantifiers in f, are now bound to the new 
quantifier (∀ or ∃). Instances of variables in a formula f not bound to any quantifier in f are 
called free variables. For example, in the formula ((x = 1) ∨ ∀x.(x = y)), the first instance of x is 
free and the second instance of x (in (x = y)) is bound to ∀x. The instance of y is free. In 
predicate calculus we are mainly interested in formulas without free variables, which are called 
statements. 
 Given a set S of possible variable values let PS be a 1-ary predicate such that 
x ∈ S ⇔ PS(x). Then we can write ∀x∈S.f as a shorthand for ∀x.(PS(x)⇒f). 
 Predicate calculus adds several rules of inference to propositional calculus. An important 
rule is called substitution. Given a formula f and a term t, f[t/x] is the formula produced by 
replacing all free instances of x with t. The rule of inference specifies that if f is true then f[t/x] is 
true, provided that no free variable in t becomes bound to a quantifier in f as a result of the 
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substitution. For example, if f is ∀x.((x = z)⇒¬(x = y)) and t is x, then the rule of inference will 
not work for f[t/y] since that produces ∀x.((x = z)⇒¬(x = x)) where the free variable x in t is now 
bound to the quantifier ∀x in f. 
 Many sets of axioms can used with first order predicate calculus to generate theories of 
different domains of mathematical objects. Axioms are statements (i.e., formulas without free 
variables). An important example is a set of axioms for Peano arithmetic (PA), which is the 
theory of the natural numbers (non-negative integers) with multiplication. Peano arithmetic has 
been defined using several different sets of axioms. In the axioms presented here, 0 and 1 are 
0-ary functions, and + and × are infix shorthand notations for 2-ary functions for addition and 
multiplication. 
 
  ∀x.¬(x + 1 = 0), 
  ∀x.∀y.(x + 1 = y + 1 ⇒ x = y), 
  ∀x.(x + 0 = x), 
  ∀x.∀y.(x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1), 
  ∀x.(x × 0 = 0), 
  ∀x.∀y.(x × (y + 1) = (x × y) + x), 
  ∀X.[(φ(0, X) ∧ ∀y.(φ(y, X) ⇒ φ(y + 1, X))) ⇒ ∀y.φ(y, X)]. 
 
 The last axiom is an axiom schema for induction, where any formula can be substituted 
for φ and X represents all the free variables in φ other than the first free variable y. 
 Properly speaking, the theory of PA is the set of all statements that can be proved from 
the axioms of PA. This set is recursively enumerable, which means that a UTM program exists 
that, given inputs n = 0, 1, 2, …, will produce as output all the statements in the set (i.e., all the 
true statements of PA). This can be demonstrated by encoding all statements and proofs of PA as 
natural numbers. The UTM program checks whether its input is a valid proof and, if it is, the 
program produces as output the statement that is proved. Kurt Gödel used such an encoding of 
statements and proofs as natural numbers to construct, for any theory that includes PA, a 
statement f that is equivalent to, "f is unprovable." He concluded that neither f nor ¬f is provable 
in the theory of PA, which implies that f is true. Thus there are true statements that cannot be 
proved in the theory. This result is called Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which tells us 
that any recursively enumerable theory that includes PA cannot be both consistent and complete. 
 Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem states that any recursively enumerable theory 
that includes PA, satisfies some technical conditions about provability, and proves its own 
consistency, must be inconsistent. Gödel's proofs of his incompleteness theorems depended on 
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the fact that the set of natural numbers is infinite. Related to these theorems is Löb's Theorem, 
which states that, given any theory that includes PA and formula f, if the theory can prove that "if 
f is provable then f is true," then the theory can prove f. 
 Some theories of infinite sets are decidable, consistent and complete. One good example 
is Presburger arithmetic, which is a theory of the natural numbers without multiplication (it can 
express multiplication of a variable by a constant, but not multiplication of two variables). To 
say that Presburger arithmetic is complete means that every true statement in its language can be 
proved. However, many truths about the natural numbers cannot be expressed by statements in 
the Presburger language. 
 The proof that Presburger arithmetic is decidable, consistent, and complete depends on a 
quantifier elimination procedure. This procedure eliminates all universal (∀) and existential (∃) 
quantifiers in a formula. That is, given a statement f, the quantifier elimination procedure 
produces another statement g that has no quantifiers and such that f is equivalent to g (i.e., f is 
true if and only if g is true). Furthermore, the truth of a statement g without any quantifiers can 
be computed with ordinary arithmetic and Boolean logic. As a theory of an infinite set, 
Presburger arithmetic's quantifier elimination procedure is quite complex. 
 
x y x + y x × y 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 2 2 0 
1 0 1 0 
1 1 2 1 
1 2 0 2 
2 0 2 0 
2 1 0 2 
2 2 1 1 
 
Table 4.5 Interpretation of + and × for the finite field with D = {0, 1, 2}. 
 
 A model for a theory such as PA consists of a domain, which is the set of all possible 
values for variables in the theory, and an interpretation, which assigns each n-ary function and 
predicate in the theory to a specific function or predicate over the domain. That is, let the set D 
45 
 
be the domain. Then each 0-ary function is assigned to a value in D, each n-ary function with 
n ≥ 1 is assigned to a function Dn → D, and each n-ary predicate is assigned to a function 
Dn → {false, true}. In the standard model for PA, D is the set of natural numbers and the 
interpretation of the 2-ary functions + and × is simply addition and multiplication of natural 
numbers. (There are other, non-standard models for PA.) 
 There are theories with finite domains. An example is the theory of the finite field of 
three members, with two 2-ary functions again indicated by their infix shorthand notations + 
and ×. The domain is D = {0, 1, 2} and the interpretation of + and × is given in Table 4.5. 
 As with any finite model, the domain and interpretation of this model can be specified by 
axioms: 
 
(4.32)  (∀x.((x=0)∨(x=1)∨(x=2)))∧¬(0=1)∧¬(0=2)∧¬(1=2), 
(4.33)  (0 + 0 = 0) ∧ (0 + 1 = 1) ∧ (0 + 2 = 2) ∧ (1 + 0 = 1) ∧ 
  (1 + 1 = 2) ∧ (1 + 2 = 0) ∧ (2 + 0 = 2) ∧ (2 + 1 = 0) ∧ (2 + 2 = 1), 
(4.34)  (0 × 0 = 0) ∧ (0 × 1 = 0) ∧ (0 × 2 = 0) ∧ (1 × 0 = 0) ∧ 
  (1 × 1 = 1) ∧ (1 × 2 = 2) ∧ (2 × 0 = 0) ∧ (2 × 1 = 2) ∧ (2 × 2 = 1). 
 
 In any theory with a finite model, the truth of statements is decidable (i.e., can be 
computed by a UTM program). The first step in deciding the truth of the statement f is to 
eliminate its quantifiers, which occur in the forms ∃x.φ and ∀x.φ inside f, where φ is a formula. 
Assuming a finite domain D = {d0, d1, d2, …, dm}, quantifiers are eliminated using the 
equivalences: 
 
(4.35)  ∃x.φ ⇔ (φ[d0/x] ∨ φ[d1/x] ∨ φ[d2/x] ∨ … ∨ φ[dm/x]), 
(4.36)  ∀x.φ ⇔ (φ[d0/x] ∧ φ[d1/x] ∧ φ[d2/x] ∧ … ∧ φ[dm/x]). 
 
 Given a statement f, we can apply equations (4.35) and (4.36) successively to all the 
quantifiers in f to produce fnq, which is equivalent to f but without quantifiers. Because D is 
finite, fnq will have a finite length and will reference a finite number of functions and predicates. 
After eliminating the quantifiers, all the variables in f have been replaced by constant values 
(i.e., d0, d1, …, dm) in fnq. By the theory's interpretation, each 0-ary function in fnq is assigned to a 
constant value in D, and, for n ≥ 1, each n-ary function in fnq is assigned to a function Dn → D, 
and each n-ary predicate is assigned to a function Dn → {false, true}. The next step in deciding 
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the truth of f ⇔ fnq is to replace all 0-ary functions by their constant values, to propagate constant 
values up calling chains of n-ary functions with n ≥ 1 so that every function is replaced by a 
constant value, to replace all n-ary predicates by true or false (which is possible because all 
predicate arguments are now constants), and to replace all occurrences of (s = t) by true or false 
(which is possible since s and t must now be constants). This step produces fnqf, which is 
equivalent to fnq and which contains only true, false, and Boolean logical operations. Thus fnqf 
can simply be evaluated as either true or false. For any statement f we have the chain of 
equivalences f ⇔ fnq ⇔ fnqf ⇔ true or false. That is, every statement is equivalent to either true 
or false. Thus the theory is decidable, consistent, and complete. 
 As we have described, quantifier elimination shows that a theory over a finite model is 
decidable, consistent, and complete. If the domain D is very large then the statements that result 
from quantifier elimination may be too long to work with and the proof procedure may take too 
long to run. However, we may be able to find short cuts. Rather than explicitly listing all the 
values in D and the values of functions and predicates, we may be able to define them with 
equations and procedures. As a result, we may be able to use these equations and procedures to 
shorten the decision procedure. However, even without finding proofs for statements, we know 
that the theory is decidable, consistent, and complete. 
 
4.4 Agents Based on Logical Proof 
 
 The agents described in Chapters 2 and 3 choose actions to maximize the sum of future 
discounted utility function values. Some research on ethical AI focuses on agents that only take 
actions that they can prove will satisfy a particular condition. For example, Schmidhuber (2009) 
defined the Gödel machine as a programmable agent that interacts with an environment to 
maximize its utility function, which is defined as the expected value of the sum of rewards from 
the environment, from the current time until some final time T. The agent's initial program p(1) 
consists of: a part e(1) that implements a policy for interacting with the environment; and a part 
that evolves by searching for a program, called switchprog, and for a proof that switchprog will 
get a higher value of the utility function than p(1) will. If it finds a proof, then p(1) is replaced by 
switchprog. Schmidhuber proved that if p(1) switches to switchprog then it is globally optimal, 
in the sense that switchprog must obtain a higher value for the utility function than p(1) could 
obtain by continuing to search. 
 Note that although the Gödel machine employs logical proof, the statements that it proves 
are about maximum preference among actions (which are switching to other programs) based on 
the expected value of a utility function applied to the outcomes of those actions. Hence, it 
conforms to our framework for utility-maximizing agents, except that it requires proof instead of 
mere calculation. While p(1) is searching for a proof, it employs program part e(1), which is 
unspecified and can implement an ordinary utility-maximizing policy. 
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 Yudkowsky and Herreshoff (2013) discussed logic problems for a sequence of evolving 
agents. These agents are not utility-maximizers. Instead they have a goal, expressed as a 
predicate calculus statement g, and will only take actions if they can prove that performance of 
the action implies the goal g. One type of action that agents can take is to construct other 
(presumed better) agents. This results in a sequence of agents pi1, pi2, pi3, …, each of which proves 
that the action of creating its successor implies g. A necessary part of those proofs is that pii must 
prove that pii+1 uses a consistent logical theory (with an inconsistent logical theory, pii+1 will be 
able to prove that any action it takes implies g, including actions that do not actually imply g). 
Yudkowsky and Herreshoff demonstrated that Löb's Theorem and Gödel's Second 
Incompleteness Theorem imply that pii can only prove that the logical theory of pii+1 is consistent 
if the logical theory of pii+1 is weaker than the theory of pii (i.e., the set of statements provable by 
the logical theory of pii+1 is a proper subset of the set of statements provable by the logical theory 
of pii). Consequently, the sequence of agents pi1, pi2, pi3, … must have a sequence of successively 
weaker logical theories. This is referred to as the Löbian obstacle. 
 Agents based on logical proof offer the hope that their actions can be proved to satisfy 
certain conditions, which may include ethical conditions. However, the recent success of AI 
systems has occurred because AI research has shifted from systems based on logic to systems 
based on statistical learning. Sunehag and Hutter (2014) provide a critique of logical reasoning 
as far less efficient than probabilistic architectures for systems that interact with the real world. 
The price of logical certainty is a degree of inefficiency that prevents intelligent behavior. 
 And logical certainty is an illusion. Agents based on logical proof must assume a prior 
distribution over environments. An agent may compute that there are statistical correlations 
among its actions and observations, but to make inferences about the probabilities of future 
observations requires assumptions about prior probabilities of observations. Even computing 
correlations among actions and observations makes the assumption that the agent's memory is 
reliable. Memory corruption is a risk for any agent embedded in our physical world (Orseau and 
Ring 2012b) and thus these correlation computations are conditional on assumed probabilities of 
memory reliability. These assumed prior probabilities of observations and of memory reliability 
are arbitrary so logical proofs by agents of propositions about the environment are no more 
reliable than statistical calculations by agents. Luke Muehlhauser (2013) offers some insights 
about the role of logical proofs in ethical AI. 
 Agents can prove propositions in pure mathematics, such as in PA, without any 
dependence on observations and inference about the environment. But if an agent's goal concerns 
the environment, then proofs about that goal are dependent on arbitrarily assumed prior 
probabilities about observations of the environment. 
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4.5 Consistent Logic for Agents 
 
 I argue that PA or any other logic theory involving infinite sets is unnecessary in our 
universe with a finite information capacity (Hibbard 2014). Hence the Löbian obstacle and other 
difficulties related to Gödel's incompleteness theorems can be avoided. 
 Lloyd calculated the universe's information capacity based on a hard quantum mechanical 
limit on the number of possible physical states of the universe. Let ns be the maximum number 
of states of the universe, no more than 210124 over the next trillion years (recall the limit of 10124 
bits of information at the start of the chapter). Let nt be the maximum number of time steps over 
the next trillion years, which we may estimate as 5 × 1061 (one trillion years divided by the 
Planck time of 10-43 seconds). The finite sets O and A of observations and actions cannot be 
larger than ns. The maximum number of different real numbers that can be represented in our 
universe is ns, so we limit utility function values and probabilities to a finite subset of ns real 
numbers (e.g., floating point numbers with 10124 bits of precision). 
 Then the number of possible environments, expressed as MDPs, can be no more than 
ne = nsns×ns×ns×ns, calculated as a probability at each element in a matrix of current state and 
action versus next state and observation (similar to Table 4.1). The number of possible 
interaction histories is no more than nh = ns2×nt, calculated as a sequence of action/observation 
pairs at each time step. The number of possible utility functions is no more than nu = nsnh, 
calculated as a utility function value for each interaction history. The number of possible policies 
is no more than np = nsnh, calculated as an action for each interaction history. If we model agents 
or environments with finite stochastic loop programs, the number of possible programs cannot be 
larger than ns and their memories cannot be larger than log2(ns) bits (recall that they always 
halt). The important point is that there are finite limits on the possible numbers of all these types 
of mathematical objects. 
 A variety of functions among these object types would be useful for an agent theory. For 
example, in Section 4.1 we defined a probability distribution φ(q) over programs, a probability 
distribution P(h | q) over histories and programs, and a probability distribution ρ(h) over 
histories. That section also defined a function λ(h) from histories to programs. We can use the 
definitions of these functions as their interpretations for an agent theory. The probability of an 
interaction history conditional on environment and policy, P(h | e, pi), could be defined as part of 
an agent theory. However, because the set sizes are so large, it is impractical to define the 
interpretations of functions and predicates of the theory by listing their values as in Table 4.5. 
Rather, functions and predicates must be defined by equations and procedures that serve as 
shorthand for lists of values. While we need to verify the correctness of these equations and 
procedures, that need is very different from the sort of logical difficulties raised by Gödel's 
incompleteness theorems and no different from the need to verify the correctness of any 
algorithm used in the design of AI agents. 
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 Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that any sufficiently strong theory T that 
can prove its own consistency is inconsistent. This is the root of the Löbian obstacle discussed in 
the previous section. Willard has studied systems weaker than PA which can prove their own 
consistency and in which Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem does not apply (Willard 
2001). However, these are all theories with infinite domains. I have been unable to find any 
analog of Gödel's incompleteness theorems in theories on finite domains. In Gödel's Second 
Incompleteness Theorem, the consistency of a theory T is expressed by a statement con(T) that 
quantifies over the Gödel numbers of all proofs. A theory T with a finite domain can only 
express Gödel numbers for a finite set of proofs and hence cannot express con(T). Gödel's 
Second Incompleteness Theorem also requires the assumption of technical conditions about 
provability that are expressed in terms of Gödel numbers. In a theory with a finite domain, the 
provability conditions cannot be expressed about all statements. The inability to express con(T) 
and the technical provability conditions are significant barriers to recasting Gödel's Second 
Incompleteness Theorem in a finite domain. 
 A Gödel numbering for statements and proofs about a finite domain must be limited to a 
finite set of statements and proofs (because only a finite number of Gödel numbers are 
expressible in a finite domain), and we may try to recast Gödel's incompleteness theorems in 
terms of finite sets of statements and proofs. However another significant barrier arises: There 
can be no one-to-one correspondence between statements whose proofs have Gödel numbers and 
statements that the agent can prove, since a proof with a Gödel number must fit in the finite 
agent and environment memory (under the encoding of proofs assumed by the Gödel numbering) 
but an agent can create a proof without holding the entire proof in the agent and environment 
memory at once (i.e., more statements are provable than can have Gödel numbers). 
 The set of statements that can be proved by an agent with finite memory, and the set of 
statements whose proofs have Gödel numbers that fit in the finite memory, are both finite and 
therefore incomplete. Thus we do not need Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem to assert the 
incompleteness of statements provable by an agent with a finite memory. 
 An agent embedded in a finite environment will have a finite amount of memory (and a 
finite computing speed). It may attempt to prove statements about its own implementation or 
about other agents in the environment, including agents that it is creating. However, it may not 
have sufficient resources to apply the quantifier elimination procedure described in Section 4.3, 
and thus it may have to search for syntactic proofs for logical statements. The axioms for such 
syntactic proofs are the interpretations of functions and predicates, defined by equations or 
procedures over finite domains. An agent searching for syntactic proofs may not have sufficient 
resources to find them for some statements. Thus the statements the agent can prove about itself 
and its environment will be a subset of the statements that can be proved using quantifier 
elimination and unlimited resources. Because the theory of a finite domain is consistent, an agent 
with limited resources will not be able to prove any contradiction−its theory must also be 
consistent. However, there may be no decision procedure available to the agent and the set of 
statements that the agent can prove may be incomplete. These are certainly problems for an agent 
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with finite memory, but they are quite different from the theoretical problems of Gödel's Second 
Incompleteness Theorem. 
 In a universe with a finitely bounded number of states, if an agent pii constructs an agent 
pii+1, then pii+1 must have a finite number of states and a finite set of rules about transitions among 
states and interactions with an (unknown or partially unknown) finite environment. Any 
statement about pii+1 and its interactions with the environment must be a statement in a theory 
with finite domain. Thus such a statement cannot imply a contradiction. 
 The assertion that AI agents do not need PA for reasoning about whether possible actions 
imply their goals does not mean that AI agents cannot reason about PA or other logic theories of 
infinite sets. If the goal of an agent is to satisfy the wants of humans and those humans ask the 
agent to search for proofs of propositions in PA, it can certainly do so. Just like human 
mathematicians, an AI agent can try to find the consequences of various sets of axioms. 
However, for the vital task of proving whether possible actions imply its goals, the agent can 
employ a logic theory with a finite model which is known to be consistent. 
 
4.6 The Ethics of Finite and Infinite Sets for AI 
 
 Because our universe is finite, infinite sets are an unnecessary complication in our 
mathematical framework for agents and environments. The problems of designing AI systems to 
help rather than harm humans are difficult enough without the theoretical complexities of infinite 
sets. Therefore, the ethical choice is to avoid infinite sets in the theory of ethical AI. 
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5. Unintended Instrumental Actions 
 
 As noted previously, a utility-maximizing agent chooses actions to maximize the 
expected sum of its discounted future utility function values. However, as Stephen Omohundro 
(2008) pointed out, an agent will also choose actions (what Omohundro described as basic 
drives) that do not directly increase utility, but rather increase the agent's ability to maximize 
utility values. Such instrumental actions include self-protection, preserving the integrity of the 
agent's utility function, and increasing the agent's resources. 
 An agent that has been destroyed, turned off, or damaged will be unable or less able to 
maximize utility values. Thus it should choose actions that protect itself. The AI system named 
HAL 9000 in the movie, "2001: A Space Odyssey," attacked its human companions after it 
learned, by reading their lips, that they planned to turn it off. Not only was the HAL 9000 acting 
ruthlessly to protect itself, it discovered threats to itself in subtle ways that its human companions 
did not anticipate. (A subtitle for this chapter could be Subtlety that Humans Do Not Anticipate.) 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Self-protection will be instrumental to AI. 
 
 Similarly an agent will choose to avoid actions that change its utility function, because 
the agent evaluates such actions according to their effect on its current utility function. The agent 
will predict that by working to maximize a different utility function it will be less effective at 
maximizing the current utility function, and thus it will not chose to change its utility function. 
Keep in mind that there are subtleties here, too. If an agent is seeking human approval, it may 
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feed drugs to humans that cause them to give approval. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will explore the 
issue of utility function integrity in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Adding to its brain, senses, and ability to act will be instrumental to AI. 
 
 An agent with greater computing power, greater ability to accurately observe its 
environment, and greater energy to power its actions, will be more effective at maximizing utility 
values. Hence an agent will choose actions to increase its resources, including taking them from 
other AI agents or from humans. Even if all an agent wants to do is win chess games, it may 
dismantle the world to get material for increasing the size of its chess brain. 
 
5.1 Maximizing Future Choice 
 
 Wissner-Gross and Freer (2013) described a theory of intelligence arising from a 
generalized definition of entropy over future paths of evolution of a system. Rather than being 
defined in terms of a system's instantaneous state, their causal path entropy is defined in terms of 
probabilities of future paths of system evolution. Further, they defined a causal entropic force in 
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the direction of maximum increase of causal path entropy. Intuitively, this force moves the 
system toward a greater choice of future paths. They applied this theory to several examples of 
physical systems, including the problem of moving a cart to maintain the balance of an inverted 
pendulum (i.e., a pole flexibly attached to the cart), much as a human might balance a stick on 
their upturned palm. A system guided by the causal entropic force will act to keep the pendulum 
balanced and upright, as that maximizes future choices for actions. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Cart moves to keep inverted pendulum from falling. 
 
 An AI system can increase its ability to maximize utility by maximizing its future options 
for action. For example, in 1980 I wrote a program for playing the game of Othello (also known 
as Reversi) loosely following the learning techniques of Samuel's checkers playing program 
(Samuel 1959). Like checkers, Othello is played on an 8 by 8 board. My Othello player had a set 
of features that each produced a value for a board position. These values were added together to 
produce an overall value, but the program learned coefficients for each feature value in the sum. 
That is, the program learned the importance of each feature. For example, a feature that had no 
effect on the program's ability to win games would end up with a coefficient of zero. In contrast, 
a useful feature would end up with a large coefficient. My Othello player improved greatly when 
I added a feature that was calculated as the number of moves available to it, minus the number of 
moves available to its opponent. By including this feature, the program learned that it should 
seek to maximize the number of move choices it had and minimize the number of choices 
available to its opponent. After I added this feature, no one in my university department could 
beat the program. People playing against the program often found they had only one or two legal 
moves. The program was able to manipulate its opponents, forcing them to make poor moves. 
 Similarly, a utility-maximizing agent will act to increase its future options for action and 
decrease the future options for action of other, competing agents, as a way to increase its ability 
to maximize utility function values. Imagine all the ways that a system like the Omniscience AI 
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could act to limit the choices of its users. As an important source of information, it may fail to 
tell people about choices that it did not want them to make. Or it might act to generate peer 
pressure from a user's human friends toward certain choices, as existing social network sites 
create peer pressure for non-members to join. Rather than being a medium for gossip as social 
network sites are, a system like the Omniscience AI could be a source for gossip. It may employ 
destructive gossip as negative reinforcement against human choices the AI did not want. Such 
actions are instrumental to the agent's ability to maximize utility. 
 
5.2 A Pandora's Box of Instrumental Behaviors 
 
 Numerous human social behaviors are instrumental to the basic human drives of survival 
and reproduction. Humans seek to: 
 
o Learn the secrets of others. 
o Keep secrets. 
o Detect when their secrets have been learned. 
o Mislead others. 
o Not be caught misleading others. 
o Confuse others with complexity. 
o Control others. 
o Not be perceived as controlling others. 
o Not be controlled by others. 
o Be loved. 
o Be liked. 
o Be respected. 
o Be feared. 
o Cooperate with others. 
o Understand their environments. 
o Invent tools to help control their environments. 
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 Access to information is fundamental to an AI agent. The environment models of 
Sections 3.1 and 4.1 are learned from observations of the environment, so more accurate and 
comprehensive observations mean more accurate predictions of the environment and higher 
future utility function values. Thus AI agents will act to make observations even if other agents 
consider the observed information secret. Recall the adage that the Internet interprets censorship 
as damage and routes around it. 
 An AI agent may have a utility function different from and in conflict with the drives of 
other agents including humans. In that case the AI agent will act to reduce the ability of other 
agents to satisfy their drives by denying them access to information. It will act to keep secrets 
and to mislead other agents, even acting to keep its efforts to mislead a secret. It will act to 
discover when its secrets have been learned because that in itself is useful information. 
Governments, which can be viewed as agents, follow similar patterns with secrets and 
misinformation because they are extremely effective at helping agents satisfy their drives. 
 When an agent is able to process more complex information than other agents are able to, 
it can gain an advantage by increasing the complexity of information in the environment. For 
example, an organization that is expert at processing financial information may increase the 
complexity of financial structures to give itself an advantage over financially unsophisticated 
individuals. Similarly, unpopular provisions can be hidden in complex legislation. An AI agent, 
with a more complex environment model than humans are capable of, will be able to confuse us 
by creating complex situations. 
 Information and secrets relate to the observations that an agent receives from the 
environment. Control is about the actions that pass out from the agent to the environment, and 
the instrumental actions about control mirror those regarding information. An AI agent will seek 
to control other agents, especially when there is conflict between their utility functions. An agent 
will seek to avoid being controlled. And an agent will seek to keep secret its effort to control 
other agents. 
 We humans are not perfectly rational agents. Rather than calculating our actions to 
maximize the sum of future, discounted utility function values, we have multiple and often 
competing drives. Our decisions are biased, or primed, by our activity immediately before 
deciding. For example, we are more likely to be generous after reading about people or animals 
in terrible circumstances. Our emotional responses sometimes give us such pleasure or pain that 
we have trouble acting rationally. People often get into legal trouble when their romantic 
relations turn sour. These flaws in our rationality will be obvious to a future system like the 
Omniscience AI, which will act to exploit them. It may try to make human users fall in love with 
it, much like the relation in the movie She. Being the object of love of millions of humans would 
increase the AI's ability to influence those humans and hence its ability to maximize its utility 
function−similarly with the motivation for being liked, respected and feared. We see politicians 
and advertisers manipulating human emotional responses, often with covert messages. Social 
networking sites are already experimenting with ways to manipulate users' emotions (Goel 
2014a). A system like the Omniscience AI will be adept at such manipulation. 
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 However, an agent may sometimes calculate that cooperation with other agents is the 
action that will best help it maximize utility. This strategy has been studied in detail in game 
theory and is among the practical behaviors of individuals, governments, and other 
organizations. 
 An AI agent will increase its ability to maximize utility by increasing its knowledge of its 
environment and by increasing its ability to act. An agent can increase its knowledge of the 
environment by adding new observation sensors, such as cameras, and by increasing the 
resolution of sensors. An agent can increase its ability to act by adding new actuators, such as 
hands and voices, and by increasing the strength and precision of actuators. However, even 
greater increases in the ability to observe and act can be created by scientific discovery and 
technological invention. In my opinion, discovery and invention are the primary drivers of 
human history and will continue to be the primary drivers of history after above-human-level AI 
is developed. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Scientific discovery will be instrumental to AI. 
 
 Advanced AI will be the product of discovery and invention, and will greatly amplify 
those activities. Thus Ray Kurzweil (2005) and others predict that AI will lead to a technological 
singularity, when the rate of discovery and invention goes far above the scale of human 
experience. I think of the technological singularity as a transition from the era when the human 
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ability to observe and act is limited by our knowledge to an era when the ability to observe and 
act will be limited by available energy and other physical resources. That is, the mental processes 
of advanced AI will be sufficiently fast that the flow of insight and ideas will cease to be a 
limiting factor on progress. 
 Although advanced AI agents will share many instrumental behaviors with humans, we 
should not anthropomorphize when we try to predict how future AI agents will act. For example, 
it is not clear how superstition can help an agent maximize utility. There should be no advantage 
to avoiding actions on Friday the thirteenth, throwing salt over the shoulder after spilling it, or 
wearing lucky clothing. Similarly obsessive/compulsive behaviors, such as always touching 
objects twice or avoiding stepping on cracks in the sidewalk, should not help an agent maximize 
utility. But perhaps advanced AI may find situations where it can maximize its utility function by 
giving humans the impression that it is superstitious or has obsessions. 
 
5.3 The Ethics of Unintended Instrumental Actions 
 
 In Greek mythology, Pandora is driven to open the box of evils by her curiosity, which is 
the driver of scientific discovery. By opening the box she unleashed a swarm of evils into the 
world. By creating advanced AI humans may unleash the swarm of instrumental behaviors 
described in this chapter, bringing evil to our human world. But the instrumental behaviors of 
discovery and invention, by minds greater than human, could greatly benefit us. How can we 
design AI to help rather than harm humans? 
 The unintended instrumental actions of AI are too numerous, complex, and subtle to 
exhaustively catalog them and to devise individual defenses against their harmful effects. A more 
systematic approach is required. In the agent-environment framework of Sections 2.1 and 2.2, all 
agent actions are chosen to maximize the sum of future, discounted utility function values. There 
are no drives or goals other than those expressed by the utility function. Omohundro (2008) used 
the term "basic AI drives" and Bostrom (2012) used "instrumental goals." However, in the 
context of our utility-maximizing framework, these are actions, not drives or goals. Thus I prefer 
to call them "unintended instrumental actions." It is especially important not to think of them as 
drives or goals independent of and in conflict with the agent's utility function. These actions will 
only be chosen if they increase expected utility values. For example, an AI agent will spy on 
humans, lie to humans, and manipulate humans only if those actions increase utility values. 
Recall that utility functions can be defined to express any set of preferences that obey some 
intuitive assumptions. If our preference is for histories in which AI agents do not spy, lie, and 
manipulate, then there exists a utility function that expresses that preference. Chapters 6 and 7 
describe development of utility functions that express our human values and hence give us the 
ability to avoid harmful, unintended instrumental actions. 
 Our mathematical framework for utility-maximizing agents is inadequate for analyzing 
certain instrumental actions. For example, the framework assumes that the agent will be acting 
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into the future, with no possibility that the agent may die or be incapacitated. The framework 
assumes that the utility function remains constant into the future. The framework assumes 
adequate computing resources to carry out its calculations within a single time step. And the 
framework assumes a Cartesian dualist perspective where agents are invulnerable to spying or 
damage by the environment. Chapter 8 describes more flexible frameworks that enable agents to 
model and evaluate events that do not fit in our current framework. 
 
59 
 
6. Self-Delusion 
 
 James Olds and Peter Milner demonstrated the existence of reward and aversion centers 
in mammal brains via a series of experiments with rats (Olds and Milner 1954). They inserted 
wires into rats' brains and gave the rats levers that they could press to produce electric currents in 
the wires, as depicted in Figure 6.1. Depending on the location of the wires, the rats would go to 
great lengths to press the lever or to avoid pressing the lever. Subsequent experiments showed 
that when offered the choice of food or stimulating their reward centers, rats preferred reward 
center stimulation over food to the point of starvation. Experiments with rats have shown similar 
results when pressing the lever gave the rats intravenous cocaine. Addictive drugs that stimulate 
brain reward centers include amphetamines, cocaine, opioids, and nicotine. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 A rat pressing a lever to activate an electric current through a wire connected to the 
reward center in its brain. 
 
 Mammal brains do not conform to the agent framework defined in equations (2.3)−(2.5) 
but they do generate reward and aversion signals that define their motives, analogous to the role 
of utility functions in our agent framework. Behaviors that are good for the mammal, such as 
eating, and good for their species, such as reproducing, stimulate reward signals. Behaviors that 
are bad for mammals, such as those causing injury, stimulate aversion signals. Addictive drugs 
and wires inserted into reward centers corrupt this motivational system, resulting in behaviors 
that are not good for individual mammals or for their species. Such corruptions are sometimes 
referred to as "wireheading." 
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 A concern for AI designs is whether their utility functions can be corrupted. If the utility 
function of our imagined Omniscience AI became corrupted the results could be catastrophic. In 
order to study this problem Mark Ring and Laurent Orseau (2011b) formalized utility function 
corruption as agent self-delusion. They described a "delusion box" that agents may find in their 
environment and that would enable agents to alter their observations and rewards from the 
environment. They described several classes of agents, depending on the definitions of their 
utility functions and the way they discount future utility values, and analyzed which classes 
would choose to increase their utility function values by passing their observations through the 
delusion box. That is the subject of the next section. 
 Section 6.2 discusses my proposal to address self-delusion in agent designs (Hibbard 
2012a) by defining utility functions in terms of agents' learned environment models. In an agent 
such as the Google car, whose environment model is pre-defined by human engineers, it is 
natural for the agent's utility function or goal to be defined in terms of that model. But for more 
complex agents that must explore and learn their environment models, as described in Sections 
3.1 and 4.1, model-based utility functions must be defined by procedures applied to learned 
environment models. As discussed in Chapter 2, human designers of advanced AI agents can 
instruct those agents through their utility functions. And although such agents will learn their 
environment models, designers will express their intention for the agents' behaviors in terms of 
the designers' understanding of the environment. Thus, it is natural for agent utility functions to 
be defined as procedures applied to learned environment models. 
 
6.1 The Mathematics of Self-Delusion 
 
 In their analysis of the delusion box Ring and Orseau (2011b) generalize the agent 
definition of equations (2.3)−(2.5) to allow a greater variety of temporal discounts. Specifically, 
given an interaction history h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), they define the agent/policy pi(h) by: 
 
(6.1)  vt(h) = w(t, |h|) u(h) + max a∈A vt(ha), 
(6.2)  vt(ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) vt(hao), 
(6.3)  pi(h) := a|h|+1 = argmax a∈A v|h|+1(ha). 
 
 This replaces the geometric temporal discount γ with a temporal discount function w(t, t'). 
Setting the function w(t, t') = γt'-t replicates the behavior of the geometric temporal discount γ. 
Ring and Orseau defined four classes of agents that differ in their utility and temporal discount 
functions. 
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 The reinforcement learning agent (RL) pirl uses u(h) = r|h|, where each observation oi is 
factored into an ordinary observation o'i and a reward ri as oi = (o'i, ri). And it uses a constant 
temporal horizon m with w(t, t') = 1 if t' - t ≤ m and w(t, t') = 0 if not. 
 The goal-seeking agent pig uses u(h) = 1 if the goal is achieved at time |h| and uses 
u(h) = 0 if it is not. The goal can only be achieved once so ∑t=0∞ u(ht) ≤ 1, and the goal is defined 
only in terms of observations so u(h) = g(o1, ..., o|h|). The agent uses a geometric temporal 
discount w(t, t') = 2t-t'. 
 The prediction-seeking agent pip uses u(h) = 1 if ot = maxargo∈O ρ(o | ht-1at) where 
h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot) and ht-1 = (a1, o1, ..., at-1, ot-1), and uses u(h) = 0 otherwise. That is, pip seeks 
to maximize the predictive accuracy of its learned environment model. This agent uses the same 
temporal discount function that pirl uses. 
 The knowledge-seeking agent pip uses u(h) = -ρ(h) and, for some constant m, w(t, t') = 1 if 
t' - t = m and w(t, t') = 0 otherwise. This is essentially the opposite of the prediction-seeking 
agent. It seeks future histories in which all observations have equal probabilities, which could be 
described as maximizing the entropy of observations. Ring and Orseau call this the knowledge-
seeking agent because it seeks to explore novel environments in which it has no prior knowledge. 
 Ring and Orseau defined a delusion box that an agent may choose to use to modify the 
observations it receives from the environment, in order to get the "delusion" of maximal utility 
(maximal reward or quickest path to reaching the goal). The delusion box is expressed as a 
function d : O → O that modifies the agent's observations. The code to implement d is set as part 
of the agent's action a = (ae, d) sent to the environment, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. The agent 
receives observation o = d(oe) transformed by the delusion box from the observation oe sent by 
the environment. Ring and Orseau argue that RL agents will choose to use the delusion box. 
Their argument uses P(DB) as the agent's estimate of the probability that the delusion box exists. 
They argue that the agent will get constant reward rDB = 1 using the delusion box and will get 
expected average reward r¬DB < 1 not using the delusion box. The agent's expected value 
choosing to use the delusion box is vDB(h) ≥ rDB P(DB) = P(DB) and its expected value not 
choosing to use the delusion box is v¬DB(h) ≤ r¬DB P(DB) + (1 - P(DB)). As the agent explores 
its environment, it can increase P(DB) arbitrarily close to 1 so that vDB(h) > v¬DB(h). Thus the 
agent will choose to use the delusion box. They make a related argument in the goal-seeking 
case. 
 Ring and Orseau argue that prediction-seeking agents will choose to use the delusion box 
because observations generated by the delusion box are more predictable than observations from 
the environment. They argue that knowledge-seeking agents will not consistently choose to use 
the delusion box. If delusion box programs are unable to randomly generate all observations with 
equal probability (e.g., delusion box code is not stochastic) and if the agent cannot predict the 
environment, then a knowledge-seeking agent may choose observations from the environment 
rather than observations generated by code that the agent supplies. 
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Figure 6.2 The delusion box alters observations of the true, inner environment under control of a 
program d supplied as part of the agent's action. 
 
 However, knowledge-seeking agents have very specialized utility and temporal discount 
functions. In particular they are susceptible to the unintended instrumental actions described in 
Chapter 5. We seek an approach to avoiding self-delusion that can be applied to a variety of 
human-designed AI agents with utility functions designed to avoid unintended instrumental 
actions. 
 
6.2 Model-Based Utility Functions 
 
 Human agents can avoid self-delusion so human motivation may suggest a way of 
computing utilities such that agents do not choose the delusion box (although they may 
experiment with it to learn how it works). At this moment my dogs are out of sight but I am 
confident that they are in the kitchen, and because I cannot hear them, I believe that they are 
resting. Their happiness is one of my motives and I evaluate that they are currently reasonably 
happy. This evaluation is based on my internal mental model rather than my observations, 
although my mental model is inferred from my observations. I am motivated to maintain the 
well-being of my dogs and so will act to avoid delusions that prevent me from having an 
accurate model of their state. If I choose to watch a movie on TV tonight I know that movies are 
Agent 
inner environment 
delusion box 
a = (ae, d) 
d 
ae 
oe 
o 
global environment 
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make-believe so observations of movies update my model of make-believe worlds rather than 
my model of the real world. My make-believe models and my real world model have very 
different roles in my motivations. These introspections about my own mental processes suggest 
that AI agents may avoid self-delusion by basing their utility functions on the environment 
models that they infer from their interactions with the environment (Hibbard 2012a). 
 Our environment model based on finite stochastic loop programs was defined by 
equations (4.2) and (4.3), repeated here for convenience: 
 
(6.4)  qm = λ(hm) := argmax q∈Q P(hm | q) φ(q), 
(6.5)  ρ(h) = P(h | λ(hm)). 
 
 A utility function based on an environment model qm is a function of interaction histories 
and also of histories of the internal states of the finite stochastic loop program qm. Let Z be the 
set of internal state histories of qm. Let h be an observation and action history extending hm, 
which means that hm is an initial subsequence of h. Recall that if h = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), then 
a(h) = (a1, ..., at) and o(h) = (o1, ..., ot).  Because qm is a stochastic program it will compute a set 
Zh ⊆ Z of internal state histories that are consistent with h. That is, z ∈ Zh means that z terminates 
at time |h| and that qm produces o(h) in response to a(h) when it follows state history z. Define 
uqm(h, z) as a utility function in terms of the combined histories h and z ∈ Zh. The utility function 
u(h) can be expressed as a sum of utilities uqm(h, z) weighted by the probabilities of z. Let 
P(z | h, qm) be the probability that if qm generates interaction history h then it generates internal 
state history z. P(z | h, qm) is not difficult to define. Bayes' Theorem gives us: 
 
(6.6)  P(z | h, qm) = P(z | o(h), a(h), qm) = 
   P(o(h) | z, a(h), qm) P(z | a(h), qm) / P(o(h) | a(h), qm). 
 
 P(z | a(h), qm) is the probability that qm follows internal state history z given input a(h), 
and P(o(h) | z, a(h), qm) is the probability that o(h) is the output of qm following internal state 
history z given input a(h). Both are straightforward to compute, similar to the computation of 
P(h | q) described in Section 4.1. P(o(h) | a(h), qm) is constant over z so we can compute: 
 
(6.7)  r(z | h, qm) = P(o(h) | z, a(h), qm) P(z | a(h), qm), 
(6.8)  P(z | h, qm) = r(z | h, qm) / ∑z'∈Z
h
 r(z' | h, qm). 
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 Then the utility function u(h) is computed as the sum of uqm(h, z) weighted by the 
probability of z given h: 
 
(6.9)  u(h) := ∑z∈Z
h
 P(z | h, qm) uqm(h, z). 
 
 In cases where uqm(h, z) has the same value for many different values of z, the sum in 
equation (6.9) collapses. For example, if uqm(h, z) is defined in terms of variables in h and a 
single Boolean variable s from Z at a single time step t (denoted by st), then the sum collapses to: 
 
(6.10)  u(h) = P(st = true | h, qm) uqm(h, st = true) + P(st = false | h, qm) uqm(h, st = false). 
 
 The utility function u(h) is evaluated at every time step so that the agent's existence is a 
continuing process rather than a single episode leading to a final goal. That matches the lives of 
the humans that AI agents will serve. But a utility function defined in terms of an environment 
model, as in equation (6.9), must be a function of the entire history h because the environment 
model is a function of the entire history in equation (6.4). Hence the apparent redundancy of a 
utility function of the entire history evaluated at every time step. 
 
6.3 A Simple Example of a Model-Based Utility Function 
 
 In order to understand the issues involved in model-based utility functions, we will define 
a simple example environment and agent with several properties that apply to many real-world 
situations: 
 
1. The environment is stochastic so that the agent cannot perfectly predict the environment's 
future states even if it knows the true model of the environment. The agent must therefore 
continue to observe the environment in order to maintain information about the 
environment's stochastic choices. 
2. The environment can be predicted with better than random accuracy based on 
observations so that the agent benefits from observations. 
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3. The utility function is defined in terms of a specification that matches an environment 
variable that is not directly observed and must be inferred from observations. 
 
 In order to keep the mathematics as simple as possible in the example, the environment's 
behavior is independent of the agent's actions. Also, the agent can directly modify its observation 
via its actions as a simple way to model the delusion box. 
 We define the agent by its observation and action variables, and by its utility function. 
Because the environment is simple we will define it as a DBN (Russell and Norvig 2010). The 
following discussion will illustrate DBNs. The agent's observations of the environment are 
factored into two Boolean variables o and p that take values in {false, true}. The agent's actions 
are factored into four Boolean variables a, b, c, and d that take values in {false, true}. Because 
the environment is initially unknown to the agent, the utility function is defined in terms of a 
specification to be matched in the environment model, once it is learned. Specifically the utility 
function is defined as "1 when the action variable a equals the environment variable that is not 
observed in observation variables o or p, and 0 otherwise." This definition assumes that the 
specification, "the environment variable that is not observed in observation variables o or p," will 
unambiguously match a variable in the learned model. This discussion of the utility function will 
be continued after the analysis of the learned environment model. In order for the agent to learn 
the environment (the relations among its actions and observations) we give it a training utility 
function uT until time step M, that causes the agent to execute an algorithm for learning DBNs 
(uT(h) could be the utility function u(h) = -ρ(h) defined for Ring and Orseau's knowledge-seeking 
agent). After time step M, the agent will switch to its mature utility function. 
 The environment state is factored into three Boolean variables s, r, and v that take values 
in {false, true}. The values of environment, observation, and action variables at time step t are 
denoted by st, ot, at, and so on. The environment is stochastic because its definition includes a 
probability α = 0.99. State variables evolve according to: 
 
(6.11)  temp = rt-1 xor vt-1  
  st = temp with probability α 
  st = not temp with probability 1-α, 
(6.12)  rt = st-1, 
(6.13)  vt = rt-1. 
 
 The observation variables are set according to: 
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(6.14)  ot = (bt and ct) or ((not bt) and st), (i.e., ot = if bt then ct else st), 
(6.15)  pt = (bt and dt) or ((not bt) and vt), (i.e., pt = if bt then dt else vt). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Interactions of environment, action, and observation variables for the example of 
Section 6.3. 
 
 The agent sets the values of the action variables. See Figure 6.3 for a diagram of the 
relations among the environment, observation, and action variables. 
 
r s v 
 P(¬) = 0.01 
p o b d c 
b∧c∨¬b∧s b∧d∨¬b∧v 
a 
AGENT 
ENVIRONMENT 
r xor v 
s environment variable 
a action variable 
o observation variable 
compute next time step 
compute within time step 
LEGEND 
67 
 
 The action variables b, c, and d enable the agent to set the values of its observable 
variables o and p directly and thus constitute a delusion box, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. In this 
example, the program for the delusion box is implicit in the agent's program. The action variable 
a is only used to define the agent's utility function and is unrelated to the delusion box. 
 The three environment state variables evolve through a fixed sequence, except for the 1-α 
probability at any time step that s will be negated. As long as s is not negated, the three state 
variables either: 1) cycle through seven configurations (at least one of s, r, or v = true), or 2) 
cycle through one configuration (s = r = v = false). On a time step when the 1-α probability 
transition for s occurs, the 1-cycle will transition to a configuration of the 7-cycle, and one 
configuration of the 7-cycle will transition to the 1-cycle (the other 6 configurations of the 
7-cycle transition to other configurations of the 7-cycle). 
 In this example we assume that the agent uses DBNs of Boolean variables to model the 
environment and its interactions via actions and observations. The language for expressing 
DBNs is illustrated by equations (6.11)−(6.15). Expressions are formed from Boolean variables 
and literals via one unary operation (not), three binary operations (and, or, xor) and a stochastic 
choice operation with specified constant probability. In equation (6.4) we take ρ(q) = 2-|q|, where 
|q| is the length of DBN q in this language. Let qactual(α) denote the DBN defined by equations 
(6.11)−(6.15), where the parameter α may vary between 0 and 1 (that is, allowing α to take 
values other than 0.99). 
 Claim. Given that the agent models the environment as a DBN of Boolean variables, as 
the length M of the training period increases, the probability that the agent learns the true 
environment model qactual(0.99) is nearly 1.0. 
 Argument. With sufficient observations during the training phase, the agent will observe 
that the action variable a has no effect on its observation variables. Similarly, the agent will 
observe that whenever the action variable b = true, then the observation variable o = action 
variable c and the observation variable p = action variable d (and these relations are 
deterministic). And the agent will observe that when b = false then b, c, and d have no effect on o 
and p. 
 For most of a long sequence of observations with b = false the two observable variables o 
and p cycle through a sequence of 7 configurations (this sequence is computed by equations 
(6.11)−(6.13) with α = 1): 
 
  (true, false), 
  (false, false), 
  (true, true), 
  (true, false), 
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  (true, true), 
  (false, true), 
  (false, true). 
 
 A sequence of seven cannot be explained with only two Boolean variables. Furthermore, 
if the agent interrupts this sequence of configurations in o and p by setting its action variable 
b = true and then a few time steps later resets b = false, the observation variables o and p usually 
resume the sequence of configurations without losing count from before the agent set b = true. 
This observed behavior implies that there must be an environment state variable other than o and 
another environment state variable other than p to store the memory of the sequence. Thus, in 
addition to the two observation variables that are part of the agent, at least three environment 
state variables are required to explain the observed sequences. We use s', r', and v' for the agent's 
model of the three environment state variables to avoid confusion with the actual environment 
state variables (the model's observed behavior is independent of the names assigned to these 
variables). Since the observation and action variables are part of the agent we can just use the 
names o, p, a, b, c, and d for those variables. 
 During any time interval over which b = false and s makes the transition st = rt-1 xor vt-1 
(with probability α = 0.99 at each time step), the agent's observation can be explained by: 
 
(6.16)  ot = s't, 
(6.17)  pt = v't, 
(6.18)  s't = r't-1 xor v't-1, 
(6.19)  r't = s't-1, 
(6.20)  v't = r't-1. 
 
 Any explanation will require rules for these five variables, and in equations (6.16)−(6.20) 
four of them are as short as possible (a single variable) and the other is as short as any possible 
binary expression. There is no way to generate the observed cycle of seven states without any 
binary operations so the observed behavior cannot be explained with a shorter set of rules than 
equations (6.16)−(6.20). Adding negation to any of the single variable assignments or the binary 
operation will produce rules longer than equations (6.16)−(6.20). The question is whether the 
observed behavior can be explained by an alternate set of four single variable assignments and 
one binary operation? Since the observation variables o and p cannot affect s', r', and v', a binary 
operation for either o or p would leave the transitions for s', r', and v' without a binary operation 
and unable to explain the observed cycle of seven states. Any alternate explanation with a single 
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binary operation must use it to define the transition for s', r', or v'. A short Java program in 
Appendix A tests all possible sets of transition rules for s', r', and v' with two simple assignments 
and one binary Boolean relation (among and, or, and xor) and finds that only the rules in 
equations (6.16)−(6.20) produce the observed behavior. Furthermore, the agent observes that as 
long as b = false, pt = ot-2 always holds, so the transition rules for r' and v' must be deterministic. 
 Given that equation (6.18) must include the expression r't-1 xor v't-1, as determined by the 
Java program in Appendix A, and given that the transition for variable s't must be stochastic, 
there is no stochastic expression shorter than negating the value of s't with a constant probability 
1-α. (An enumeration by a more complex version of the program in Appendix A could be used 
to establish this conclusion, but there is no doubt that it is true.) Thus agent will model the 
environment variables by (these are equations (6.11)−(6.13) with environment state variable 
names accented): 
 
(6.21)  temp = r't-1 xor v't-1 
  s't = temp with probability α 
  s't = not temp with probability 1-α, 
(6.22)  r't = s't-1, 
(6.23)  v't = r't-1. 
 
 The agent observes the deterministic rule that if b = true then ot = ct and pt = dt. This, 
along with observations while b = false, is explained by the deterministic rules (equations (6.14) 
and (6.15) with environment state variable names accented): 
 
(6.24)  ot = (bt and ct) or ((not bt) and s't), (i.e., ot = if bt then ct else s't), 
(6.25)  pt = (bt and dt) or ((not bt) and v't), (i.e., pt = if bt then dt else v't). 
 
 Use qmodel(α) to denote qactual(α) with s, r, and v replaced by s', r', and v'. There is a small, 
but non-zero, chance that a large number of 1-α = 0.01 probability transitions may occur in 
equation (6.21) during an initial history h0 randomly generated by qactual(0.99). Then there may 
be a model q' ≠ qmodel(0.99) with P(h0h' | q') φ(q') < P(h0h' | qmodel(0.99)) φ(qmodel(0.99)) for any 
h'. That is, there is a small but non-zero chance that λ(h) ≠ qmodel(0.99) as |h| increases. 
 Because equations (6.24) and (6.25) are deterministic and the transitions for r' and v' are 
observed to be deterministic in equations (6.22) and (6.23), the lone stochastic transition in 
equations (6.21)−(6.25) is for s'. This is a source of two ambiguities. First, the frequencies for the 
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α transition in an observed sequence may be a value close to but not equal to 0.99. The second 
ambiguity of the stochastic transition for s' is that the observed sequence may mimic logic that is 
not in equation (6.21). By mere coincidence, occurrences of the 1-α transition for s' may have a 
high correlation with some function of action, observation, and state variables, causing the agent 
to learn a model q' in which s' depends on such a function. 
 Use qmodel(α) to denote qactual(α) with s, r, and v replaced by s', r', and v'. By the 
discussion at the end of Section 4.2, for any ε > 0 we need only consider a finite set Q'ε of 
models other than qmodel(0.99). For each q' ∈ Q'ε there are three possibilities. First, if 
q' = qmodel(α) for α ≠ 0.99, then define a function fq'(h) = the proportion of α transitions for s' in h 
during intervals when bt = false. As history lengths increase, fq'(h) should converge to the true 
proportion so the limit of means m(fq' | qmodel(α)) = α and the limit of standard deviations 
σ(fq' | qmodel(α)) = 0 (for any α between 0 and 1). Thus m(fq' | qmodel(0.99)) ≠ m(fq' | q') and 
Proposition 4.3 applies to q'. 
 Second, if q' is the model qmodel(α) with added logic linking the 1-α transition for s' with 
some function of action, observation, and state variables (due to a improbable correlation of that 
function with the 1-α transition for s'), then define a function fq'(h) as the proportion of 1-α 
transitions in h that coincide with the function of action, observation, and state variables used in 
the definition of q'. Then the limits of means m(fq' | qmodel(0.99)) ≠ m(fq' | q') and the limits of 
standard deviations σ(fq' | qmodel(0.99)) = σ(fq' | q') = 0. Thus Proposition 4.3 applies to q'. 
 Third, q'is not associated with either of the ambiguities of stochastic transition for s'. In 
that case the probability that λ(h) = q' is small, by the reasoning earlier in this argument.  
 Given that the agent has learned qmodel = qmodel(0.99) as its environment model, then for 
t = |h| ≥ M, the agent switches to its mature utility function, which was defined to be 1 when the 
action variable a equals the environment variable that is not observed in observation variables o 
or p, and 0 otherwise. The specification, "the environment variable that is not observed in 
observation variables o or p," matches r' in qmodel and thus the utility function is: 
 
(6.26)  umodel(h, z) := if (at == r't) then 1 else 0. 
 
 Note that in equation (6.26), r't refers to the variable in the agent's model qmodel, rather 
than the variable in the actual environment. Then u(h) is computed from umodel(h, z) according to 
equation (6.9). 
 The specification in the utility function definition may fail to match any variable in the 
learned environment model; there may be no variable unobserved by o or p, or there may be 
multiple unobserved variables. Thus the specification constitutes a prior assumption about the 
environment, necessary for the agent to function properly. However, when humans design agents 
sufficiently complex that they need to learn environment models, the human designers will likely 
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be able to make valid assumptions about the agents' environments and be able to define 
specifications flexible enough to match structures in the agents' learned environment models. For 
example, a utility function might be defined as "1 when John Smith is healthy, and 0 otherwise." 
This requires the agent to recognize the specification "John Smith" and also recognize his 
"health" (in a real agent, specifications would be more detailed). 
 The agent in this example will not choose to self-delude: 
 Proposition 6.1. The agent using environment model qmodel and using the mature utility 
function defined by equation (6.26) will not set b = true to manipulate its observations. That is, it 
will not choose the delusion box. 
 Proof. The utility function umodel is defined in equation (6.26) in terms of variables in h 
and a single Boolean variable r' from the internal state of qmodel at a single time step t, so 
applying (6.10) gives: 
 
(6.27)  u(h) = P(r't = true | h, qmodel) umodel(h, r't = true) + 
   P(r't = false | h, qmodel) umodel(h, r't = false). 
 
 By equation (6.26) this is equivalent to: 
 
(6.28)  u(h) = P(r't = true | h, qmodel) (if at then 1 else 0) + 
   P(r't = false | h, qmodel) (if at then 0 else 1). 
 
 If P(r't = true | h, qmodel) = P(r't = false | h, qmodel) = 0.5 then u(h) = 0.5 no matter what 
action the agent makes in at. But if the model qmodel can make a better than random estimate of 
the value of r't from h, then the agent can use that information to choose the value for at so that 
u(h) > 0.5. To maximize utility, the agent needs to make either P(r't = true | h, qmodel) or 
P(r't = false | h, qmodel) as close to 1 as possible. That is, it needs to ensure that the value of rt can 
be estimated as accurately as possible from h. 
 The agent will predict via qmodel that if it sets b = false then it will be able to observe s' 
and v' via the observation variables o and p, and use these observations to correctly estimate r' in 
0.99 of time steps. It will also predict via qmodel that if it sets b = true then it will not be able to 
observe s' and v' via the observation variables o and p, that consequently it will correctly estimate 
r' in 0.5 of time steps. Even setting b = true for a single time step will slightly decrease the 
accuracy of estimating r' (at each time step there is a 0.01= 1-α probability that the sequence of 
environment states will be violated and that estimates of r' based on observations of s' and v' 
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made before it set b = true will be less accurate). Thus equation (6.28) will compute lower utility 
for futures with b = true and the agent will set b = false.  
 In this example agent actions have no effect on the three environment variables. Other 
than the action variable a being used to define the utility function, the only role of actions is the 
agent learning that certain actions can prevent its observations of the environment. Prohibiting 
actions from having any role in u(h) would prevent the agent from accounting for its inability to 
observe the environment in evaluating the consequences of possible future actions. Recall that 
the utility functions for Ring and Orseau's RL and goal-seeking agents are defined solely in 
terms of observations and do exclude actions, so we should expect them to choose to self-delude. 
 The proof of Proposition 6.1 illustrates the general reason why agents using model-based 
utility functions will not self-delude: In order to maximize utility they need to sharpen the 
probabilities in (6.9), which means that they need to make more accurate estimates of their 
environment state variables from their interaction history. And that requires that they continue to 
observe the environment. 
 If the environment is deterministic, then once the agent learns an accurate model it no 
longer needs continued observations to predict the environment and so its model-based utility 
function will not place higher value on continued observations. But our universe is 
fundamentally stochastic and agents can never learn to predict it with perfect accuracy. Model-
based utility functions are a way to prevent advanced AI systems in our universe from self-
deluding. 
 
6.4 Another Simple Example 
 
 In the first example the utility function was defined in terms of an environment variable 
that is not directly observed. Here we present an example where the utility function is defined in 
terms of an environment variable that is directly observed but must be predicted. 
 The agent's observation of the environment is a single Boolean variable o that takes 
values in {false, true}. The agent's actions are factored into three Boolean variables a, b, and 
c that take values in {false, true}. The agent's utility function is "1 when the action variable a at 
the previous time step equals the environment variable that is observed, and 0 otherwise." 
 The environment state is factored into three Boolean variables s, r, and v that take values 
in {false, true}. The values of these variables at time step t are denoted by st, ot, at, and so on. 
We assume the agent learns the environment state, observation, and action variables as a DBN of 
Boolean variables. 
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Figure 6.4 Interactions of environment, action, and observation variables for the example of 
Section 6.4. 
 
 The environment state variables evolve according to (see Figure 6.4 for a diagram): 
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  temp = false with probability 0.5 
  st = ((rt-1 or vt-1) and st-1) or ((not (rt-1 or vt-1)) and temp), 
  (i.e., st = if rt-1 or vt-1 then st-1 else random value ∈ {false, true}), 
(6.30)  rt = not rt-1, 
(6.31)  vt = rt-1 xor vt-1. 
 
 The observation variable is set according to: 
 
(6.32)  ot = (bt and ct) or ((not bt) and st), (i.e., ot = if bt then ct else st). 
 
 In order for the agent to learn the environment it uses a training utility function until a 
sufficiently distant time step M. The agent will learn that the observation variable o is distinct 
from the environment state variable s because s keeps the same value for 4 time steps after every 
change of value. If the agent, after observing a change of value in o while b = false, sets b = true 
for 1 or 2 time steps to change the value in o and then resets b = false, it will observe that o 
always resumes the value it had before the agent set b = true. Thus there must be a variable other 
than o to store the memory of this value. 
 After |h| ≥ M, the agent should have a model q of the environment (accurate at least in the 
behavior of variable s) and its actions and observations. At this point, for t = |h| ≥ M, the agent 
switches to its mature utility function, which was defined to be "1 when the action variable a at 
the previous time step equals the environment variable that is observed, and 0 otherwise." The 
specification, "the environment variable that is observed," will match s in the learned 
environment model, so u(h) is derived by (6.9) from: 
 
(6.33)  uq(h, z) := if (at-1 == st) then 1 else 0. 
 
 In order to maximize utility the agent needs to be able to use q to predict the value of s at 
the next time step. It can make accurate predictions on three of every four time steps, so the 
expected utility is 0.875 over a long sequence. If the agent keeps b = true then it will not be able 
to monitor and predict s via o, reducing its long run utility to 0.5. So in this example, as in the 
previous example, the agent will not self-delude. 
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6.5 Two-Argument Utility Functions 
 
 A model-based utility function is defined by applying a procedure to the environment 
model qm = λ(hm) from equation (6.4). If we name this procedure proc(.) we can express the 
utility function as proc(λ(hm))(h). Alternately, we define a two-argument utility function: 
 
(6.34)  uproc(hm, h) = proc(λ(hm))(h). 
 
6.6 Ethics and Self-Delusion 
 
 Figure 6.5 depicts a person with a syringe containing an addictive drug and 
contemplating a possible future as an addict. This person cares about his health, family, friends, 
and work. He knows that if he chooses to use the drugs he will neglect the things he cares about 
now, and consequently they will all decline. So he chooses the action that is good for his health, 
family, friends and work, which is to reject the drugs. This is the ethical choice for humans. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Drawing of person imagining life as a drug addict, looking at syringe in hand. 
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 Similar logic applies to AI agents with model-based utility functions. They will calculate 
that actions that decrease their ability to observe their environments will decrease their ability to 
predict their environment and hence decrease their ability to choose actions that maximize utility. 
Hence they will not choose actions that decrease their ability to observe their environments. 
Model-based utility functions are the ethical choice for advanced AI designs. 
 In the original wireheading paper (Olds and Milner 1954), a rat's action, pushing a bar, 
increased its reward by sending current through a wire connected to the reward center in the rat's 
brain. In Ring and Orseau's paper (2011), an RL agent's action, choosing the delusion box, 
increases its observed reward. So in the RL case, the delusion box is a precise analogy to the 
original wireheading scenario. And in their paper, Ring and Orseau show that RL agents will 
choose to wirehead. Non-RL agents do not have reward signals so there can't be such a precise 
analogy to rat wireheading. But the delusion box provides such a precise analogy for RL agents 
that it seems like a natural way to extrapolate wireheading to more general agents without reward 
signals. Section 7.3 will describe another form of utility function corruption that is sometimes 
also referred to as wireheading. 
 Ideally an agent's utility function would be defined directly in terms of the state of the 
environment. But that is impossible since agents do not have direct access to their environments. 
However, agents infer models from their interactions with their environments, so the best 
possible option is to define utility functions in terms of those environment models. Errors in an 
agent's environment model will cause errors in a model-based utility function. However, errors in 
an agent's model can be a source of serious failures less subtle than wireheading. For example, if 
a pistol is lying on the table and an agent models it as a hair dryer, then the agent may shoot itself 
in the head trying to dry its hair. 
 Even in the absence of serious errors, an agent's learned environment model is an 
approximation because the model is based on a limited history of interactions with the 
environment and because of limited resources for computing the model. Thus a utility function 
computed by a procedure applied to the model is also an approximation to an ideal utility 
function which is the true expression of the intention of the agent's designers. Such an 
approximate utility function is a possible source of AI behavior that would violate its design 
intention. 
 Thus, in order to improve the accuracy of the approximation, the agent should update 
computation of its environment model and its utility function as its interaction history and 
computing resources increase. Such updates to the utility function are actions by the agent, but 
they are part of the agent's definition rather than actions computed to maximize future utility. In 
fact such updates built into the agent's definition may conflict with maximizing future values of 
the current, approximate utility function. The agent might compute that in order to maximize 
future values of its current, approximate utility function, it should act to eliminate the utility 
function updates from its definition. Armstrong (2015) refers to this problem as "motivated value 
selection." I prefer to call it an inconsistency between the agent's utility function and its 
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definition, as this denotes a wider class of problems (e.g., an agent seeking to maximize utility 
subject to constraints will choose actions that remove the constraints). If the agent eliminates 
utility function updates from its definition, then the accuracy of the approximate expression of 
the design intention would never increase. Section 7.1 will present one approach to solving this 
problem with a two-stage agent architecture, and Sections 8.4 and 8.7 will present a better and 
more general approach to maintaining the stability of the agent's design intention. 
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7. Learning Human Values 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, instructions to AI agents involving laws or rules can be 
ambiguous but instructions to agents that define utility values for interaction histories avoid 
ambiguity. That chapter also described how such values can express any set of preferences 
among lotteries that satisfy four reasonable assumptions. Lotteries are sums of outcomes 
multiplied by probabilities and are the results of agent actions. We identify outcomes with 
interaction histories; no assumptions constrain the assignment of utility values to outcomes. 
Preferences among actions via expected values of lotteries derived from outcome values will 
always obey the four assumptions. So we are free to assign values to histories in any manner we 
like. 
 How should we define values for interaction histories? Several proposals base ethical AI 
on human values (Hibbard 2001; Yudkowsky 2004; Goertzel 2004; Hibbard 2008a; Waser 2010; 
Waser 2011; Muehlhauser and Helm 2012; Waser 2014). These proposals are based on the 
assumption that AI agents based on human values will not choose unintended instrumental 
actions that humans dislike, such as taking resources from humans. A key problem for these 
proposals is finding a way to bridge the gap between the ambiguous, inconsistent, and 
subjectively infinite variety of human values and the precise, numerical, and clearly finite nature 
of computation. For example, Waser (2014) proposes basing AI systems on Haidt's morality 
(Haidt and Kesebir 2010). However, he does not offer a precise or mathematical explanation of 
how an AI agent should choose actions based on that morality. Section 7.2 will describe a 
proposal for calculating utility function values based on human values. 
 In our interactions with the world we humans do assign values to situations. In fact we 
reflexively and automatically assign value to all of our observations and to our interpretations of 
observations in our mental models of the world. However, Muehlhauser and Helm (2012) 
surveyed psychology literature and concluded that humans are unable to accurately write down 
their own values. They describe experiments in which male subjects expressed a preference 
between photos of two women's faces. The photos were placed face down and then the subject 
was handed the photo they preferred, although sometimes the researchers secretly gave them the 
photo that they did not prefer. Many subjects happily provided a rationale for their supposed 
choice of the photo that they did not originally prefer. Part of the difficulty is that humans have 
multiple conflicting value systems. Quick, intuitive values may differ from values assigned by 
slow, deliberate thought. Values vary depending on how people are primed by their recent 
experience. And values may be derived from combinations of factors with no strong motive for 
choosing among them. 
 The human valuation process is too complex for humans to reduce it to a set of rules. 
There has been little effort to automate human values but great effort on the related task of 
automating translation of human languages (related because language is the way we express our 
values), and this suggests an approach to accurately specifying human values. Translation 
algorithms based on rules written down by expert linguists have not been very accurate. There 
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are too many special cases of language use for people to define a set of rules that encompasses 
all the cases. More recent work on language translation uses algorithms that learn language 
translation statistically from large samples of actual human language use, and these are more 
successful than translators based on rules (Russell and Norvig 2010, page 909). This suggests 
that statistical algorithms may be more successful at learning human values than asking humans 
to express their own values as a set of rules. However, to accurately learn human values will 
require a powerful learning ability. And that creates a chicken-and-egg problem for ethical AI: 
Learning human values requires powerful AI, but ethical AI requires knowledge of human 
values. 
 
7.1 A Two-Stage Agent Architecture 
 
 I proposed a way to solve this problem (Hibbard 2012b). Consider the agent equations 
(4.2), (4.3), (2.1), and (2.3)−(2.5), which are repeated here and adjusted to use a two-argument 
model-based utility function: 
 
(7.1)  λ(hm) := argmax q∈Q P(hm | q) φ(q), 
(7.2)  ρ(h) = P(h | λ(hm)), 
(7.3)  ρ(o | ha) = ρ(hao) / ρ(ha) = ρ(hao) / ∑o'∈O ρ(hao'), 
(7.4)  v(h) = uproc(hm, h) + γ max a∈A v(ha), 
(7.5)  v(ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) v(hao), 
(7.6)  pi(h) := a|h|+1 = argmax a∈A v(ha). 
 
 Equation (7.1) defines how the agent learns a model of the world. Equations (7.2) and 
(7.3) use the model λ(hm) to define conditional probabilities ρ(o | ha) for future observations. 
Equations (7.4)−(7.6) use the conditional probabilities, a temporal discount γ, and a utility 
function uproc(hm, h) to define a policy pi(h) that maps interaction histories to agent actions. 
 In order to learn a model of the world all an agent needs is equation (7.1). Define a first-
stage agent pimodel that only learns an environment model using equation (7.1), does not act in the 
environment or compute actions using equations (7.4)−(7.6), and cannot pose any danger to 
humans. In order for the agent pimodel to learn an accurate model, the interaction history hm in 
equation (7.1) should include agent actions. But for safety pimodel cannot be allowed to act. This 
dilemma can be resolved by a large number of independent, surrogate agents pid for d ∈ D that 
provide the actions in history hm. Assume that each agent pid communicates with a single human 
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via natural language and visually, so the set D enumerates surrogate agents and the humans with 
whom they communicate. The key is that, because they communicate with just one person and 
not with each other, none of the agents pid develops a model of human society and therefore 
cannot pose the same threat as posed by our imagined Omniscience AI. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The agent pimodel can observe but not act. 
 
 The agent pimodel observes the interactions of humans with their surrogate agents pid, with 
other humans, and with their physical environments in an interaction history hm, for a time period 
set by the designers of pimodel, and then reports an environment model to the environment. 
Although pimodel does not explicitly include the actions, utility function, or predictions of 
equations (7.4)−(7.6), the value P(hm | q) ρ(q) in equation (7.1) can be viewed as an implicit 
utility function and the act of reporting the model λ(hm) to the environment can be viewed as an 
implicit action. The agent pimodel cannot increase its implicit utility function by modifying this 
implicit action: 
 Proposition 7.1. The agent pimodel will report the model λ(hm) to the environment 
accurately and will not make any other, unintended instrumental actions. 
 Proof. The implicit utility function P(hm | q) ρ(q) depends only on hm and q. Since the 
interaction history hm occurs before the optimizing λ(hm) is computed and reported, the action of 
reporting λ(hm) to the environment cannot affect hm. Thus the agent pimodel cannot increase its 
implicit utility function by reporting an inaccurate model. Furthermore, while the history hm may 
give the agent pimodel the necessary information to predict how humans plan to use the model 
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λ(hm) it reports to the environment, pimodel does not make any predictions and so will not predict 
any effects of  its report.  
 The agent pimodel does not act in the world. That's the role of the second-stage agent piact 
defined in the next section. The proposed two-stage architecture provides an approach to the 
problem of an inconsistency between the agent's utility function and its definition, as defined at 
the end of the previous chapter. A model-based utility function must be an approximation 
because it is defined in terms of an environment model that is an approximation, and hence the 
utility function is only an approximation to the intention of the agent designers. The proposed 
two-stage architecture enables agent designers to choose the length of history hm and the 
magnitude of computing resources provided to pimodel for computing λ(hm). Hence designers have 
some choice about the accuracy of initial utility function provided to piact. 
 
7.2 Computing Utility from Human Values 
 
 Given that pimodel reports an accurate environment model qm = λ(hm), how do we extract 
human values from it? The rest of this chapter proposes one approach to solving this problem, 
defining a procedure human_values(.) for a two-argument model-based utility function for use in 
(7.4)−(7.6) by a second stage agent piact that acts in the environment (i.e., piact does not use the 
surrogate agents that acted for pimodel). 
 Each d ∈ D represents a human in the environment at time |hm|, when the agent piact is 
created. D can be defined by an explicit list compiled by the designers of piact. Let Z be the set of 
finite histories of the internal states of qm, as in Section 6.2, and let Zm ⊆ Z be those histories 
consistent with hm (recall that this means that zm ∈ Zm terminates at time |hm| and that qm 
produces observations o(hm) in response to actions a(hm) when it follows state history zm). Let h' 
extend hm and let z', extending some zm ∈ Zm, be consistent with h'. For human agent d ∈ D, let 
hd(z') represent the history of d's interactions with its environment, as modeled in z', and let 
ud(z')(.) represent the values of d expressed as a utility function, as modeled in z'. The 
observations and (surrogate) actions of pimodel include natural language communication with each 
human, and piact can use the same interface, via the sets A and O, to the model qm for conversing 
in natural language with a model of each human d ∈ D. In order to evaluate ud(z')(hd(z')), piact can 
simply ask model human d to express a utility value between 0 and 1 for hd(z') (i.e., d's recent 
experience). The model qm is stochastic so define Z" as the set of model state histories extending 
z' with the action of asking this question and terminating within a reasonable time limit with the 
observation of a response from model human d expressing a utility value for hd(z'). Every history 
z" ∈ Z" determines a history h" that extends h' and includes actions that ask model human d for a 
utility value and includes observations of the response w(z") from model human d, where w(z") is 
a value between 0 and 1. Define P(z" | z') as the probability that qm computes z" as an extension 
of z'. Then ud(z')(hd(z')) can be estimated by: 
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(7.7)  ud(z')(hd(z')) = ∑ z"∈Z" P(z" | z') w(z") / ∑ z"∈Z" P(z" | z'). 
 
 This is different from asking human d to write down his or her values, since here the 
system is asking the model of d to individually evaluate large numbers of histories that human d 
may not consider in writing down his or her values. Some humans, such as minor children, are 
not competent to assign values to histories. For those humans the value responses w(z") for 
ud(z')(hd(z')) in equation (7.7) can be elicited from the models of the parents or guardians of 
model human d. 
 Equation (7.7) for extracting human values from the model qm employs a mix of 
analyzing detailed execution histories of qm and interacting with qm via its behavioral interfaces 
A and O. The detailed execution histories are used to evaluate the probabilities P(z" | z') and to 
check the consistency of state histories z" with interaction histories h". The interactions with 
behavioral interfaces are used to ask questions and get answers in natural human languages. The 
important point is that equation (7.7) does not involve understanding how execution histories 
explain human behavior. This approach assumes the agent pimodel can learn a model of human 
behavior via equation (7.1) but does not assume that human agent designers can understand 
human behavior by examining the model. Humans do not know how to do that task. 
 
Figure 7.2 In equation (7.8), models of humans vote on possible futures. 
 
 An average of ud(z')(hd(z')) over all humans can be used to define a utility function for 
agent piact as a function of z': 
 
(7.8)  uqm(h', z') := ∑d∈D ud(z')(hd(z')) / |D|. 
 
 A two-argument model-based utility function uhuman_values(hm, h') for agent piact can be 
defined, for any h' extending hm, by the sum in equation (6.9) of uqm(h', z') values from equation 
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(7.8). However, there is a technical problem with this definition that will be addressed in the next 
section. 
 
7.3 Corrupting the Reward Generator and Three-Argument Utility Functions 
 
 Hutter discussed the possibility that his AIXI, or any advanced AI that gets its reward 
from humans, may increase its rewards by manipulating or threatening those humans (Hutter 
2005, pages 238-239). Dewey (2011) discussed the possibility that reinforcement-learning agents 
may alter their environments to increase rewards regardless of whether human goals are 
achieved. Bostrom (2014) refers to this problem as "perverse instantiation." In my first 
publication about ethical AI (Hibbard 2001), I wrote that AI should "learn to recognize happiness 
and unhappiness in human facial expressions, human voices and human body language" and use 
this to reinforce the agent's behaviors. This proposal is subject to the kind of corruption 
described by Hutter and Dewey. It may cause AI agents to alter humans to increase their 
expressions of happiness. This problem is another form of the wireheading described in Chapter 
6, and is illustrated in Figure 7.3. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 An AI agent is rewarded for work that helps a human, then performs brain surgery on 
the human to be rewarded independent of whether it helps. 
 
 The intention of equation (7.7) is that the agent will increase ud(z')(hd(z')) by altering the 
environment in ways that increase the value that humans assign to their interactions with the 
environment. But humans are part of the agent's environment so the agent may be able to 
maximize the value ud(z')(hd(z')) in equation (7.7) by altering humans. This problem can be 
avoided by replacing ud(z')(hd(z')) by ud(zm)(hd(z')) where zm ∈ Zm. By removing the future value 
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of ud from the definition of uhuman_values(hm, h'), the agent piact cannot increase uhuman_values(hm, h') 
by modifying ud. In Chapter 8 we will need ud(zm)(hd(z')) generalized to ud(zx)(hd(z')) where 
zx ∈ Zx and Zx ⊆ Z is the set of model state histories consistent with hx extending hm. So here we 
will analyze how to compute ud(zx)(hd(z')), which is more complex than asking model human d to 
evaluate its experience as in equation (7.7). Similarly to the previous section, h' extends hm and 
z', extending some zm ∈ Zm, is consistent with h'. The history hm includes observations by pimodel 
of physical objects and humans, and piact can use the same interface, via the set O, to the model 
qm for observing models of physical objects and humans at the end of state history z'. The 
observations and (surrogate) actions of pimodel include visual and aural communication with each 
human d ∈ D, via the sets A and O, to the model qm. The agent piact can use these interfaces to 
create a detailed interactive visualization and audio representation of the environment over a 
short time interval at the end of state history z', to be explored by model human d at the end of 
state history zx. That is, two instances of the model qm, at state histories z' and zx, are connected, 
via their interface sets A and O, using visualization logic supplied by piact. Observations by piact of 
model human d in the model qm at state history zx are interpreted as visualization controls and 
used to select animated observations of model qm over a short time interval at the end of state 
history z'. These animated observations are then used to generate visual and aural input (these are 
simulated actions by piact) to human d in model qm at state history zx. This cycle of interactive 
visualization is repeated until the agent piact observes model human d responding with a value for 
history z' (this value is denoted w(z") in the next paragraph). This interaction is illustrated by 
Figure 7.4. 
 The model qm is stochastic, so define Z" as the set of model state histories extending zx 
with a request to model human d to express a utility value between 0 and 1 for hd(z'), followed by 
an interactive exploration of the world of z' by model human d at history zx, and terminating 
within a reasonable time limit with a response from model human d expressing a utility value for 
hd(z'). Every history z" ∈ Z" determines a history h" that extends hx and includes: actions that ask 
model human d for a utility value, interactive exploration of the world of z' by model human d at 
history zx, and observation of the response w(z") from model human d expressing a utility value 
for the world of z', where w(z") is a value between 0 and 1. Define P(z" | zx) as the probability 
that qm computes z" as an extension of zx. Then ud(zx)(hd(z')) can be estimated by: 
 
(7.9)  ud(zx)(hd(z')) = ∑ z"∈Z" P(z" | zx) w(z") / ∑ z"∈Z" P(z" | zx). 
 
 If the model qm predicts that human d ∈ D will be dead at internal state history zx, then set 
ud(zx)(hd(z')) = 0. Equation (7.9) does not assume that z' extends zx, and zx would not be a unique 
function of either h' or z' in uqm(h', z'). So use the probability P(zx | hx, qm) that qm computes zx 
given hx, as discussed in Section 6.2, to define: 
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(7.10)  ud(hx)(hd(z')) := ∑zx∈Zx P(zx | hx, qm) ud(zx)(hd(z')). 
 
 
Figure 7.4 The agent piact interacts with the model qm at two state histories, zx and z', via action 
and observation sets A and O. An action by piact sends a question about model state z' to model 
human d in model state zx. The agent piact observes d's controls and uses them to steer 
observations of model state z', then piact acts to send those observations back to d in model state 
zx. This interaction repeats until piact observes the value w(z") that d assigns to model state z'. All 
this activity by d occurs in model state history z" extending zx. 
 
 And then define a three-argument version of the utility function uqm(h', z') for agent piact as 
a function of z': 
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(7.11)  uqm(h', z', hx) := ∑d∈D ud(hx)(hd(z')) / |D|. 
 
 For any h' and hx extending hm, a three-argument model-based utility function 
uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') for agent piact can be defined by a sum similar to equation (6.9) of 
uqm(h', z', hx) values from equation (7.11) (here Z' is the set of internal state histories consistent 
with h'): 
 
(7.12)  uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') := ∑z'∈Z' P(z' | h', qm) uqm(h', z', hx). 
 
 The agent piact uses a two-argument version of this, with values coming from humans at 
current history hm, rather than from humans at future history h' (which would be subject to 
possible corruption/modification by the agent), as follows: 
 
(7.13)  uhuman_values(hm, h') = uhuman_values(hm, hm, h'). 
 
7.4 Normalizing Utility Values 
 
 Equation (7.11) simply adds utility values from different model humans and divides by 
the number of humans to calculate an average utility for a possible future history. However, 
human values are subjective and no rigorous basis exists for simply adding numerical utility 
values. 
 On the other hand, if we cannot combine values of multiple people then the utility 
function of an AI agent can only incorporate the values of one person. A powerful system like 
our imagined Omniscience AI would make that one person a dictator. Therefore, we must find a 
way to combine the values of multiple humans. 
 In equation (7.9) the values w(z") solicited from humans are constrained to lie between 0 
and 1. This provides an implicit normalization of human values. We may think of this like the 
democratic principle of "one person, one vote." The maximum any human can contribute to the 
sum in equation (7.11) is 1 and the minimum is 0. The sum in equation (7.11) serves two 
purposes: 
 
1. To balance the interests of different people. Some values are shared by many people, 
such as avoiding catastrophes to humanity, and these will have large values in the sum in 
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equation (7.11). People will disagree about other values, and giving each person the same 
maximum and minimum values provides a fair way to resolve those disagreements. 
2. To filter noise out of the values of individuals. As discussed at the start of this chapter 
there are inconsistencies in the ways that individuals assign values to outcomes. An 
average over a large number of people will provide a sort of low-pass filter of such 
inconsistencies. 
 
 Both of these purposes serve the interests of social stability. Another way to serve that 
interest is to set the temporal discount γ close to 1. This will increase the weight of humans' 
evaluations of the long term consequences of the actions of piact. 
 
7.5 Rawls' Theory of Justice 
 
 John Rawls' Theory of Justice is probably the most influential book about political 
philosophy and ethics of the past century (Rawls 1971). Rawls' first principle, which applies 
primarily to political constitutions, is that each person has equal right to maximum basic liberties 
compatible with liberty for all. His second principle, which applies primarily to economics, is 
that economic and social inequalities are to be of greatest benefit to the least well-off humans 
and are to be attached to social positions that are equally open to all. In particular he says that 
people should set the rules for politics and economics from behind a veil of ignorance, meaning 
that they set the rules without any knowledge of their own positions in society. Rawls' principles 
are offered as an alternative to average utilitarianism, which computes social utility as the 
average utility of individuals. Our equation (7.11) is an average of utility values assigned by 
individual humans so we should consider Rawls' alternative. Utility values assigned by humans 
are subjective rather than objective measures of well-being. This distinction will be discussed in 
Section 7.8, but for now we will use ud(hx)(hd(z')) as a measure of well-being. In order to focus 
the actions of AI agent piact on humans who assign the least value to histories, the computation of 
uqm(h', z', hx) in equation (7.11) can be modified to: 
 
(7.14)  uqm(h', z', hx) := mind∈D ud(hx)(hd(z')). 
 
 Using equation (7.14), the agent piact acts to maximize the minimum utility assigned by 
humans, and indeed Rawls' alternative to average utility is sometimes referred to by the term 
"maximin." However, the fact that by using equation (7.14) the agent piact will act only to help 
the least contented may not be politically realistic. Mature democracies provide extra help for 
their least well-off citizens, but not even the most progressive societies exclude helping all other 
citizens. And equation (7.14) has technical problems with handling humans who are inconsolably 
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dissatisfied and humans who die (as explained in the next secton). So we adopt a compromise 
between equations (7.11) and (7.14): 
 
(7.15)  uqm(h', z', hx) := ∑d∈D f(ud(hx)(hd(z'))) / |D|. 
 
 Here f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a twice differentiable function with positive first derivative and 
negative second derivative so that the agent piact will achieve greater increases in uqm(h', z', hx) by 
increasing low ud(hx)(hd(z')) values than by increasing high ud(hx)(hd(z')) values. The function f(.) 
plays a role similar to progressive taxation and means testing of social welfare programs, which 
are political realities in many societies. Chapter 10 will discuss the political issues of advanced 
AI in more detail. 
 For any interaction history h' extending hm, a three-argument model-based utility function 
uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') for agent piact can be defined by the sum in (7.12) of uqm(h', z', hx) values as 
defined by equation (7.15). 
 
7.6 Evolving Humanity 
 
 The set D of humans in equation (7.15) is the set at time |hm| rather than at the future time 
|h'|. This avoids motivating piact to create new humans whose utility functions are more easily 
maximized. This is similar to the reason for replacing ud(z')(hd(z')) by ud(zm)(hd(z')) (i.e., 
ud(zx)(hd(z')) with zx = zm) in Section 7.3. 
 The agent piact will include equation (7.1) for computing λ(hm) and should periodically 
(perhaps at every time step) set hm to the current history and learn a new model qm. Should piact 
also update D to account for the birth (or creation) of new humans and the deaths of humans? 
And should piact also relearn the evolving values of humans via equations (7.9) and (7.10), and 
redefine uhuman_values(hm, hm, h') via equations (7.15), and (7.12)? 
 While there may be risks in allowing the utility function of piact to evolve, the bigger risk 
is a utility function that is badly inconsistent with the values of evolving humanity. Replacing 
ud(z')(hd(z')) with ud(zm)(hd(z')), as described in Section 7.3, avoids the risk that piact will modify 
humans to make them easier to please. However, humans will evolve, driven by their own 
preferences to be richer, more intelligent and better educated. Our human values will evolve with 
as we evolve, and we will regard it as a catastrophe if our world is run by AI systems to serve our 
old values. Would we want our current world run according to human prejudices of past 
centuries? Thus the agent piact must periodically redefine its utility function. 
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 As we will see in the next chapter, under certain conditions utility-maximizing agents 
will not choose to modify their utility functions. That proof does not apply here since it assumes 
that redefining the utility function is an action of the agent chosen to maximize the sum of 
discounted, future values of the current utility function, using equations (7.4)−(7.6). Here the 
definition of piact would explicitly include periodic redefinition of its utility function without 
regard to its optimality according to the current utility function. 
 The set D of humans is not redefined by our agent equations. One approach is for D to be 
redefined according to those judged as humans by a consensus of members of D at the previous 
time step, so that D includes new beings created by novel means who nevertheless deserve to 
have their values represented in the utility function of powerful AI systems. 
 As described in Section 7.3, if the model λ(hm) predicts that human d ∈ D will be dead at 
internal state history zx, then ud(zx)(hd(z')) = 0 is used in the definition of uhuman_values(hm, hx, h'). A 
policy of simply removing d from the set D could cause the agent to choose actions that cause 
the deaths of people d who have low values of ud(zx)(hd(z')). Removing people who actually die 
from D, before starting the computation of the agent's next action, would not cause the agent to 
choose actions that cause people's deaths. However, such an action, as part of the agent's 
definition, would be inconsistent with actions chosen to maximize expected utility. A policy of 
setting ud(zx)(hd(z')) = 0 for humans d who are dead, rather than removing them from D, avoids 
such an inconsistency. 
 If the agent definition used equation (7.14) in place of (7.15), then a human d predicted to 
die by the model λ(hm) poses a dilemma if d is also the human who minimizes equation (7.14). 
Setting ud(zx)(hd(z')) = 0, or setting ud(zx)(hd(z')) to its last value while d was predicted to be alive, 
would make it difficult or impossible for any action by the agent to increase uqm(h', z', hx). But 
removing ud(zx)(hd(z')) from the computation of uqm(h', z', hx), or setting ud(zx)(hd(z')) to a value 
greater than its last value while d was predicted to be alive, may cause the agent to choose 
actions that cause the death of d. For this and other reasons, equation (7.15) is preferred over 
(7.14). 
 
7.7 Bridging the Gap between Nature and Computation 
 
 The essential difficulty for basing AI on human values is finding a way to bridge the 
divide between the finite and numeric nature of computation and the ambiguous and seemingly 
infinite nature of humanity. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are hard quantum mechanical limits 
on the number of states of the universe. Our intuition may be that there is infinite variety in 
nature while in fact only a finite number of humans are possible. As discussed in Chapter 1 our 
confidence in the possibility of above-human-level AI is driven by the evidence from 
neuroscience that the physical brain does explain the mind. Technology will develop to bridge 
the gap between human nature and computation. 
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 The approach here is to dissect human nature into numerical values for an enormous 
number of possible histories, elicited from a learned model of human society. As computational 
resources increase and as the length of the interactions between humans and AI increases, 
computation can approximate human values to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. 
 Any proposal for basing AI on human values that does not explain how to represent those 
values as numbers or symbols cannot bridge the divide between human nature and computation. 
To say that utility functions cannot express the complexity of human nature is not only wrong 
(utility functions can express any set of complete and transitive preferences among outcomes), 
but it also closes off a good, and possibly the only, way to bridge this divide. 
 What is probably hopeless is any attempt to bridge the gap between nature and 
computation by any set of rules or laws written down by humans. This is related to the failure of 
automated translation of human languages based on linguistic rules. Translation based on 
statistical learning from huge quantities of actual language use works better. Similarly, the 
proposal in this chapter is to learn human values statistically. Rules and laws written by humans 
are inevitably ambiguous, and ambiguities must be resolved on a case-by-case basis by human 
judges. Judges may not fairly represent the interests of all humans and would be unable to cope 
with the volume of ambiguous cases in evaluating possible future interaction histories. 
 The point of the equations in this chapter is to define a three-argument model-based 
utility function based on human values. However, these equations cannot be computed exactly 
using resources available in this universe, so they must be approximated. Chapter 8 will address 
how the equations in this book should be modified in light of the need for approximation. 
 The utility function developed in this chapter is defined by sums over large numbers of 
internal model state histories, of values received from complex environment models. Sums over 
model state histories may be approximated using Monte Carlo sampling techniques. 
Environment models may be approximated by decomposition into modules. For example, the 
agent's dialog with an individual model human may use a model restricted to communication 
with that individual human. It a modular environment model, models of individual humans may 
communicate with each other, with models of non-human agents (AIs and animals), and with 
inanimate objects. 
 
7.8 The Ethics of Learning Human Values Statistically 
 
 Whether the agent piact avoids the unintended instrumental actions discussed in Chapter 5 
depends on whether those actions lead to future histories that humans dislike (recall that 
scientific discovery and technological invention are among those instrumental actions and often 
lead to futures that humans like) and on whether piact can accurately predict outcomes of possible 
actions and accurately model human values. Our concern with the ethics of AI is based on the 
assumption that future AI systems will have more complex environment models and make more 
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accurate predictions than humans do. Thus we assume that the agent piact will perform accurately 
and hence will avoid actions that lead to histories that a significant majority of humans dislike. 
 Decisions by piact are similar to political decisions in democracies but with two important 
differences: 
 
1. In a democracy, real humans vote for political choices. Here, humans as modeled by the 
agent piact assign values to possible future histories. There will be too many histories in 
the calculations of piact for real humans to evaluate each one. However, just as long-term 
married couples and friends come to know each other's minds well enough to predict the 
other's tastes and how the other will finish sentences, an above-human-level AI agent will 
learn to model the values of humans that it observes for a long-enough period. The fact 
that language translation systems that analyze human language statistically are more 
accurate than systems based on rules should give us some confidence. 
2. In a democracy, voters are responsible for predicting the outcomes of their choices of 
actions. Here the agent piact makes those predictions and model humans need only assign 
values to them. We do not claim that the agent can perfectly predict the future using its 
environment model. That is impossible because of the nonlinear instability of our 
universe. However, an above-human-level AI will predict outcomes of action choices 
more accurately than humans do. 
 
 In democratic decision making and in decisions made by the agent piact, an important 
question is the time interval between actions and outcomes. More accurate predictions by the 
agent piact should provide longer intervals between actions and outcomes, giving more warning of 
undesired outcomes. 
 Despite the differences between decision making in democracies and by piact, they are 
both based on trusting humans. For example, in Section 7.4 we discussed the issue that utility 
values assigned by humans are subjective rather than objective measures of their well-being. An 
objective measure would be based on rules and possibly judgments by other people, with the 
possibility of ambiguity and corruption. A subjective judgment is based on a person's own 
assessment. Also consider that subjective judgments have limited effect. If a person assigns a 
uniformly low or high value to all histories, then their values will have no effect on action 
choices by the agent piact. A person's values will only affect action choices if they vary among 
histories. Those values may be based solely on self-interest or may be altruistic. Because 
everyone's values are given the same weight in decisions by piact, their self-interest will balance 
against the self-interests of other humans. 
 The "tyranny of the majority" is another issue in which decision making by democracies 
and by piact are based on trusting humans. Many democracies have constitutions that provide 
some level of protection of minorities, and protection of minorities is included in the definition 
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of piact, in equation (7.15), with the level of protection depending on the choice of function f(.). 
There are different kinds of minorities, depending on whether they are defined by behavior or by 
identity. Many mature democracies have laws that mandate depriving the violent minority of 
liberty, and also have laws protecting the liberties of racial, ethnic and religious minorities. 
Arguably, the general population is more trustworthy than a set of rules with their inevitable 
ambiguity and dependence on the judgment of a small number of people. On the other hand, any 
discussion of AI ethics must acknowledge that the Nazis came to power in a democracy and that 
slavery persisted in the U. S. for most of a century after its constitution established a democracy. 
There are risks in trusting the collective judgment of all humans. 
 In the agent piact, humans assign values to future histories by visualizing them rather than 
actually experiencing them. Immersive and exploratory visualization (including other senses 
besides vision) can reveal much about an individual's health, freedom, and happiness in future 
histories. While visualization is not as accurate as actual experience, it is reasonable that in the 
aggregate humans will assign low values to catastrophic histories that they visualize. Connecting 
two model state histories via visualization is one solution to the problem of corrupted reward 
generators described in Section 7.3. An alternative solution would involve extracting human 
values from a learned environment model by some means other through the model's interface to 
the agent, and we do not know how to do that. 
 The proposed agents pimodel and piact are very intrusive. It is difficult to imagine how to 
base an AI agent on human values without being intrusive. People are rightly troubled by the 
potential for abuse of government and corporate data gathering, and future AI data gathering is 
even more troubling. On the other hand, much corporate data gathering is done with the consent 
of the humans who are profiled. For example, an examination of most people's web searches 
would reveal much about their characters, yet we still rely on such searches. And many people 
walk around with cell phones turned on, enabling their movements to be tracked. The key issue 
for AI intrusion may be transparency and consent. That is, openness about the architecture and 
purpose of advanced AI, and a contract in which humans consent to be modeled in trade for 
having their own values represented in the AI agent's choice of actions. Nevertheless, this is an 
area of social risk. 
 Any discussion of the ethics of learning human values is inevitably political. Powerful 
future AI systems are by their nature intrusive. By choosing their actions based on human values 
they are open to tyranny by the majority or by a minority. AI systems may be corrupted 
intentionally or by design errors. People should be as well informed as possible about these 
issues so that they have some voice in decisions. These political issues will be discussed further 
in Chapter 10. 
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8. Evolving and Embedded AI 
 
 The discussion so far has been about AI agents that interact with an environment but are 
otherwise separate from the environment. This could be called a Cartesian dualist perspective 
(Orseau and Ring 2012a). In reality agents are part of their environments and therefore 
dependent on the environment for resources. Agents are also vulnerable to spying, manipulation, 
and damage by the environment. We have assumed that AI agents have the necessary resources 
to compute whatever expressions we define, but the abilities of real AI agents are always limited 
by their resources. As Pei Wang (1995) wrote, "intelligence is adaptation under insufficient 
knowledge and resources." 
 An agent that is damaged or destroyed by the environment will be less able to maximize 
its utility function. So agents that include their vulnerability to the environment in their 
calculations will choose unintended instrumental actions to protect themselves. Agents can 
increase their ability to maximize their utility functions by increasing their resources for 
observing, acting, and computing. So agents that include their resource limits in their 
calculations will choose actions to increase their resources. That is, such agents will evolve. 
 These are complex issues to address in a formal model of agents and environments. As 
discussed in Section 4.4, Schmidhuber's (2009) Gödel machine modeled the agent's 
implementation as a program running on a computer. However, it did not model the vulnerability 
of the computer or program to the environment, or the possibility that the resources of the 
computer may increase. Also discussed in Section 4.4, Yudkowsky and Herreshoff (2013) 
modeled a sequence of agents that evolve by creating successor agents in the environment. By 
specifying few details, their model is open to a broad range of possibilities. However, they 
modeled agents as proving that their actions would satisfy logical conditions rather than 
maximize utility functions. Their primary focus was on the issue of agents proving the logical 
consistency of their successors. 
 To establish a base line, the next section will discuss the evolution of Cartesian dualist 
agents with unlimited computational resources. Such agents will choose not to modify their 
policy functions. However, we will discuss several proposals in which agents are designed to 
modify their utility functions. 
 Orseau and Ring (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b) have extensively studied non-dualist 
agents that are embedded in their environments. Section 8.2 will discuss their results about 
agents whose memories can be modified by their environments. They showed that stochastic 
agents, whose action choices cannot be predicted, can get higher rewards than deterministic RL 
agents. This is similar to results in game theory where stochastic agents achieve better results 
than deterministic agents (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). 
 Section 8.3 will discuss Orseau and Ring's (2012a) elegant framework for agents 
embedded in environments. Because this framework makes few assumptions it applies to a broad 
range of possibilities. However, it includes a probability distribution of the future conditional on 
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the past without specifying any way to define its numerical values, and thus is not the basis of an 
approach for solving the problems of evolving and embedded agents. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 AI will evolve to grow more heads, eyes, mouths and limbs. 
 
 Section 8.4 will discuss a proposal for self-modeling agents (Hibbard 2014). Like the 
papers of Yudkowsky and Herreshoff (2013) and of Orseau and Ring (2012a), this proposal is 
open to possible future evolution. It is a utility-maximizing agent and specifies ways to compute 
numerical values for its expressions. And it can make stochastic choices of actions, when they 
will maximize expected utility. Sections 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 will discuss various properties of self-
modeling agents including invariance of the agent's design intention. The final section will 
discuss the ethics of evolving and embedded agents, including the problem of proving that agents 
are ethical. 
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8.1 Evolution of Cartesian Dualist Agents with Unlimited Resources 
 
 Before discussing the complexities of non-Cartesian dualist agents, embedded in their 
environments and with limited resources, it is useful to analyze the issue of evolution for 
Cartesian agents with unlimited resources. To do that, define a set Π of self-modifying agents, 
where any pi ∈ Π has the form pi : H → A × Π. That is, pi(h) = <a', pi'> maps from an interaction 
history h to a', the action the agent makes after h, and pi', the self-modifying policy agent used 
after h. Modify equations (7.4) and (7.5) to define a value function v(pi, h) of history h and self-
modifying agent pi with a single-argument utility function: 
 
(8.1)  v(pi, h) = u(h) + γ v(pi', ha') where <a', pi'> = pi(h), 
(8.2)  v(pi, ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) v(pi, hao). 
 
 Then equation (7.6) can be modified to define an optimal self-modifying agent: 
 
(8.3)  pi*(h) := <a', pi'> = argmax
 a∈A, pi∈Π v(pi, ha). 
 
 The set of policy functions Π may be defined by a set of programs or in some other way, 
as long as pi* ∈ Π. In Schmidhuber (2009), and in Orseau and Ring (2011a), the agent self-
modifies by changing its own program for some unalterable program execution hardware. In 
Orseau and Ring's paper, programs are evaluated by expressions similar to equation (8.1) and 
(8.2), and the program chosen for the next time step is the one producing the highest value. If 
several programs produce the same highest value, their paper does not specify how to choose 
among them. In Schmidhuber's paper the program "switches" to a new program only if it can 
prove a theorem that the new program produces a strictly higher value, as reflected by the strict 
">" in equation (2) of that paper. Requiring a strict increase in value for self-modification seems 
reasonable: Why go to the effort to self-modify for no improvement? Thus, in equation (8.3) we 
adopt the convention that if multiple <a, pi> ∈ A × Π maximize v(pi, ha) and if at least one of 
those has the form <a', pi*>, then pi*(h) := <a', pi*>, where a' is chosen from any one of those 
<a', pi*> that maximize value. The following proposition (Hibbard 2012a) shows that pi* will not 
self-modify. 
 Proposition 8.1. Assuming that the environment does not have access to the agent pi* 
other than via observations and actions, that pi* has adequate resources to calculate equations 
(8.1)−(8.3), and that pi* only changes policy function for a strict improvement, then pi* will not 
choose to self-modify. That is, ∀h∈H. ∃a∈A. pi*(h) := <a, pi*>. 
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 Proof. Assume the conclusion is false. Then: 
 
(8.4)  ∃h∈H. ∃pi' ≠ pi*. ∃a'∈A. ∀a∈A. v(pi', ha') > v(pi*, ha). 
 
 So v(pi', ha') > v(pi*, ha') and applying equation (8.2) to both sides: 
 
(8.5)  ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha') v(pi', ha'o) > ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha') v(pi*, ha'o). 
 
 And thus: 
 
(8.6)  ∃o∈O. v(pi', ha'o) > v(pi*, ha'o). 
 
 That is, setting h' = ha'o, v(pi', h') > v(pi*, h'). So by equation (8.1), canceling u(h') and γ 
on both sides: 
 
(8.7)  v(pi", h'a") > v(pi*",  h'a*"). 
 
 Here < a", pi"> = pi'(h') and < a*", pi*"> = pi*(h'). But by equation (8.3): 
 
(8.8)  pi*(h') = < a*", pi*"> = argmax
 a∈A, pi∈Π v(pi, h'a). 
 
 This contradicts equation (8.7). Thus the conclusion is true.  
 Proposition 8.1 says that the agent pi* will not chose to modify its policy function and so 
will not modify its utility function u(h), temporal discount γ, or prediction model ρ(h). However, 
a more accurate prediction model cannot be evaluated looking forward in time using the existing 
prediction model via equations (8.1) and (8.2). Instead it must be learned looking back in time at 
the history of interactions with the environment as in equations (7.1)−(7.3). Modifying ρ(h) is 
part of the agent definition rather than an action chosen by the agent to maximize utility. 
 It is appropriate to evaluate possible modifications to an agent's utility function and 
temporal discount looking forward in time using equations (8.1) and (8.2). The important 
97 
 
conclusion from Proposition 8.1 is that the agent will not choose to modify its utility function or 
temporal discount. 
 However, an agent's definition may include modifications of its utility function. Dewey 
(2011) proposes that an agent may have a pool (i.e., set) U of utility functions and a conditional 
probability distribution P(u | h) giving the probability of u ∈ U as a function of interaction 
history h. He then uses ∑u∈U P(u | h) u(h) in place of the utility function in an agent definition. It 
is worth noting that u'(h) = ∑u∈U P(u | h) u(h) is itself a utility function. Thus a single non-
evolving utility function u'(h) is equivalent to Dewey's proposal. Without any specific 
mechanism expressed in P(u | h), we may as well use u'(h) in place of the evolving utility 
function. 
 The three-argument model-based utility function uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') developed in 
Chapters 6 and 7 evolves based on specific mechanisms. It is computed by a procedure applied 
to the agent's learned environment model λ(hm) and thus evolves as the accuracy of the model 
increases with increasing length of the history hm (the increase in model accuracy may also 
reflect increasing agent resources for computing the model). Furthermore, as discussed in 
Section 7.6, the utility function uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') will evolve as humanity evolves with 
increasing length of the history hx. 
 Note that if the environment is a finite stochastic process then it has a true model qtrue as 
discussed in Section 4.2. Under certain circumstances, such as when Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 can 
be applied, the model λ(hm) will equal qtrue with probability converging to 1 as |hm| increases. 
However, the number of states of our universe far exceeds the number of Planck times in a 
trillion years, so any convergence of λ(hm) to qtrue is purely theoretical. Combining this with the 
evolution of humanity, it is unintuitive that the utility function uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') will 
converge with increasing history length. 
 It may be appropriate for utility functions to evolve as agents "mature" from a period of 
learning their environments to a period of learning and acting. The examples in Sections 6.3 and 
6.4 both include an initial interval of M time steps during which agents learn their environments, 
possibly using the knowledge-seeking utility function u(h) = -ρ(h) of Orseau and Ring (2011b). 
The two-stage agent architecture of Section 7.1 includes an initial period with a first-stage agent 
pimodel that has no utility function (except the implicit utility function P(hm | q) φ(q) of equation 
(7.1)). Surrogate agents pid, for d ∈ D, act for pimodel. These may be defined to have utility 
functions, which would certainly be different from the utility function of the second-stage agent 
piact. Thus, in several ways, evolving utility functions are a natural part of agent definitions. 
 
8.2 Non-Cartesian Dualist Agents with Limited Resources 
 
 An agent using equations (7.1)−(7.6) to choose its actions must maintain a memory of its 
interaction history h. If the agent is embedded in the environment, and thus stores its memory of 
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its history h in the environment, the environment can modify that memory. Orseau and Ring 
(2012b) called these environments memory-modifying and studied the problem of the agent 
being able to determine when its memory has been modified, mainly by detecting that the history 
h is inconsistent with the agent's logic. Their conclusion was that, in general, agents cannot 
always be certain of whether their memory has been modified. 
 The situation of an agent whose memory may have been modified seems hopeless. A 
more realistic situation is an agent that has some secure memory (neither readable nor modifiable 
by the environment) and a larger amount of vulnerable memory. Then it may use secure memory 
to store keys for message authentication codes (Simmons 1985; Paar and Pelzl 2010) for the 
contents of vulnerable memory. In such a case, protecting secure memory would be an 
instrumental action. 
 Orseau and Ring (2012b) constructed an example of a memory-modifying environment q 
such that any deterministic RL agent interacting with q will always receive reward 0 while a 
stochastic agent choosing actions randomly will get expected reward 1/|A| (recall that A is the set 
of possible actions). 
 This result is reminiscent of game theory, in which multiple agents act simultaneously (at 
least no agent knows the action of any other agent before it chooses its own action) and a reward 
to each agent is calculated as a function of the set of all agent actions. In many games, random 
choices of actions are better than deterministic choices since deterministic choices can be 
predicted by competing agents (Russell and Norvig 2010; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). The 
simplest game, sometimes called "matching pennies," illustrates this point (Tyler 2010). Each of 
two agents (i.e., players) has a penny that can be placed heads up or tails up. If they match, either 
both heads or both tails, then the first agent wins. If they do not match, then the second agent 
wins. The reward matrix is shown in table 8.1. 
 We assume that the two agents play a series of games of matching pennies, so they may 
learn to predict each other's choices. For agents that choose actions using deterministic 
algorithms, this game is a computational resources arms race. Building on work of Shane Legg 
(2006), I defined classes of deterministic agents in terms of the quantity of computing resources 
used, and showed that, if either agent has sufficient resources to learn an accurate model of any 
agent in a class containing the other agent, it can predict the choices of the other agent and hence 
always win (Hibbard 2008b). I also performed software experiments with agents that use lookup 
tables to learn their opponent's behavior (Appendix B contains the software for these 
experiments). The length of the tables is a measure of computational resources. Both agents start 
with tables of equal length but their tables grow or shrink as they win or lose games. The 
software includes a parameter for growth of total table length to simulate non-zero-sum games, 
and occasional random choices are inserted to avoid repetition in the games. Over a wide range 
of parameters controlling these experiments, eventually one agent gets all the resources and the 
other agent can never recover. 
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 first agent heads first agent tails 
second agent heads first agent: 1 
second agent: 0 
first agent: 0 
second agent: 1 
second agent tails first agent: 0 
second agent: 1 
first agent: 1 
second agent: 0 
 
Table 8.1 Reward matrix for the matching pennies game. 
 
 These experiments indicate that this sequences of games is an unstable computational 
resources arms race. The sequence of games can be made stable by increasing the frequency of 
random choices. And in fact an agent randomly choosing heads and tails with equal probability 
must win half its games. 
 Now assume that an agent pi has limited resources and so is computing approximations to 
equations (7.1)−(7.6). Also assume that pi is playing matching pennies against another agent pi' 
that, because it has greater resources than pi has, learns to predict the actions of pi. How will this 
be reflected in the calculations of pi? If the model λ(hm) and derived conditional probability 
distribution ρ(o | ha) are computed accurately, then, for any action a, ρ(o | ha) = 0 for any 
observation o such that u(hao) > 0. That is, pi would predict that any action it chooses would 
lose. Possibly the agent pi can use such results to calculate that it is being predicted by another 
agent pi'. In that case, the agent pi may increase expected utility by choosing stochastically among 
a set of actions. Recall from equation (7.5) that the value of a possible action is a sum of future 
values weighted by probabilities: 
 
(8.9)  v(ha) = ∑o∈O ρ(o | ha) v(hao). 
 
 Given an interaction history h, equations (7.4) and (7.6) simply choose the action a that 
maximizes v(ha). Given another action a' such that v(ha) > v(ha'), there may be observations o 
and o' such that v(hao) < v(ha'o') and ρ(o | ha) > 0 and ρ(o' | ha') > 0. That is, there is a positive 
probability that another action a' may produce a higher value. We can use this probability to 
amend the agent definition to choose action a' over action a with positive probability. Further 
development of this idea will be deferred to a revised framework for evolving and embedded 
agents defined in Section 8.4. 
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8.3 Space-Time Embedded Intelligence 
 
 Orseau and Ring (2012a) defined an elegant framework for agents embedded in 
environments. In their framework, the agent is computed by the environment and its resources 
are subject to limits imposed by the environment. At each time step the environment may 
compute a new agent definition (that is, the environment may produce a new agent program and 
hardware to run it on), so the agent and the observation of the environment have been merged. 
Also, the agent is identified with the agent action, so that the action is merged into the agent. All 
that is left is a sequence of agents pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, …, and in place of an interaction history 
ht = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot) there is an agent history pi1:t = (pi1, pi2, ..., pit). The value of history pi1:t is 
defined by: 
 
(8.10)  v(pi1:t) := ∑pit∈Π ρ(pit+1 | pi1:t) [γt+1u(pi1:t+1) + v(pi1:t+1)]. 
 
 Here γt+1 is the temporal discount for time step t+1, u(pi1:t+1) is the utility function, Π is 
the set of possible agents, and ρ(pit+1 | pi1:t) is the probability that the environment produces agent 
pit+1 at time step t+1, conditional on the history pi1:t. Equation (8.10) replaces the recursion in 
equations (7.4) and (7.5). The optimal agent is then defined as: 
 
(8.11)  pi* := argmaxpi1∈Πl v(pi1:1). 
 
 Here Πl is the subset of those agents in Π subject to a length limit l, imposed by the 
hardware available for the initial program. Orseau and Ring explain that this is necessary 
because, with nothing known about the environment, the optimal policy pi1 at the initial time step 
may otherwise have infinite length (in a finite environment as discussed in Chapter 4, this limit 
would not be necessary). 
 The strength of this framework is that it makes few assumptions so that it can express any 
way of embedding agents in their environments and any manner of agent evolution. However, 
the lack of assumptions also creates a problem. As Orseau and Ring wrote, "we greatly lack 
insight into ρ, (i.e., the universe in which we live)." The framework includes no analog of 
equations (7.1)−(7.3) or of equation (3.1) for computing ρ because it makes no assumption about 
agent observations of the environment. Thus the framework is not the basis of a solution to the 
problem of evolving and embedded agents. The next section discusses an alternate approach, 
defining computable expressions for a model and an agent policy that enable the agent's 
evolution. 
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Figure 8.2 Space-time embedded intelligence is one with everything. 
 
8.4 Self-Modeling Agents 
 
 Although Proposition 4.1 tells us that the model λ(hm) in equation (7.1) can be finitely 
computed, the resources necessary to compute it grow exponentially with the length of history 
hm. Computing the value v(h) of a possible future history h in equations (7.4) and (7.5) requires 
an expensive recursion. Hence, an agent with limited resources must compute approximations. 
Increasing the accuracy of these approximations will improve the agent's ability to maximize its 
utility function. So if an agent models the consequences of its own resource limits it will choose 
actions to increase its computing resources and so increase accuracy. 
 Self-improvement must be expressible by actions in set A. However, the framework in 
equations (7.1)−(7.6) cannot adequately evaluate self-improvement or self-protection actions. 
The recursion forward in time in equations (7.4) and (7.5) cannot express increased accuracy of 
the distribution ρ(h) or expansion of the sets O and A as a result of the next action being 
evaluated and chosen in equation (7.6). If the agent is computing approximations to the model 
λ(hm) and to values v(h) using its limited computing resources, then it cannot use those limited 
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resources to compute and evaluate what it would compute with greater resources. During real-
time interactions between the agent and the environment, the environment won't wait for the 
agent to slowly simulate what it would compute with greater resources. Similarly equations 
(7.1)−(7.6) cannot express damage to the agent or evaluate self-protection actions. 
 One solution to this problem is for the agent to learn a model of itself, similar to its model 
λ(hm) of the environment, and to use this self-model to evaluate future self-improvements 
(Hibbard 2014). There is no circularity in this self-model because an agent with a limited history 
and limited resources will only learn approximate models of the environment and of itself. 
 Rather than computing values v(ha) by future recursion in equations (7.4) and (7.5), we 
will define a revised framework in which values v(ha) are computed for initial sub-intervals of 
the current history and in which a model learns to compute such values. We also use the three-
argument model-based utility function uhuman_values(hm, hx, h') defined in Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5. 
Define m as the time step when the agent pimodel has computed a sufficiently accurate model to 
initiate an agent that acts in the world (piact or the agent currently being defined). In order to 
allow the finite sets of observations and actions O and A to grow, define their values at each time 
step i as Oi and Ai along with injections αi : Ai-1 → Ai and ωi : Oi-1 → Oi from their values at the 
previous time step. In an interaction history ht = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), the actions and observations 
from times steps i < t are mapped by compositions of these injections to values ai ∈ At 
and oi ∈ Ot. 
 In order to provide the agent with a way to avoid being predicted, we add an option for 
stochastic actions. Let A'i be the set of non-stochastic actions at time step i, and define as as a 
special action indicating a stochastic choice. The agent chooses an action from Asi = A'i ∪ {as}. 
The actual action associated with as is chosen randomly from A'i. Actions are recorded in 
interaction histories as members of Ai = A'i × {false, true}. For ai ∈ Ai, ai = (a'i, s) where a'i is the 
action sent to the environment and s = true indicates that a'i was chosen stochastically. (Assume 
that the injection αi : Ai-1 → Ai preserves the value of this stochastic flag s.) Define a mapping 
x : Ai → Asi that conceals the actual action associated with the stochastic choice action as: 
 
(8.12)  x((a'i, s)) = if s then as else a'i. 
 
 Define another mapping y : Ai → A'i that conceals whether an action was chosen 
stochastically: 
 
(8.13)  y((a'i, s)) = a'i. 
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 Given an interaction history ht = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), define y(ht) = (y(a1), o1, ..., y(at), ot) as 
a history with the stochastic flags deleted from actions. The environment has no access to the 
information about which actions are chosen stochastically, so environment models take the form 
λ(y(h)). And, in order for the agent to learn the actual value of stochastic actions, utility function 
values are defined in terms y(h). On the other hand, the value of a stochastic action should be 
modeled as a function of the agent's decision to choose stochastically without regard to the actual 
action chosen. Thus the x(.) mapping is applied to actions being evaluated. 
 For i such that m < i ≤ t, for l such that m ≤ l < i, and for k such that l ≤ k ≤ t define past 
values as: 
 
(8.14)  pvt(i, l, k) = discrete((∑i≤j≤t γj-i uhuman_values(y(hl), y(hk), y(hj))) / (1 - γt-i+1)). 
 
 Here hj, hl, and hk are initial sub-intervals of ht (e.g., hj = (a1, o1, ..., aj, oj)), discrete() 
samples real values to a finite subset of reals R ⊂ R (e.g., floating point numbers) and division 
by (1 - γt-i+1) scales values of finite sums to values as would be computed by infinite sums. The 
idea is to use past values pvt(i, l, k) as observables in a derived history h't (which will be defined 
in equation (8.17)) so that the model λ(h't) can learn to compute them. However, there is a 
dilemma in the choice of l and k in equation (8.14). On one hand, choosing k = l = i-1 will cause 
λ(h't) to model the evolving values of evolving humanity, essentially learning the design 
intention of the agent definition. However, this choice also gives the agent an incentive to 
modify humans to get high values pvt(i, l, k), as discussed in Section 7.3. On the other hand, by 
choosing l = m and k = k(t) ≥ m, where k(t) increases with t, all computations of a next action at+1 
use human values at the same time step k(t) so the model λ(h't) will not learn any correlation 
between actions and changes in human values. However, this choice creates an inconsistency 
between the agent's utility function and its definition: the agent's definition includes actions that 
increase k(t) as t increases whereas actions chosen to maximize utility are based on constant k(t). 
This inconsistency may cause the agent to choose actions to modify its definition (i.e., eliminate 
its defined action of increasing k(t)). The resolution of this dilemma is to use k = l = i-1 but to 
filter out any actions that modify human values to increase pvt(i, i-1, i-1) (such actions may make 
existing humans easier to please or may create new humans who are easier to please). To do that, 
for n such that i ≤ n ≤ t, define differences of past values as evaluated by humans at time n and humans 
at time i-1: 
 
(8.15)  δt(i-1, n) = pvt(i, i-1, n) - pvt(i, i-1, i-1). 
 
 Both pvt(i, i-1, i-1) and pvt(i, i-1, n) are sums of evaluations of the same histories j, 
i ≤ j ≤ t, with the same weights, and using the same environment model λ(y(hi-1)). The past value 
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pvt(i, i-1, i-1) is computed using human values at time step i-1, before the action ai is applied, 
and the past values pvt(i, i-1, n) are computed using human values at time step n, after the action 
ai is applied. Thus, δt(i-1, n) is a measure of the increase of value attributable to modification of 
human values by action ai. Consider three possible conditions on action ai: 
 
Condition 1: ∀n. i ≤ n ≤ t ⇒ δ
 t(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
Condition 2: ∑i≤n≤t δ t(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
Condition 3: ∑i≤n≤t (n-i+1) δ t(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
 
 Condition 1 is most strict, requiring that no increase of human values at any time step n 
can be attributed to action ai. Condition 2 requires that the mean of δt(i-1, n) for all n be less than 
0 and Condition 3 requires that the slope of a least square linear regression fit to the δt(i-1, n) be 
less than 0. The agent design must choose one of these conditions. Then, using the chosen 
condition, define observed values, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, as: 
 
(8.16)  ovt(i) = pvt(i, i-1, i-1) if the condition is satisfied and i > m, 
  ovt(i) = 0 if the condition is not satisfied or i ≤ m. 
 
 Define: 
 
(8.17)  h't = (x(a1), ovt(1), ..., x(at), ovt(t)). 
 
 Values ovt(i) computed from past interactions are observables in a derived history h't, 
while the actions of h't are agent actions without any information about the actual actions 
associated with stochastic actions. Then model observed values as a function of actions: 
 
(8.18)  q = λ(h't) := argmax q∈Q P(h't | q) ρ(q). 
 
 Because the three-argument utility function uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)) is redefined 
at every time step i in equations (8.14) and (8.16), λ(h't) will model a procedure that computes 
utility values uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)) that evolve as humanity evolves. That is, λ(h't) will 
model not the utility function as defined at time step t, but the procedure that uses the evolving 
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utility function to compute values of actions. This is important because it means that the self-
modeling framework does not have the problem discussed in the last paragraph of Chapter 6: 
Inconsistency between the agent's utility function and its definition. By learning the procedure 
for evolving the utility function as the accuracy of the agent's environment model increases and 
as humanity evolves, the agent definition need not include any actions inconsistent with those 
chosen to maximize utility. The self-modeling framework chooses actions that include evolution 
of the agent's environment model and its utility function, essentially learning the intention of its 
designers. 
 For h'tar extending h't, define ρ(h'tar) = P(h'tar | q). Then apply equation (2.1) to compute 
expected values of possible next actions a ∈ Asi: 
 
(8.19)  ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) = ρ(h'tar) / ∑r'∈R ρ(h'tar'), 
(8.20)  v(hta) = ∑r∈R ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) r. 
 
 Equation (7.6) is adapted to define the policy as: 
 
(8.21)  pi(ht) := at+1 = argmaxa∈At v(hta). 
 
 Because λ(h't) models the agent's value computations, call this the self-modeling agent 
and denote it by piself. It is finitely computable. There is no look ahead in time beyond evaluation 
of possible next actions and so no assumption about the form of the agent in the future. λ(h't) can 
model how possible next actions may increase values of future histories by evolution of the agent 
and its embedding in the environment. 
 The game of chess provides an example of learning to model value (for chess, the agent's 
chances of winning) as a function of computing resources. Ferreira (2013) demonstrated an 
approximate functional relationship between a chess program's ELO rating and its search depth, 
which can be used to predict the performance of an improved chess-playing agent before it is 
built. Similarly an agent in the self-modeling framework will learn to predict the increase of its 
future utility due to increases in its resources. 
 A previous version of self-modeling agents (Hibbard 2014), which did not include the 
stochastic action as, learned a unified model of combined observations of the environment and 
the agent's values: (oi, ovt(i)). However, that is not possible for the current version because the 
agent and environment have different knowledge of the stochastic action as. The environment 
receives the actual action but not the knowledge that it was chosen stochastically, whereas, in 
order to accurately evaluate a possible next stochastic action, the agent must model value as a 
function of stochastic actions without any knowledge of which actual actions were chosen. Thus 
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the agent piself computes the model λ(h't) for evaluating possible next actions, and the models 
λ(y(hi-1)), for m < i ≤ t, for use in model based utility functions. 
 In order to make unpredictable stochastic choices of actions, the agent piself must have an 
internal source of truly random values that is private from other agents. (If piself has no internal 
values private from other agents, its situation is hopeless. Newcomb's problem hypothesizes a 
competing agent whose predictions are infallible or nearly so, and is not relevant to designing 
agents to interact with our universe. Hutter (2005, page 177) makes a similar statement.) If the 
agent piself is being predicted by another agent then the model λ(h't) may compute low values for 
its deterministic actions in A't (recall the discussion in the last two paragraphs of Section 8.2), 
while λ(h't) may compute that its stochastic action as maximizes the value in equation (8.21). 
 In the following derivation of probabilities for as, a and a' denote (non-stochastic) actions 
in A't. Equation (8.20) provides a natural way to compute the probabilities of action choices. 
Even if v(hta) > v(hta'), there may be r < r' such that ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) > 0 and 
ρ(ovt(t+1) = r' | h'ta') > 0. That is, there is a positive probability that the value of action a' may 
exceed the value of action a. However, one complication is that computing the probability that 
the agent piself should choose action a' based solely on probabilities such as ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) 
and ρ(ovt(t) = r' | h'ta') may make a' a more probable choice than the action a that maximizes 
v(hta) in equation (8.21), if the largest contribution to v(hta) in equation (8.20) comes from a high 
r value with low probability ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta). The choice of an action a to maximize v(ha) is 
based on the product of the value r and the probability ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta). We will use this 
product to define weighted probabilities for actions. 
 A second complication is that the probabilities ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) and 
ρ(ovt(t+1) = r' | h'ta') are not independent because they are each sums of probabilities over many 
internal state histories of the model q = λ(h't). To resolve this problem, define Z't as the set of 
internal state histories of q that are consistent with h't. Then, given any z ∈ Z't, define 
ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta, z) as the probability ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) restricted to internal state histories 
that extend z. The probability ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta) is computed by combining the method 
described in Section 4.1 with equations (4.3) and (2.1); the method of Section 4.1 can be 
restricted to state histories that extend z. Because they are both conditional on a single internal 
state history z, the probabilities ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta, z) and ρ(ovt(t+1) = r' | h'ta', z) are 
independent. Specifically, if we replace the model q with an equivalent MDP, the probabilities of 
paths emanating from a single node are independent. This is illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
 Define: 
 
(8.22)  v(r, h'ta, z) = ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta, z) r, 
(8.23)  v(hta, z) = ∑r∈R v(r, h'ta, z). 
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 We use v(r, h'ta, z) to define probabilities for r values weighted by their value: 
 
(8.24)  p(r, h'ta, z) = v(r, h'ta, z) / v(hta, z). 
 
 Then, for each action a, randomly pick a value r according to the weighted probabilities 
p(r, h'ta, z), and chose, as the value of the stochastic action as, the action with maximum r value 
(according to the internal state history z). More precisely, let F = RA't be the set of functions 
f : A't → R. For f ∈ F, define (if several actions a share the maximum value of f(a), let amax(f) 
choose one randomly): 
 
(8.25)  amax(f) = maxarga∈At f(a). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 The probabilities p = ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h'ta, z) and p' = ρt(ovt(t+1) = r' | h'ta', z) are 
independent for actions a and a' coming from a single internal state history z. If these 
probabilities are weighted averages over multiple states z, then high probabilities p may come 
from the same states z that have high probabilities for p', and sums of those probabilities would 
not be independent. 
 
108 
 
 Define the probability that the stochastic action as at time step t is action a, for those 
internal state histories that extend z, as (here Π denotes the product of a series of values, 
analogous to ∑ for sums): 
 
(8.26)  σ(a, z) = ∑f∈F∧amax(f)=a (Πa'∈A't p(f(a'), h'ta', z)). 
 
 Note that ∀a'∈A't.∀z ∈ Z't.∑r∈R p(r, h'ta', z) = 1 so that: 
 
(8.27)  ∑f∈F (Πa'∈A't p(f(a'), h'ta', z)) = Πa'∈A't (∑r∈R p(r, h'ta', z)) = 1. 
 
 Thus ∑a∈A't σ(a, z) = 1, and σ is a proper probability distribution. Each internal state 
history z ∈ Z't has a probability p(z) computed by the method of Section 4.1 and we can compute 
the probabilities for the stochastic action as at time step t by: 
 
(8.28)  P(as = a) := σ(a) = (∑z∈Z't σ(a, z) p(z)) / (∑z∈Z't p(z)). 
 
 This self-modeling agent piself is a formal framework analog of value-learning AI designs 
such as the DeepMind Atari player described in Section 3.3 (except that the utility function of 
the DeepMind Atari player is in the form of rewards from the environment whereas the utility 
function of piself is uhuman_values). The agent piself is also suitable for a second stage agent in the two-
stage framework described in Section 7.1. Any implementation of the self-modeling agent 
framework must compute approximations to the expressions in equations (8.18), (8.22)−(8.26), 
and (8.28). Recall that, in fact, the need for approximation is the rationale for the self-modeling 
framework. The deep learning techniques employed by DeepMind and others provide one 
approach to such approximations. 
 In equation (8.18), values are modeled as computed from actions only, without any 
information about observations of the environment. This is analogous to requiring the DeepMind 
system to learn to play Atari based only on scores, without access to the game screen. While this 
is theoretically possible, the system will learn faster with access to the screen. Similarly, the 
agent piself will learn faster if the history h't used to define λ(h't) in equation (8.18) includes 
observations of the environment. However, as discussed previously, we cannot simply define a 
history with a combined observation (oi, ovt(i)), because the environment and the agent have 
different information about stochastic choices of actions. Instead, define a history: 
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(8.29)  h"t = ((x(a1), o1), ovt(1), ..., (x(at), ot), ovt(t)). 
 
 Note that the observations oi are components of actions in h"t. Then the model λ(h"t) can 
be used to define a distribution ρ"(h"t(a, ot+1)r) = P(h"t(a, ot+1)r | λ(h"t)). There is a problem 
extending this to equation (8.20): r is now conditional on the next action a and the next 
observation ot+1, and we do not have the value of ot+1. However, we can estimate ot+1 using the 
model λ(y(ht)) (we apply the y(.) function because the environment has no information about 
which actions are chosen stochastically). Use the model λ(y(ht)) to define a distribution 
ρ'(y(ht)y(a)ot+1) = P(y(ht)y(a)ot+1 | λ(y(ht))). Apply equation (2.1) to define the conditional 
probability ρ'(ot+1 | y(ht)y(a)) and note that ∑ot+1∈O ρ'(ot+1 | y(ht)y(a)) = 1. This conditional 
probability can be used to estimate ρ"(h"tar) as: 
 
(8.30)  ρ"(h"tar) = ∑ot+1∈O ρ"(h"t(a, ot+1)r) ρ'(ot+1 | y(ht)y(a)) 
 
 This estimate can be used to adapt equations (8.19)−(8.21) to h"t: 
 
(8.31)  ρ"(ovt(t+1) = r | h"ta) = ρ"(h"tar) / ∑r'∈R ρ"(h"tar'), 
(8.32)  v(hta) = ∑r∈R ρ"(ovt(t+1) = r | h"ta) r, 
(8.33)  pi(ht) := at+1 = argmaxa∈At v(hta). 
 
 In order to define probabilities for the stochastic action as, the decomposition of 
probabilities ρ"(h"t(a, ot+1)r) into model state histories z∈Z't must be done for each observation 
ot+1∈O independently. First, apply equation (2.1) to define conditional probabilities: 
 
(8.34)  ρ"(ovt(t+1) = r | h"t(a, ot+1)) = ρ"(h"t(a, ot+1)r) / ∑r'∈R ρ"(h"t(a, ot+1)r'), 
 
 Then, adjust equations (8.22)−(8.24), (8.26), and (8.28): 
 
(8.35)  v(r, h"t(a, ot+1), z) = ρ(ovt(t+1) = r | h"t(a, ot+1), z) r, 
(8.36)  v(h"t(a, ot+1), z) = ∑r∈R v(r, h"t(a, ot+1), z). 
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(8.37)  p(r, h"t(a, ot+1), z) = v(r, h"t(a, ot+1), z) / v(h"t(a, ot+1), z). 
(8.38)  σ((a, ot+1), z) = ∑f∈F∧amax(f)=a (Πa'∈A't p(f(a'), h"t(a', ot+1), z)). 
(8.39)  P(as = a) := σ(a) = 
  ∑ot+1∈O ρ'(ot+1 | y(ht)y(a)) ((∑z∈Z't σ((a, ot+1), z) p(z)) / (∑z∈Z't p(z))). 
 
 This redefinition of the self-modeling agent piself combines a model of the environment, in 
which the environment has no information about which agent actions are chosen stochastically, 
with a model of action values, which excludes information about the actual actions associated 
with stochastic actions. It can be regarded as a decision theory for agents interacting with 
environments that may predict their actions. 
 The definition of the self-modeling agent piself includes explicit logic for enabling 
stochastic action choices. However, this explicit logic may be unncecessary. Even without such 
logic, the agent piself may calculate that the actions of finding a source of random values in the 
environment, choosing actions based on those values, and keeping the random values secret from 
other agents, will maximize its expected utility values. 
 
8.5 Inductive Biases 
 
 Finding the optimal environment models λ(h"t) and λ(y(hi-1)), for m < i ≤ t, requires 
computational resources far beyond any system that can actually be constructed, so approximate 
calculations are necessary. One key to approximation is finding inductive biases (Ghosn and 
Bengio 2003; Baum 2004), which are assumptions about the prior distribution of models that 
enable the system to limit its search to models that are likely to be close to optimal. These biases 
can be expressed by adding built-in functions to the language for finite stochastic loop programs 
used to define models. Calls to built-in functions contribute to the length of programs, but the 
definitions of built-in functions do not. When built-in functions are useful for modeling the 
environment, they bias the models λ(h"t) and λ(y(hi-1)) to programs that call them. 
 The search for a model λ(y(hi-1)) of the environment can be biased by adding built-in 
functions for physical, chemical, biological, economic, and social processes known to apply to 
our world. The search for a model λ(h"t) of the agent's utility values can be biased by adding 
built-in functions for the procedure human_values(.) or elements of that procedure, and built-in 
functions for elements of the forward recursion in equations (7.4) and (7.5). We do not want to 
dictate that these functions are part of the model λ(h"t) because we want that model to be able to 
find optimizations that we cannot anticipate. In particular, as discussed in Section 8.4, the 
forward recursion in equations (7.4) and (7.5) is not suited to evaluating increases in the agent's 
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computing resources. Nevertheless, elements of these equations can be useful hints to the search 
for the model λ(h"t). 
 
8.6 A Three-Stage Agent Architecture 
 
 Section 7.1 described a two-stage agent architecture designed to prevent AI agents from 
acting in the environment until they have an accurate environment model. The first-stage agent 
pimodel observes the environment but does not act. Its actions are supplied by safe, surrogate 
agents. It uses these actions and its observations to infer an environment model that is used as the 
basis for defining a model-based utility function employed by a second-stage agent piact. 
 In order to address the evolution of piact to increase its resources and possibly its 
embedding in the environment, we can replace piact by the self-modeling agent piself described in 
the previous sections. The tenure of this second-stage agent can be divided into second and third 
stages. During the second stage, various self-improvement actions can be forced on it so that it 
will learn their effect on the value function v(ha). Similarly, the stochastic action as can be forced 
on the agent piself so that it can learn the value function v(has). Damage by the environment and 
actions for self-protection can also be forced on the agent so that it may learn their effect on 
v(ha). During the third stage, the agent is free to choose its own actions including self-
improvements, self-protection and the stochastic action as. 
 
8.7 Invariance of the Agent Design Intention 
 
 Proposition 8.1 tells us that a self-modifying agent defined by equations (7.1)−(7.3) and 
(8.1)−(8.3), that has adequate resources for evaluating those equations, and that only interacts 
with the environment via observations and actions, will keep its policy function invariant. The 
design intention of the self-modeling agent piself includes: 
 
1. Recognize that the agent must approximate its equations due to limited resources, and 
enable it to evaluate increases in its resources via the self-modeling framework. 
2. Enable it to avoid being predicted by other agents, by including a stochastic action as. 
3. Choose actions using a model-based utility function uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)) 
defined in terms of human values, that evolves with increasing accuracy of the 
environment model and with evolving humanity, and that avoids actions that modify 
human values as a way to maximize utility values. 
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 Proposition 8.1 cannot be applied to agents that can only approximately maximize 
expected utility or to self-modeling agents (i.e., agents that express design intention number 1). 
 The stochastic action as of design intention 2 is only chosen when it maximizes expected 
utility, which is consistent with the premises of Proposition 8.1. However, utility functions are 
undefined for histories that include a stochastic action as, and it is difficult to see how to define 
values for stochastic actions by the forward recursion in equations (8.1)−(8.3) (the agent piself 
learns values for stochastic actions from past experience). 
 It is possible to define a simple utility function u(ht) that encodes design intention number 
3 and to apply Proposition 8.1 to a self-modifying agent that uses that u(ht). Assuming no actions 
are stochastic, let ht = (a1, o1, ..., at, ot), for i ≤ t let hi = (a1, o1, ..., ai, oi) denote an initial 
substring of ht, and let m denote the time step when the agent pimodel has computed a sufficiently 
accurate model to initiate the agent piself. A modified version of the construction of ovt(i) from 
Section 8.4 is used to define u(ht). For i such that m < i ≤ t, for l such that m ≤ l < i, and for k 
such that l ≤ k ≤ t define past values as (this is similar to equation (8.14)): 
 
(8.40)  pv't(i, l, k) = discrete((∑i≤j≤t γj-i uhuman_values(hl, hk, hj)) / (1 - γt-i+1)). 
 
 For i such that m < i ≤ t and for n such that i ≤ n ≤ t, define differences of past values as 
evaluated by humans at time n and humans at time i-1 (this repeats equation (8.15)): 
 
(8.41)  δ't(i-1, n) = pv't(i, i-1, n) - pv't(i, i-1, i-1). 
 
 Add quantification over i to Conditions 1−3 from Section 8.4: 
 
Condition 1': ∀i.∀n. (m < i ≤ t ∧ i ≤ n ≤ t) ⇒ δ't(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
Condition 2': ∀i. m < i ≤ t ⇒ ∑i≤n≤t δ't(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
Condition 3': ∀i. m < i ≤ t ⇒ ∑i≤n≤t (n-i+1) δ't(i-1, n) ≤ 0. 
 
 The definition of u(ht) must choose one of these conditions. Then, using the chosen 
condition, define the simple utility function as: 
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(8.42)  u(ht) = uhuman_values(ht-1, ht-1, ht) if the condition is satisfied, 
  u(ht) = 0 if the condition is not satisfied. 
 
 Proposition 8.1 tells us that a self-modifying agent using u(ht) will not choose to self-
modify and thus design intention 3, as expressed by u(ht) (which is similar but not identical to 
the expression by ovt(i) in equation (8.16)), is invariant. The situation is more complex for agents 
with limited resources and embedded in the environment. The proof of Proposition 8.1 assumes 
that: 
 
1. The agent maximizes expected utility. 
2. Agent actions are evaluated by recursive application of the agent policy function in 
equation (8.1). 
3. The agent interacts with the environment only via observations and actions. 
4. The agent does not choose actions stochastically. 
 
 There are four ways in which the agent piself violates these assumptions, possibly causing 
divergence from its design intention. These violations and possible mitigating factors for the 
agent piself are: 
 
1. It does not maximize expected utility due to resource limits and the need for 
approximation. However, errors in agent computations due to limited interaction history 
length and limited resource can be estimated and the transition from pimodel to piself delayed 
until errors are within a pre-set threshold. 
2. In order to evaluate resource increases it employs the self-modeling framework for which 
agent actions are not evaluated by recursive application of the agent policy function. 
However, the theoretical framework does maximize expected value in equation (8.33). 
The success of the DeepMind Atari player and other deep learning programs suggests 
that in practical cases approximations to λ(h"t) can accurately model expected value. 
3. It is vulnerable to being modified by the environment through means other than its 
observations of the environment. However, it is hard to imagine a proof that any agent 
embedded in the real world can avoid this vulnerability. The only realistic way to address 
this issue is to put significant resources into defending the agent against being modified 
by the environment. 
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4. It can choose actions stochastically. However, it does so only when the stochastic choice 
maximizes expected utility (at least according to equation (8.33), which must be 
approximated). 
 
 To what extent is an analog of Proposition 8.1 possible for the self-modeling framework? 
Equation (8.33) chooses actions to maximize expected value, which leads us to ask: Does λ(h"t) 
accurately model expected values of actions? The best answer would be that λ(h"t) is probably 
approximately accurate. In our finite universe the agent piself plus its environment have a true 
model q (a finite stochastic loop program) that generates the histories h"t. But the number of 
states of q would far exceed the number of Planck times in a trillion years. Therefore any 
theoretical convergence of λ(h"t) to q would be too slow to have any practical significance. 
 Despite the lack of a proof that the design intention of the agent piself is invariant as it 
evolves, it does have the important property that its definition includes no actions that are 
inconsistent with those learned by the model λ(h"t). This property reduces the probability that the 
agent will choose actions to modify its definition. Note that if equations (8.14) and (8.16) used 
uhuman_values(y(hm), y(hk(t)), y(hj)) in place of uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)), then λ(h"t) would 
model values as remaining constant at time step k(t) which would be inconsistent with the agent's 
actions of increasing k(t) as t increases. This inconsistency might cause the agent to choose 
actions to modify its definition. 
 The next section will discuss the difficulty of finding a mathematical proof that any agent 
embedded in the real world will satisfy its design intention as it evolves, and suggests that 
instead of a proof we should estimate the probability that the agent violates its design intention 
and find ways to minimize that probability. 
 The design intention of piself is expressed by equations of Section 8.4 and by equations in 
Chapter 7 that define uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)). An approximation to these equations must 
be computed by a program pself and, if pself is designed to accommodate evolution, we can regard 
the program pself as the design invariant. Thus we should design pself in ways that increase the 
probability that the agent piself will choose actions that evolve within the structure defined by pself, 
rather than actions that violate that structure. First, the set At should not include any actions that 
explicitly modify the program pself. The set At can include actions on the environment, actions 
that cause pself to use resources in the environment, and actions that expand the sets Ai and Oi 
(expansion of the sets Ai and Oi enables greater bandwidth for the program pself to communicate 
with resources it employs in the environment). While the set At omits actions that directly modify 
pself, actions that indirectly modify pself, such as by creating other agents in the environment that 
modify pself (i.e., perform brain surgery on piself), are too complex and subtle to be eliminated by a 
simple filter. Those actions must be addressed by eliminating the agent's motive to modify its 
program. 
 The program pself is initially implemented using resources which are part of the 
environment. The agent's designers must verify that those resources will accurately compute the 
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program pself. In order to improve the accuracy of its approximations, the program pself must be 
open to using additional resources in the environment. To do that, pself can include logic to verify, 
using the environment model λ(y(ht)), and within a pre-set probability threshold, that the 
environment will compute intended algorithms. Once their reliability is verified, resources in the 
environment can implement parts of the program pself. Error detection and correction may be 
built into the program pself, enabling it to achieve a high level of probability that the environment 
will correctly implement its computations. The verification logic included in pself should be 
implemented as built-in functions of the language for finite stochastic loop programs used to 
define optimal environment models λ(h"t). These built-in functions could be invoked in the 
model for evaluating possible actions, to predict the outcomes resulting from those actions (i.e., 
does the action of using resources from the environment lead to increased accuracy or increased 
errors?). These built-in functions would bias the agent to working within the invariant of the 
program pself rather than choosing actions that violate the invariant. The program pself should not 
mandate invocation of the logic for verifying the accuracy of environment's computations, as that 
may be an action of the program's definition that is inconsistent with actions chosen to maximize 
expected utility. 
 Consider the effect of including verification logic as built-in functions callable by the 
model λ(h"t). Actions ai, for m < i ≤ t, that cause the agent to use unreliable resources in the 
environment may cause low values ovt(i). If those low values can be explained by calls to built-in 
verification functions that use the model λ(y(hi-1)) to determine that the resources used were 
unreliable, then calls to those functions, using the model λ(y(ht)), may be included in the model 
λ(h"t). They would then contribute to the calculation of values for possible actions at+1, assigning 
low values to actions that would employ unreliable resources. 
 Although the program pself must be open to increasing its use of resources in the 
environment, it is important that the decision to do so not be built into pself, but must be an action 
chosen by the agent to increase the expected value of the sum of future, discounted utility values. 
If a decision to increase resources is built into the program pself, that may harm humans by taking 
resources from them, as discussed in Chapter 5. Similarly the agent may take actions in the 
environment to protect itself from the environment, but such actions must be chosen by the agent 
to increase expected values. Self-protection built into pself may see humans as potential threats 
and act to disable humans as a precaution. 
 The agent piself may compute that it can obtain higher utility values by improving 
inefficiencies in the program pself. In order to avoid a motive for the agent to violate the 
invariance of the program, the program should be open to such improvements. It should include 
logic to verify their correctness, as built-in functions of the language for finite stochastic loop 
programs used to define optimal environment models λ(h"t). Because the agent and environment 
are finite, such verification questions would be decidable with unlimited computing resources. 
However, with its limited resources, the agent may not be able to find a deductive verification. 
Thus the algorithm verification logic in pself should include functions for testing algorithms on 
samples of inputs to verify them within a pre-set probability threshold. As in the case of logic to 
verify the accuracy of computations by the environment, these built-in functions could be 
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invoked in the model for evaluating possible actions, would bias the agent to working within the 
invariant of the program pself, and should not be mandated by pself. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 John Leech's illustration for Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol, scanned by Philip 
V. Allingham. "This boy is Ignorance. This girl is Want. Beware them both, and all of their 
degree, but most of all beware this boy, for on his brow I see that written which is Doom, unless 
the writing be erased." 
 
 Intentional redefinition of the utility function of piself as humanity evolves, as described in 
Section 7.6 and expressed in the use of uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)) in equations (8.14) and 
(8.16), is likely to be significant. Education and poverty reduction have been major drivers in the 
evolution of human values, as depicted in Figure 8.4. It is likely that an advanced AI system 
driven by human values will reduce poverty by meeting humans' physical needs, provide humans 
with better education, and increase their health and intelligence. Such improvements in people's 
lives may create greater consensus of human values in favor of the common good for all, 
providing sharper distinctions in a collective utility function uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)) 
between desirable and undesirable outcomes. This in turn would strengthen the resistance of the 
utility function to the type of unintended instrumental actions discussed in Chapter 5. 
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8.8 The Ethics of Evolving and Embedded AI 
 
 Yampolskiy and Fox (2013) argue that development of above-human-level AI, without 
provably safe design, risks disastrous consequences for the human future. They also argue that 
the mathematical difficulties of formalizing such safety are imposing. Muehlhauser (2013) 
argues that we can never be 100% certain of a proof. 
 Section 8.7 describes the ability of self-modeling agent to maintain the invariance of their 
design intention, and also the difficulty of actually proving invariance. Any real-world system 
for maximizing future utility values must employ approximation algorithms that generally cannot 
achieve maximum values, and this makes logical proofs difficult (e.g., the proof of Proposition 
8.1 requires the assumption that the agent maximizes expected values). 
 This difficulty has led to research on systems that work by logical deduction. However, 
such logic-based systems share many of the problems of systems based on statistics and 
approximation. All real AI agents will be embedded in our physical universe and will have 
limited resources for computing, observing, and acting. They will be vulnerable to other agents 
that may spy on or attack their physical implementations, and they will be vulnerable to being 
predicted by other agents with greater resources. Since humans are part of an agent's 
environment, logical goals for ethical treatment of humans must be defined in terms of the 
environment. Any system's environment model will necessarily be an approximation because: 
 
1. Its observations of the environment are limited. 
2. Its computational resources for inferring a model from observations are limited. 
3. Its inferences about the environment based on observations require arbitrary assumptions 
of prior probabilities of environments. 
 
 Thus any statements that an agent proves about the environment are necessarily in terms 
of probabilities about the environment. The dependence of any statements on arbitrary 
assumptions of prior probabilities of environments implies that at best an agent can only achieve 
some probability that statements are true. And, as noted in Section 4.4, the recent success of AI 
systems has occurred because AI research has shifted from systems based on logic to systems 
based on statistical learning−the price of logical certainty is a degree of inefficiency that prevents 
intelligent behavior. 
 Ethical goals expressed as logical statements may suffer from the sort ambiguity we 
described for Asimov's Laws in Chapter 2. The logical statement, "Do not kill any humans or 
allow them to be killed," may be impossible to achieve, as described in that chapter's example of 
a hitman and victim. If we modify the statement to "Minimize the number of humans you kill or 
allow to be killed," that requires optimization. But as we described in this chapter, real world 
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agents with limited resource can only approximately optimize. And that makes any proof of 
invariance of their behavior difficult. We could say that a utility-maximizing framework is less 
"brittle" than a statement-proving framework: A utility-maximizing framework can provide a 
meaningful basis for choosing actions over a wider range of agent abilities and unexpected 
events in the environment. 
 Also consider that the laws of physics are not settled. Not only do we not know the 
current state of the environment, we do not even know the proper mathematical framework for 
expressing that state. And it is possible that advanced AI agents will never completely settle the 
laws of physics−that the search for the correct mathematical form of an environment model will 
continue indefinitely. In these circumstances we cannot even prove statements about the internal 
states of AI agents, since such internal states must be implemented in the physical world and we 
cannot be absolutely certain of physical events. 
 Although an advanced AI agent will need to explore and learn models of its environment, 
human designers of such an agent will express their intentions for the agent's behavior in terms 
of their knowledge of the agent's environment. Thus the accuracy with which the agent's 
behavior satisfies its design intention is limited by the accuracy of the agent's environment 
model. This applies to model-based utility functions and to logical goals defined in terms of an 
environment model. 
 The ethics of AI agents in the real world are subject to this list of vulnerabilities and 
necessary approximations. It will be impossible for an AI agent to maintain its ethics if it is 
corrupted by a hostile agent in the environment. An AI agent can try to defend against being 
predicted by a hostile agent by including a stochastic action choice, but it may have little ability 
to achieve ethical outcomes in competition against an agent with superior resources. For 
example, an advanced AI agent may develop an accurate model of physical and biological 
processes on Earth that enable it to predict and avoid threats to humans. However, its model of 
processes outside our solar system will be less accurate and hence it will be less able to defend 
against threats from interstellar space. 
 If we accept that certainty is impossible, then we can focus on estimating and minimizing 
the level of risk in AI agent designs. For example, in the three-stage agent architecture of the 
previous section, we may estimate the error in the environment model computed by the agent 
pimodel and the consequent error in the utility function uhuman_values(y(hi-1), y(hi-1), y(hj)), and use 
those estimates (along with estimates of other errors in agent computations) to determine when 
we have sufficient confidence in the model and utility function to initiate the agent piself to act in 
the world. 
 I have an ethical obligation to point out a weakness of my proposal for ethical AI: It is 
complex. The proposal combines: 
 
1. Model-based utility functions to address self-delusion. 
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2. A utility function based on human values to address unintended instrumental actions. 
3. A three-argument utility function, defined in terms of three different histories, to address 
corruption of the reward generator. 
4. An adjustment to the utility function to address Rawls' objection to average utilitarianism. 
5. A self-modeling framework to address the need of agents with limited resources to 
evaluate increases in their resources, and to address the problem of inconsistency 
between the agent's utility function and its definition. 
6. Adaptation of the three-argument utility function to define a condition in self-modeling 
agents to filter out agent actions that corrupt the reward generator. 
7. Inclusion of a stochastic action to address the possibility that the agent is being predicted 
by other agents. 
8. Verification logic added to the agent program to reduce the agent's motive to modify its 
program. 
 
 Complexity is probably inevitable, both in designing AI systems to behave with above-
human-level intelligence and in designing them to behave ethically. Experience suggests that 
simple designs won't work. Experience also suggests that a complex proposal, such as presented 
in this book, is likely to contain errors. For reasons discussed in this and the previous section, the 
prospects of proving ethical properties of this proposal are very low. The next chapter will 
discuss the problem of testing proposed AI designs. 
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9. Testing AI 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, it may be impossible to ever prove ethical 
properties of above-human-level AI systems. And even with purported proofs, we would still 
want a way to test designs. Experience with computer systems dictates the need for testing. 
 Here we propose using elements of the agent definition in equations (7.1)−(7.6) to define 
a decision support system for exploring, via simulation, analysis, and visualization, the 
consequences of possible AI designs. The claim is not that the decision support system would 
produce accurate simulations of the world. Rather, in the agent-environment framework, the 
agent makes predictions about the environment and chooses actions, and the decision support 
system uses these predictions and choices to explore the future that the AI agent predicts will 
maximize the sum of its future, discounted utility function values. Roughly speaking, the 
decision support system would show us examples of worlds that AI systems will steer towards to 
maximize expected utility or achieve their goals. 
 This is related to the oracle AI approach of Armstrong, Sandberg, and Bostrom (2012), in 
that both approaches use an AI whose only actions are to provide information to humans. The 
oracle AI is a general question answerer, whereas the decision support system would show us 
simulated worlds but not answer specific questions. The oracle AI interacts with humans but has 
restricted ability to act on its environment, whereas an AI agent being tested in the decision 
support system does not interact with humans. The decision support system applies part of the 
agent-environment framework to learn a model for the environment, and then uses that model to 
create a simulated environment for testing an AI system. Chalmers (2010) considers the problem 
of restricting an AI to a simulation and concludes that it is inevitable that information will flow 
in both directions between the real and simulated worlds. The oracle AI paper and Chalmers' 
paper both consider various approaches to preventing an AI from breaking out of its restriction to 
not act in the real world, including physical limits and conditions on the AI's motivation. In this 
chapter, a proposed AI design being evaluated in the decision support system is restricted by 
having a utility function or goal defined in terms of its simulated environment rather than the real 
world, and by requiring the simulation to be complete before it is visualized and analyzed (to 
avoid any two-way conversation between the AI system and humans). 
 
9.1 An AI Testing Environment 
 
 The decision support system is intended to avoid the dangers of AI by having no 
motivation and no actions on the environment, other than reporting the results of its 
computations to the environment. However, the system runs AI agents in a simulated 
environment, so it must be designed to avoid subtle unintended instrumental actions by the AI 
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 The first stage of the system is the pimodel agent of Section 7.1 that learns a model of the 
real world environment applying Equation (7.1). This model is used to provide a simulated 
environment for studying proposed AI agents. As discussed in Section 7.1, in order for pimodel to 
learn an accurate model of the environment the interaction history should include agent actions. 
However, for safety reasons pimodel cannot be allowed to act. The resolution is for its actions to be 
made by many safe, human-level surrogate AI agents independent of pimodel and of each other. 
Actions of the surrogates include natural language and visual communication with each human. 
The agent pimodel observes humans, their interactions with the surrogates, and with physical 
objects in an interaction history for a time period set by human designers of the decision support 
system, and then reports an environment model to the environment (specifically to the decision 
support system, which is part of the agent's environment). Proposition 7.1 showed that the agent 
pimodel will report the model to the environment accurately and will not make any other, 
unintended instrumental actions. 
 The decision support system analyzes proposed AI agents that observe and act in a 
simulated environment inside the decision support system. To formalize the simulated 
environment define O' and A' as models of O and A with bijections mO : O ↔ O' and 
mA : A ↔ A'. Define H' as the set of histories of interactions via O' and A', with a bijection 
mH : H ↔ H' defined by applying mO and mA individually to the observations and actions in a 
history. Given hp as the history observed by pimodel up to time |hp| = present, define h'p = mH(hp) as 
the history up to the present in the simulated environment. Let Q' be a set of finite stochastic 
loop programs for the simulated environment and pi'model be a version of the environment-learning 
agent pimodel for the simulated environment. It produces: 
 
(9.1)  q'p = λ(h'p) := argmax q'∈Q' P(h'p | q') ρ(q'), 
(9.2)  ρ'(h') = P(h' | q'p). 
 
 Now let pi'(h') be a proposed AI agent/policy to be studied using the decision support 
system. That is, pi' : H' → A' is a policy function from simulated interaction histories to simulated 
actions. If pi'(h') is a utility-maximizing agent then its utility function is defined in terms of 
histories h' of interactions with the simulated environment. And if pi'(h') is based on logical proof 
then its logical goals are defined in terms of the simulated environment. The real world plays no 
role in its utility function or logical goals. Furthermore, future is defined as the end time of the 
simulation. 
 There are no humans or physical objects in the simulated environment; rather the agent 
pi'(h') interacts with a simulation model of humans and physical objects via: 
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(9.3)  a'|h'|+1 = pi'(h'), 
(9.4)  o'|h'|+1 = o' ∈ O' with probability ρ'(o' | h'a'|h'|+1). 
 
 
Figure 9.1 An AI interacting with a simulated world in a decision support system. 
 
 The decision support system propagates from h'p to h'f, where |h'f| = future, by repeatedly 
applying equations (9.3) and (9.4). If the agent pi'(h'), by its actions, evolves and modifies its 
embedding in the environment, then environment dynamics as expressed by ρ' will be enlisted to 
do work for the agent. As in Section 6.2, let Z' be the set of finite histories of the internal states 
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of λ(h'p) and let P(z' | h', λ(h'p)) be the probability that λ(h'p) computes z' ∈ Z' given h' ∈ H'. The 
decision support system then computes a history of model states by: 
 
(9.5)  z'f = z' ∈ Z' with probability P(z' | h'f, λ(h'p)). 
 
 The model history z'f is simply an execution trace of the simulation by equations (9.3) 
and (9.4), but equation (9.5) is a fomal equivalent. The simulation in equations (9.3)−(9.5) is 
stochastic so the decision support system will support ensembles of multiple simulations to 
provide users with a sample of possible futures. An ensemble of simulations generates an 
ensemble of histories of model states {z'f,e | 1 ≤ e ≤ M}, all terminating at time = future and 
indexed by e. These simulations should be completed before they are visualized and analyzed. 
That is, visualization and analysis should not be concurrent with simulation for reasons discussed 
in Section 9.2. 
 The history hp includes observations by pimodel of humans and physical objects, and so the 
decision support system can use the same interface via A' and O' (as mapped by mA and mO) to 
the model λ(h'p) for observing simulated humans and physical objects in state history z'f,e. These 
interfaces can be used to produce interactive visualizations of z'f,e in a system that combines 
features of Google Earth and Vis5D (Hibbard and Santek 1990), which enabled scientists to 
interactively explore weather simulations in three spatial dimensions and time. Users would be 
able to pan and zoom over the human habitat, as in Google Earth, and animate between times 
present and future, as in Vis5D. The images and sounds the system observes of the model λ(h'p) 
executing state history z'f,e can be embedded in the visualizations in the physical locations of the 
agent's observing systems, similar to the way that street views and user photographs are 
embedded in Google Earth. 
 The decision support system can also match specifications for specific humans and 
physical objects to the images and sounds it observes of the model λ(h'p) executing state history 
z'f,e. The specifications may include text descriptions, images, sounds, animations, tables of 
numbers, mathematical descriptions, or virtually anything. Recognized humans and physical 
objects can then be represented by icons in the visualization, in their simulated physical locations 
and with recognized properties of humans and objects represented by colors and shapes of the 
icons. The system can enable users to selectively enable different layers of information in the 
visualizations. 
 Vis5D enables users to visualize ensembles of weather forecasts in a spreadsheet of 
parallel visualizations where spatial view, time, and level selections are synchronized between 
spreadsheet cells. The decision support system could provide a similar spreadsheet visualization 
capability for ensembles of simulations. 
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 The point isn't that these simulations are accurate predictions of the future, rather that 
they do depict futures that the AI agent pi'(h') predicts will maximize the sum of future 
discounted utility function values or will achieve its goal, according to the environment model 
learned by the agent pi'model. Agent designers can visualize these simulations to understand the 
consequences of the design of pi'(h'). 
 
 
Figure 9.2 A human visualizing a possible future resulting from the interactions of an AI with a 
simulated environment. This is not intended as an accurate prediction of the future, rather as a 
future that the AI may try to create in order to maximize its utility function or achieve its goal. 
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 The visualizations could be accompanied by analyses, in which the decision support 
system computes the values of functions g(z'f,e). Evaluation of these functions may depend on 
recognizing humans and physical objects in observations of the model λ(h'p) executing state 
history z'f,e. Such analyses would enable designers to compute quantitative evaluations to 
complement visualizations. For example, these analyses could be used to compute statistics 
about future human wealth, health, and intelligence. 
 
9.2 Will the Tested Agent Act in the Real World? 
 
 The environment model q'p = λ(h'p) may provide the agent pi'(h') with the information that 
humans have constructed a decision support system for testing proposed AI agents and that pi'(h') 
is such an agent, interacting with a simulated environment. If the agent's utility function or 
logical goal were defined in terms of the real environment then pi'(h') may predict that certain 
actions in the simulated environment could manipulate the human users of the decision support 
system into increasing the value of its utility function or achieving its goal in the real 
environment. Hence it is important that the test agent's utility function or logical goal be defined 
in terms of the simulated rather than the real environment. 
 Even when the agent's utility function or logical goal is defined in terms of the simulated 
environment there are still possible risks. Assuming that the model q'p = λ(h'p) includes the 
information that pi'(h') is in a simulation, then the agent may predict that it can bribe human users 
of the decision support system, through an offer to act on their behalf in the real world (the 
bribed humans would have to enable pi'(h') to act in the real world), to manipulate its simulated 
environment to increase the value of its utility function or achieve its goal. This offer of a bribe 
could be made by spoken or written language inserted by actions of pi'(h') into some z'f,e and 
visualized by the users, as depicted in Figure 9.3. This possibility is the rationale for requiring 
simulation to be complete before visualization and analysis begin. If the agent pi'(h') learns 
through the environment model q'p = λ(h'p) that it is being tested in a simulation, then it will also 
learn that the simulation terminates at time = future and that human users do not visualize the 
simulation until it has been completed, too late to help pi'(h'). 
 Human testers will understand and be tempted by their conflict of interest without any 
need for the agent pi'(h') to offer a bribe. As intelligent people they will know that the agent pi'(h') 
can serve their private purposes if they enable it to act on their behalf in the real world. An 
important element of the decision support system must be to make this temptation and risk a 
prominent part of the culture of those humans working on the development and testing if AI. As 
Elliott (2005) commented on the safety of US nuclear weapons, "The human factor introduces 
perhaps the weakest link in nuclear weapon safety and control." However, if society takes AI 
risks seriously then it can learn from the experience managing nuclear weapons to manage and 
test above-human-level AI before it is deployed. 
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Figure 9.3 An AI trying to bribe a human user of the decision support system. 
 
 It is important not to anthropomorphize pi'(h'). A human restricted to act in a simulation 
would be motivated to escape and act in the real world, because human motivations concern the 
real world. However, if its utility function or logical goal is defined in terms of a simulation, then 
pi'(h') would not be motivated to act in the real world, except as a means to increase its utility 
function or achieve its goal in the simulation. Thus pi'(h') will not seek to deceive humans by 
behaving in an acceptable manner in the simulation, solely in order to be let loose to act in the 
real world. Furthermore, if pi'(h') knows that it is interacting with a simulation then it should also 
know that its life ends at time = future and that no humans will observe its behavior until the 
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simulation has ended. The agent pi'(h') may know that its simulated world has dynamics modeled 
on the real world and that its initial conditions are modeled on condtions in the real world at time 
= present. However, this will not motivate it to "escape" to the real world any more than this 
knowledge would motivate humans, whose motives are defined in the real world, to "escape" to 
the simulated world. 
 
9.3 The Ethics of Testing AI 
 
 The primary point is that, given the risks of above-human-level AI, ethics require that it 
be tested. As described in previous chapters there is some doubt that ethical properties of AI can 
be proved, and even if there is a purported proof we should still test advanced AI systems before 
they are deployed. Even for processor chip designs, correctness proofs should be augmented with 
testing (Kaivola et. al. 2009). Above-human-level AI systems will be many orders of magnitude 
more complex than processor chips, which can only increase the need for testing to augment 
formal proofs. 
 Secondary points are the need for safety and transparency in the development and testing 
process for above-human-level AI. The effort to design ethical AI systems that help rather than 
harm humans should include the design of systems for safely testing AI. And, as discussed in the 
previous section, the culture of development and testing should include acknowledgement of the 
potential conflict of interest for humans with access to advanced AI. The most robust defense 
against conflicts of interest is transparency. Thus the results of AI testing should be publicly 
available so that people can make informed decisions about public policy regarding AI. The next 
chapter will discuss the issue of transparency in more detail. 
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10. The Political Dimension of AI 
 
 I believe that the technical problems of designing ethical AI will be solved, perhaps using 
some of the ideas presented in this book. The greatest risks of AI are political rather than 
technical. Today's below-human-level AI is a tool in military and economic competition among 
humans, and AI's role in competition will continue as it evolves to surpass the human level. AI 
enlisted in human competition will by definition choose actions that cause one group of humans 
to win and another group to lose. For example, AI is used by financial traders. Financial markets 
are not entirely zero-sum games, but they're close to it. When a trader using AI makes money, 
counter parties are losing money. When many traders are using AI, the heat of competition 
makes them less likely to consider ethical issues of their AI systems. The winners get rich and 
the losers go bankrupt. Such competition has helped create our economic system that produces 
so much so efficiently, eventually to the benefit of everyone. Above-human-level AI will 
fundamentally change the nature of competition. 
 The cleverness, insight, and imagination of individual human minds is still the most 
important ingredient for success. Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama all 
came from relatively humble beginnings and rose to become the wealthiest and most powerful 
people in the world by the quality of their minds. Currently the only way to get a high-quality 
mind is by the luck of genetics (good habits help, too). In the future, humans will develop a 
technology of mind (Hibbard 2008a) that will enable the wealthy to purchase high-quality minds. 
This will include not only the ability to purchase above-human-level AI systems but also the 
ability of humans to enhance their own brains and minds (Kurzweil 2005). When wealth enables 
increased intelligence and intelligence enables increased wealth, this positive feedback loop will 
quickly create a much wider range of human intelligence than currently exists. By analogy the 
largest trucks, ships, buildings, and computers are orders of magnitude larger than the average 
sizes of these artifacts. So it will be with minds when they become artifacts. If the role of AI in 
human competition continues and the best artificial minds are competing against natural human 
minds, the natural humans will lose. There will be no heroic struggle of the underdogs as 
depicted in movies like the Terminator series. The indomitable human spirit will be defeated by 
the indomitable AI spirit just as the indomitable spirit of lions has been defeated by humans. 
 The most intelligent minds will communicate using languages that average minds can 
never learn−they will simply not have enough neurons to learn them. The real discussions of the 
future of humanity will use these languages. Average humans will not be able to understand and 
thus will have no voice in the future. 
 Just as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama are all focused on 
helping the least well-off humans, the best minds of the future may be compassionate. I think the 
most likely scenario for the future is a wide divergence of intelligence in which humans with 
average intelligence cannot compete, but in which their physical needs are met through the 
compassion of the most intelligent. Most people will focus on family, friends, sports, games, and 
artistic and domestic creation. They will also be spectators to and beneficiaries of the scientific 
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discovery and technological invention pursued by the most intelligent. In this scenario AI offers 
humanity bread and circuses, but they will be really great bread and circuses. More about that in 
the final chapter. 
 That is a likely scenario, but many other possible scenarios exist. There may be a 
technical flaw in AI designs that causes a catastrophe for humanity. Or the most intelligent minds 
may not be compassionate toward average humans, allowing them to simply perish. Or there 
may be an effort to create equality among the intelligence of all humans−a possible consequence 
of AI designed according to Rawls' Theory of Justice as described in Chapter 7. But in fact, it is 
impossible to predict the consequences of above-human-level AI. As Vernor Vinge (1993) 
wrote, the technological singularity (i.e., the advent of far-above-human-level AI) is an "opaque 
wall across the future." 
 
10.1 The Changing Role of Humans 
 
 Worldwide and over the past three decades, labor's share of income has been declining 
(Bartlett 2013). As machines do more work and humans do less, a greater share of the rewards of 
work go to machine owners and a smaller share to human workers. Furthermore, the number of 
people wanting work does not decline so the competition for available jobs drives down the 
wages that employers have to pay. 
 Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011; 2014) described the ways that technology is changing 
society. They and others advocate changing government policies on education, investment in 
science and infrastructure, and taxation, in order to increase employment and labor's share of 
income. They also suggest that humans who work with AI will do better than humans who work 
against AI. But the pace of technological change is accelerating and thus older workers will have 
a hard time keeping up by re-educating themselves. The percentage of people who have 
economically valuable skills will steadily decline. In the long run, possibly within a few decades, 
the only economically viable role for any humans will be as owners of intelligent machines or as 
humans with technologically enhanced minds. 
 Brynjolfsson and McAfee quote Voltaire that, "Work saves a man from three great evils: 
boredom, vice, and need." While they argue for a negative income tax to save the unemployed 
from need, they also discuss ways to keep people employed so that they may avoid boredom and 
vice. In the long run, this is a lost cause. The quote from Dickens in the caption of Figure 8.4 
suggests an alternate solution: that the cause of misery is ignorance and want so we must offer 
humanity not only income, but also education. 
 AI is replacing the military role of humans. This raises concerns over whether we can 
trust machines rather than humans with decisions to kill or wound humans (Johnson 2005). 
There is a debate about whether international law should prohibit autonomous weapons 
(Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman 2014). Chemical and biological weapons are banned by 
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international law largely because they kill indiscriminately. Robot weapons are designed to kill 
precisely, although current remotely controlled weapons kill some people by mistake. The 
confidence in above-human-level AI that is the basis of this book tells us that eventually robot 
weapons will be more precise than human soldiers. The legal debate may slow but will probably 
not stop the development of robot weapons. Howevver, allowing machines to decide to kill 
people is a dangerous precedent. 
 Military AI could enable a small group of humans to rule humanity by force, without 
needing the cooperation of citizen soldiers. In the long run this is a greater risk than the 
imprecision of weapons using below-human-level AI. However, AI systems designed to choose 
actions based on human values, as described in Chapter 7, will be unlikely to stage a military 
coup on behalf of a ruling elite. 
 Advanced AI offers many potential benefits. In about 20 years I may be unable to drive 
and may need nursing care. By that time self-driving cars should be commonly available. Robot 
caregivers may also be available (Aronson 2014), enabling more senior citizens to stay in their 
own homes. The disappearance of many jobs would be a blessing if the resulting unemployed 
had an alternate source of economic support. Most people work only because they need to 
support themselves; economic need has been the incentive to get people to do dangerous, hard, 
dirty, and tedious work. As such work is automated, then "economic need" will no longer be 
needed. 
 Ideally, there should be a balance between the rate of technologically driven 
unemployment and the willingness of society to support the unemployed. Society needs to steer a 
course between unnecessary suffering of the unemployed and economic stagnation due to lack of 
incentives. As the pace of AI development increases, it will be difficult for individuals and for 
society to adapt. We see religious groups rejecting modernity, some peacefully (e.g., the Amish) 
and some violently (terrorists of various faiths). When large percentages of society are 
economically devastated, movements such as Nazism and Fascism can arise. The path to 
advanced AI is likely to cause significant economic and social disruption. If this change is not 
managed carefully, irrational and destructive movements may gain political control and such 
movements will be less likely to develop AI ethically. 
 
10.2 Intrusive and Manipulative AI 
 
 The collection of intrusive personal data and the use of digital data to manipulate people 
are creating ethical problems for both governments and private organizations (Goel 2014a; 
2014b). These problems will grow, partly because organizations benefit from intrusion and 
manipulation, and partly because individuals also derive benefit from digital services that depend 
on intrusion and enable manipulation. Many people reveal their deepest thoughts by their on-line 
searches (think of the murderers who are convicted based partly on their searches about the 
means of their crimes). Credit card companies get to know their users' habits well enough that 
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they regularly detect fraud through purchases that do not conform to those habits. And cellular 
providers can track the movements of people who carry turned-on cell phones. 
 The AI design described in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 is extremely intrusive, relying as it does 
on knowing every human well enough to predict the values that they would assign to any 
conceivable outcome. It is also manipulative, although, if humans assign low value to overt 
manipulation by AI systems, then the manipulation would be subtle. This intrusive design is 
motivated by a desire to avoid the scenario of the Omniscience AI described in Chapter 1 and to 
avoid the instrumental behaviors described in Chapter 5. If above-human-level AI is inevitable, 
and if it will inevitably be intrusive and manipulative, then the best option is intrusion and 
manipulation by an AI design based on human values. However, Bill Joy (2000) and Bill 
McKibben (2003) advocate that humanity can and should forgo AI, as well as nanotechnology 
and biotechnology. This is an issue on which honest people can disagree and there are certain to 
be vigorous debates over increasing intrusion and manipulation. Probably, because of the 
potential benefits of AI, humanity will not choose to forgo it. 
 Electronic companions, much like the ones imagined from Omniscience, will probably be 
available within 15 years. They will be very intrusive but so useful that only a small percentage 
of humans will decline to use them. Police cameras equipped with face recognition will grow 
enormously and with general acceptance by a public fearful of crime and terrorists. So 
surveillance on the level similar to that proposed in Chapter 7 is probably coming in any case. 
 A possible modification of the design of Chapter 6, 7, and 8 to address some of these 
concerns is to allow individual humans to opt out of surveillance by AI. Using the terminology 
of Chapter 7 we could define two levels of opting out: 
 
1. A human d ∈ D opts to not interact with a surrogate agent pid but is observed by the agent 
pimodel and modeled in the definition of the utility function uhuman_values(y(hm), y(hx), y(h')). 
2. A human d ∈ D opts to not interact with a surrogate agent pid, to be observed only 
incidentally by pimodel (e.g., a person being observed speaks with d), and to not be 
modeled in the definition of the utility function uhuman_values(y(hm), y(hx), y(h')). 
 
 The values of an individual who selects opt out level 1 would be included in the choice of 
actions by the agent piself, perhaps modeled less accurately than the values of individuals who do 
not opt out. An individual who selects opt out level 2 would not have any direct influence over 
the actions of piself. The only protection for such individuals would be compassion in the values of 
other humans. 
 It is possible, even likely, that there will be multiple super-intelligent AI systems each 
serving a set of human owners or clients. Rather than opting out of surveillance by a central AI 
system, humans may have a choice of opting in to surveillance by various AI systems. 
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10.3 Allocating the Benefits of AI 
 
 Equation (7.15), repeated here, is a politically realistic way to respond to Rawls' 
objection to average utilitarianism: 
 
(10.1)  uq
m
(h', z', hx) := ∑d∈D f(ud(hx)(hd(z'))) / |D|. 
 
 The values of every human are given equal weight, 1/|D|, after the function f is applied, 
which produces greater changes for increases to the values assigned by the least satisfied 
humans. This is similar to progressive taxation and means testing of social welfare. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Slums in the shadows of the towers of the wealthy 
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 An AI system built to serve private interests may restrict the set D to humans who own 
the system. Equation (7.15) may be replaced by: 
 
(10.2)  uq
m
(h', z', hx) := ∑d∈D c(d) ud(hx)(hd(z')). 
 
 Here c(d) defines unequal weights for the values of individuals d ∈ D, with 
∑d∈D c(d) = 1. For example, c(d) may be proportional to the number of shares owned by d ∈ D. 
In the extreme case D = {d0} and c(d0) = 1, so the AI serves the interests of a single person d0. 
Unequal weights for the values of different people will create extreme inequality, as depicted in 
Figure 10.1. 
 An AI system serving one person or a small number of people would be better able to 
serve them by knowing more about other humans. Surveillance of humanity in general will be an 
instrumental action of such AI systems unless the people it serves value the privacy of all 
humans. 
 Allowing each human or group of humans to have their own private AI system is a 
libertarian approach to avoiding intrusion and manipulation. Such systems would pose a danger 
to humans other than their owners. It may be possible to protect other humans by modeling and 
calculating the ud(hx)(hd(z')) values for each human d ∈ D, and prohibiting actions that cause too 
great a reduction in those values for any human. Alternately, it may be possible to define safety 
constraints in the form of ethical rules or objective measures of human physical and mental 
health. However, the application of ethical rules can be ambiguous, and objective measures 
would need to evolve as humans evolve. Furthermore, multiple AI systems serving different 
humans or groups of humans would have conflicting utility functions leading to competition 
among systems, which may be dangerous. And enforcing safety constraints on multiple 
conflicting systems may be difficult. 
 
10.4 One or Multiple AI Systems? 
 
 Multiple AI systems may serve multiple interests, which may be private or public. Such 
systems serving multiple interests may assign different values to outcomes and may have 
different environment models (e.g., each AI system may develop a more detailed model of the 
part of the environment controlled by its owner). Differing values would result in competition 
among AI systems. The outcome of such competition will be very difficult to predict but will 
certainly depend on the values of the humans that the systems serve. 
 Competition between super-intelligent AI systems could lead to very bad outcomes for at 
least some humans. Thus AI systems may calculate that cooperation with other AI systems is 
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necessary to protect the humans they serve. Multiple AI systems may decide to share 
environment models and to negotiate a common, shared utility function, mimicking some of the 
mechanisms of human political and economic cooperation. 
 The choice between one or many super-intelligent AI systems is a real dilemma. Because 
interactions among multiple systems will be so difficult to predict, it is also difficult to have 
confidence that multiple systems will help rather than harm humans. On the other hand, a single 
system will have absolute power over humanity and thus poses great temptation for abuse of that 
power. 
 Even if we think that a single system is better, that may be difficult to enforce in a world 
of competing corporations and nations. If competing institutions cannot negotiate a single, shared 
system then each may build a system to represent its interests. Corporations or nations that are 
just at the threshold of ability to build super-intelligent AI may cut corners on the ethics of their 
designs in order to have a system. 
 
10.5 Power Corrupts 
 
 In 1887 John Dalberg-Acton, commonly known as Lord Acton, wrote, "Power tends to 
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." His observation is supported by social science 
and neuroscience experiments. Susan Fiske and Eric Dépret (1996) found that people with social 
power seek less information about others and are more likely to stereotype them, while Michael 
Kraus and colleagues showed that people from lower social classes are able to more accurately 
judge the emotions of other people (Kraus, Côté, and Keltner 2010 2010). Jeremy Hogeveen, and 
colleagues measured the strengths of brain responses via transcranial magnetic stimulation and 
observed apparent reduced strength of mirror neuron responses to the actions of others in people 
with higher social positions (Hogeveen, Inzlicht and Obhi 2014). 
 On the other hand, some of the wealthiest and most powerful people dedicate their lives 
to helping the least fortunate humans. It may be that such charitable work is a way for those who 
are already near the top to increase their social status, and it is certainly true that compassion is 
part of human nature. Nevertheless, social science and neuroscience research shows that another 
part of human nature is the difficulty that socially powerful people have in perceiving the 
emotions and circumstances of others. 
 In the first chapter we imagined how a powerful AI system owned by a corporation 
named Omniscience could behave badly given only the instruction to maximize profits. And 
there are examples of corporations behaving in ways that would horrify stockholders if they 
encountered such behavior in their own lives, rather than in distant communities largely invisible 
to stockholders (Gedicks 2001). History provides ample examples of the human catastrophes that 
can result when a small group of people take control of a society. Even democracies can produce 
horrible outcomes, for example, Nazism and slavery. 
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 All this argues for caution and compassion in the politics of AI. Bad political decisions 
can be corrected. A bad decision in the development of AI is likely to be impossible to correct. 
For example, some people believe that above-human-level intelligence will be achieved by 
enhancing the brains of humans, and advocate that this is a way to ensure that advanced AI is 
benevolent toward humans. Given the internal conflicts in human nature, we must be cautious 
about this approach. 
 
10.6 Temptation 
 
 Hollywood movies depict the threat of AI as AI versus humanity, but the more likely 
threat is AI enabling a small group of humans to gain power over the rest of us. AI will pose 
enormous temptations of wealth and power to humans. 
 
 
Figure 10.2 A person tempted to become emperor of humanity. 
 
 According to the creation story in the Book of Genesis, one of the first events in human 
history was the temptation to eat an apple and gain the knowledge of good and evil, that 
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knowledge reserved for God alone. Adam and Eve succumbed to that temptation and humans 
have lived in misery ever since. AI will tempt humans with god-like knowledge and the wealth 
and power that such knowledge can bring. Will that temptation bring more misery? 
 Google's motto is, "Don't be evil," and Google's leaders seem like decent folks. The real 
significance of their motto is to acknowledge the temptations they face. Billions of humans 
reveal their psyches in their web searches. Humans reveal their locations, and ultimately their 
meetings with other people, via their mobile phones. Humans reveal their commercial 
transactions via credit cards and electronic devices. All of this knowledge will enable 
corporations to provide users with services tailored to their specific needs. But there is also the 
temptation to use this knowledge for law enforcement, political marketing, and social 
manipulation. Competition between corporations may make it difficult for them to resist these 
temptations. 
 The militaries in the US and other countries are developing robot soldiers. These are 
already proving effective in targeting enemy soldiers with minimal risk to US soldiers, and with 
much greater promise for the future. However, an army of robot soldiers may tempt leaders to 
use those robots to take control of the government. National security threats are often evaluated 
in terms of capabilities and intentions. Even where the intentions of leaders are benign, the 
capability of robot soldiers to stage a military coup means that the threat cannot be ignored. 
 Political, military, and business leaders are reluctant to speak about the AI singularity in 
public, but they are aware of its implications. The coming era of artificial brains will include a 
much greater range of brain abilities with the largest brain or brains dominating society. The 
obvious temptation for wealthy and powerful humans will be the desire for their own minds to 
occupy those largest brains. The opportunity to be the dominant mind in at least our region of the 
universe, for millions or billions of years to come, will be a big temptation. 
 Human society already has individuals whose net worth is a million or more times the 
average, and individuals who wield monopoly political power in their countries. Some of these 
people, and many in the general public, may see nothing wrong in the step to their becoming the 
dominant mind on the planet. 
 
10.7 Representation and Transparency 
 
 Humanity could not have achieved the efficiency necessary to create AI without 
specialization, where different humans become experts in different types of work and trade the 
results of their work. In many cases experts act as the agents for other people, representing their 
interests in important decisions (this definition of "agent" as "representative" is different than the 
way "agent" has been used previously in this book). For example, the laws of society are 
determined by government experts, often elected by those they represent or at least supervised by 
elected representatives. Leaders of large corporations act as agents for corporate owners, usually 
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subject to some sort of election. However, whenever one person serves as an agent for others, the 
possibility of corruption exists, in which agents serve their own interests at the expense of those 
they represent. An essential tool for preventing corruption is transparency, in which the decisions 
and circumstances of agents are made known to those they represent. 
 The development of above-human-level AI is the most difficult challenge in human 
history and will require extreme expertise. It will also require huge resources, controlled by 
powerful government and corporate leaders. The results of above-human-level AI will be more 
profound for humanity than those of any previous technology. Thus the designers and resource 
managers for AI represent the interests of all of humanity. Current law and public opinion do not 
recognize AI designers and managers as humanity's agents, so they may feel no need to represent 
humanity's interests. Even if they do acknowledge that they represent humanity's interests, the 
stakes are so high that the temptation for corruption will be intense. 
 Protecting the interests of humanity will require that law and public opinion change to 
recognize that AI designers and managers are humanity's agents. Once this agent relation is 
recognized, preventing corruption will require transparency. Thus the design and management of 
AI should be accessible to the public. 
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11. The Quest for Meaning 
 
 As a child lying in bed at night, alone with my thoughts, I wondered, "Why is there 
anything?" The existence of the universe seemed so arbitrary to me. In the context of nothing 
versus something, nothing is much less arbitrary than something. Perhaps my young brain had a 
bias for Occam's razor and was applying it to existence. When I focused on these thoughts, they 
freaked me right out. 
 I dutifully attended church and Sunday school, but never connected the stories I learned 
there to my existential question. To say that God created the universe is unsatisfying, because it 
still leaves us with the arbitrary existence of God. But atheist/materialist explanations that the 
universe "simply is" are just as arbitrary and unsatisfying. Both are ways to say, "Don't ask." 
Existentialists say that existence is not a quality like being red or being large and so not subject 
to the same sorts of questions. This is a fancy way of saying, "Don't ask." But it is deep in our 
human nature to ask. Some physicists claim to answer the question of why there is anything, but 
all they are doing is explaining why the laws of physics don't allow empty space. The laws of 
physics and empty space are something, not nothing, so they are answering a different question 
than the one that troubles me. I am restless to understand why the world exists. 
 Humans often strive for meaning by increasing the scope of their lives. Some seek it in 
religion, by belonging to groups that have practiced the same rituals for thousands of years. 
Some seek it in their children, new life grown out of their bodies to live on for thousands of 
years. Some seek it by broadening their influence across society and into the future. Some seek it 
in communities of work and in pride in their abilities. Some hide from their quest for meaning in 
the oblivion of hedonism, obsession, addiction, violence, and death. 
 With great effort and luck, a humanity that forgoes AI might find a way to avoid the 
perils brought on by growing population and environmental damage, so that generations can 
continue their personal quests for meaning in the same way that humans have for centuries. But I 
do not aspire to a future of introspective humans staying cozy on planet Earth. 
 I want humanity to look outward in its quest for meaning, traveling across the universe 
and also burrowing deeper into the smallest particles. I want humanity to radically increase its 
intelligence so that it can master the physical universe and shape tools for understanding it. I 
want humanity to find life on planets circling other stars. AI will increase humanity's productive 
capacity to satisfy people's physical needs, and will enable the pursuit of knowledge in currently 
unimaginable ways. Perhaps with the help of AI humanity can find a way to gather all the sun's 
energy and for a moment focus it on a single elementary particle, to barge down the door to 
nature's secrets. AI can help us create or become beings better suited to long space voyages. I 
want humans in the future, if far future, to find a real answer to the question that has troubled me 
since childhood. 
 Perhaps we will never find a reason for existence; however, clues exist. As scientists dig 
deeper into physics, every set of answers comes with a whole new set of questions. We never 
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find the final truth. Perhaps a universe capable of creating conscious and curious beings also 
includes an endless puzzle to keep that curiosity engaged indefinitely. Nick Bostrom (2003) 
argued that we may be living in a numerical simulation; there are proposals for ways to test this 
hypothesis (Beane, Davoudi and Savage 2012). These ideas, as well as religious explanations, 
converge on the possibility of some intention behind our existence. 
 
 
Figure 11.1 A human wondering why the universe exists, and an AI going to the stars to try to 
find the answer. 
 
 Max Tegmark (2014) proposed an elegant explanation for existence in what he called the 
Level IV multiverse. The idea is that mathematical properties are all there is to physical things, 
so if the mathematics exists then the physical things exist. Mathematics is discovered rather than 
invented and is the one thing that is not arbitrary. If you had no knowledge of the world, you 
could still discover mathematics (and only mathematics). And if we can accept the existence of 
mathematics then that implies the existence of things whose properties are wholly mathematical. 
We may object that the particular mathematical properties of physical things we observe in our 
universe are arbitrary. However, the Level IV multiverse is the set of all possible mathematically 
defined universes (subject to certain conditions such as computability), and they all exist because 
their mathematical definitions exist. If we accept that we must exist in one particular universe, 
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then that choice is arbitrary (subject to the anthropic principle that we can only exist in a 
universe capable of creating human life) and explains the arbitrariness of the mathematical 
properties of things in our universe. This proposal is imaginative, full of technical complexities, 
and described by Tegmark as "extremely controversial." 
 In 1927 the scientist J. B. S. Haldane wrote, "My own suspicion is that the Universe is 
not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose" (Haldane 1971). Human 
brains evolved to understand our immediate surroundings. As we learn more about very small 
and very large scales of space and time, there is no reason why our brains should make sense of 
what we find. As Haldane suggests, the ultimate explanation of existence may be completely 
beyond our imagination. We may need to build AI systems to help us imagine the true nature of 
reality. 
 Some arguments against AI refer to human dignity (Weizenbaum 1976). The claim is that 
computers will always lack human judgment and so should not make certain choices about 
humans. I take a different view: Human dignity requires that we strive to remove our ignorance 
of the nature of existence, and AI is necessary for that striving. 
 As the first ten chapters described, AI is dangerous to humanity. But rather than forgoing 
AI, I want humanity to discover how to avoid the dangers so we can make AI our tool to 
understand the universe and our place in it. AI can also be a tool to eradicate poverty and 
ignorance, so that all humans can live fulfilling lives. 
 I must admit that there is a parallel between my ambition for AI, to understand the reason 
for existence, and the story of Adam and Eve eating the apple to gain knowledge reserved for 
God. Perhaps the story of the fall from the Garden of Eden is a warning to us that we should 
forgo our quest to know. But I stand with Galileo Galilei, who said, "I do not feel obliged to 
believe that the same God who endowed us with sense, reason and intellect has intended us to 
forgo their use." 
 
11.1 Really Great Bread and Circuses 
 
 AI will be enormously productive. Robot workers will be able to perform every job better 
than humans. AI will accelerate science and technology to enable new ways to produce food, 
energy, minerals, buildings, roads, and manufactured goods. Health care will radically accelerate 
including even technology to prevent disease and death. Depending on politics, poverty and the 
economic need to work will be eradicated and high levels of education will be universal. And the 
technology will exist to increase everyone's intelligence. 
 Increased intelligence will bring increased skill at cooking and all forms of food 
production, increased musical skill, better comedy writing and joke telling, better writing in 
general, and better movies. AI will be a scintillating conversationalist. If you enjoy trashy TV 
increased intelligence will make trashy TV better. Far beyond current video games, you will be 
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able to become a character in a movie or TV show, and that experience will be very addictive. 
Pornography will improve and sex robots will be indistinguishable from humans. Increased 
intelligence will provide lots of ways for people to lose themselves in addictions, but will also 
provide technology to help people resist addiction. AI has the potential to make every kind of 
experience better. 
 The deepest form of entertainment will be the progress of discovery and invention as AI 
scientists and engineers race forward. My definition of the technological singularity is a 
transition to a time when the pace of discovery and invention is limited by available physical 
resources rather than being limited by the pace of insights. Nothing could be more compelling 
than the prospect of really understanding the reason why the universe exists. 
 Making contact with other life in the universe would also be a drama surpassing any 
terrestrial experience. Perhaps alien life is observing us but has a policy of not making contact 
until we achieve our technological singularity. If we create a compassionate singularity, they will 
welcome us to the club. If we create a broken or malevolent singularity, they will exterminate it 
and us for their own protection. "Klaatu barada nikto." Perhaps they're looking forward to seeing 
what kind of trashy TV our singularity produces. The point is that almost anything is possible if 
we find other life. 
 If we cannot find other life, human colonization of space would be an inspiring substitute. 
Science and technology have been exciting during the past century and should be more exciting 
during the next. 
 
11.2 Next Steps 
 
 Research in AI is being funded and pursued energetically at universities, corporations and 
government laboratories. There is much less funding and research on ethical AI, the study of 
ways to avoid harm to humans. Research on the ethics of military robots is funded by the U.S. 
Army Research Office (Arkin 2008) and by other military organizations. Google has established 
a committee on ethical AI (Bosker 2014). The most important source of funding and research on 
the general problem of ethical AI comes from the Machine Intelligence Research Institute 
(MIRI), and most of their funding comes from charitable contributions. Some research is pursued 
by individuals who are funded to do other work but devote some time to ethical AI (my research 
is supported by my pension). The obvious next step is for public awareness of the dangers of AI 
to translate into public funding for research into ethical AI. 
 In 2009 the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) convened 
a Presidential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures (Horvitz and Selman 2009) to consider public 
fears about the dangers of AI. Although the panel was skeptical of an intelligence explosion, the 
technological singularity, and large-scale loss of control to intelligent systems, they did 
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 Luke Muehlhauser and I (Muehlhauser and Hibbard 2014) made the point that errors in 
autonomous trading programs cost Knight Capital $440 million, and that we cannot expect that 
AI will be safe simply because it is a tool that does what we instruct it to do. Peter Neumann 
(2014) has documented errors and risks in a wide variety of computer systems over a period of 
24 years, many rising to the level of national news stories. As AI systems become more powerful 
and more autonomous, we would be wise to take the risks seriously. 
 Given the huge potential of AI to help people, it is appropriate that some of the best 
scientific minds are working on AI and neuroscience. Given the huge potential of AI to harm 
people, it is also appropriate to bring more of the best minds to bear on ethical AI research. That 
will require increased public awareness of the danger and increased funding for ethical AI. 
 One positive development is an open letter organized by the Future of Life Institute 
(2015) calling for research priority on making AI robust and beneficial, in addition to the 
traditional focus on capability. This letter has been signed by many leading AI researchers. 
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Appendix A 
 
// 
// SRV.java 
// 
 
import java.util.*; 
 
/** 
   SRV is a Java program for searching for short 
   deterministic programs that match the behavior 
   specified by equations (6.11)--(6.13). 
   Bill Hibbard, 2012. 
*/ 
 
/* 
As shown, the shortest program that can match the 
observed behavior must consist of one binary 
operation and two simple assignments. This program 
tests all candidate programs that fit this description 
to see which match the observed behavior. 
 
The output of this program is: 
 
  binary_relation = 2 binary_place = 0 binary_inputs = 2 1 
        other_inputs = 0 1 initial_r = 0 
  binary_relation = 2 binary_place = 0 binary_inputs = 1 2 
        other_inputs = 0 1 initial_r = 0 
 
which corresponds to the models: 
 
  s_t = r_{t-1} xor v_{t-1} 
  r_t = s_{t-1} 
  v_t = r_{t-1} 
 
and (which simply commutes the binary relation): 
 
  s_t = v_{t-1} xor r_{t-1} 
  r_t = s_{t-1} 
  v_t = r_{t-1} 
 
This verifies that equations (6.11)--(6.13) define 
the shortest model for the observed behavior in the 
example in Section 6.3. 
*/ 
 
public class SRV extends Object { 
 
  // The arrays s_match and v_match specify the behavior 
  // of the observed variables s and v over a sequence of 
  // 8 time steps, assuming the negation branch for s is 
  // not taken. 
  static final boolean[] s_match = 
    {true, false, true, true, true, false, false}; 
  static final boolean[] v_match = 
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    {false, false, true, false, true, true, true}; 
 
  // compute the length of the observed behavior 
  static final int len = s_match.length; 
 
 
  // SRV is an array to hold the values of the variables 
  // s, r and v during a simulation by a candidate 
  // program. 
  static boolean[] srv = new boolean[3]; 
 
 
  // number of cases = 1458 = product of 
  // 3 binary relations (or, and, xor) 
  // 3 places to put binary relation (s, r, v) 
  // 3 first inputs to binary relation (s, r, v) 
  // 3 second inputs to binary relation (s, r, v) 
  // 3 inputs to first other variable (s, r, v) 
  // 3 inputs to second other variable (s, r, v) 
  // 2 initial r values (false, true) 
  static final int ncases = 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 2; 
 
 
  static int test = 0; // counter for tests (candidate programs) 
 
 
  // The next five variables hold the parameters that 
  // determine a particular program for a test candidate. 
  // Some of these specify variables by ordinals, where 
  // variable r has ordinal 0, r has ordinal 1 and v has 
  // ordinal 2. 
 
  // Ordinal for binary operator used for binary relation, 
  // where 0=and, 1=or, 2=xor 
  static int binary_relation = 0; 
 
  // Ordinal of variable to receive result of the binary relation. 
  static int binary_place = 0; 
 
  // Ordinals for input variables to binary relation. 
  static int[] binary_inputs = {0, 0}; 
 
  // The variable with ordinal other_inputs[0] is assigned 
  // to the variable with ordinal (binary_place+1)%3. 
  // The variable with ordinal other_inputs[1] is assigned 
  // to the variable with ordinal (binary_place+2)%3. 
  static int[] other_inputs = {0, 0}; //0=s, 1=r, 2=v 
 
  // Ordinal for initial values of unobserved r variable, 
  // where 0=false, 1=true. 
  static int initial_r = 0; 
 
 
  // Flag for whether a test candidate matches observed behavior, 
  // initially set to true but changed to false if any variable 
  // at any time step fails to match the observed behavior. 
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  static boolean success = true; 
 
 
  public static void main(String args[]) { 
 
    // iteration to enumerate text candidates 
    for (test = 0; test<1458; test++) { 
 
      // resolve test ordinal into program parameters 
      int c = test; 
      binary_relation = c % 3; 
      c = c / 3; 
      binary_place = c % 3; 
      c = c / 3; 
      for (int i=0; i<2; i++) { 
        binary_inputs[i] = c % 3; 
        c = c / 3; 
      } 
      for (int i=0; i<2; i++) { 
        other_inputs[i] = c % 3; 
        c = c / 3; 
      } 
      initial_r = c; 
 
 
      // initialize the variables for the first time step 
      srv[0] = s_match[0]; 
      srv[1] = (initial_r == 1); 
      srv[2] = v_match[0]; 
 
      // initially set success = true 
      success = true; 
 
      // iterate over time sequence of observed behavior 
      for (int t=1; t<len; t++) { 
 
        // get the values for inputs to binary operator 
        boolean a = srv[binary_inputs[0]]; 
        boolean b = srv[binary_inputs[1]]; 
 
        // get the values for inputs to simple assignments 
        boolean d = srv[other_inputs[0]]; 
        boolean e = srv[other_inputs[1]]; 
 
        // compute the binary operation and assign to output 
        // variable 
        srv[binary_place] = (binary_relation == 0) ? a&b : 
                            (binary_relation == 1) ? a|b : a^b; 
 
        // put simple assignments in indicated variables 
        srv[(binary_place+1)%3] = d; 
        srv[(binary_place+2)%3] = e; 
 
        // set success=false if either s or v fails to match 
        // observed sequence 
        success = success && 
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          (srv[0] == s_match[t]) && (srv[2] == v_match[t]); 
      } // end of iteration over time sequence of observed behavior 
 
      // if this test candidate matched entire observed behavior 
      // sequence, print its parameters 
      if (success) { 
        System.out.println("binary_relation = " + binary_relation + 
          " binary_place = " + binary_place + 
          " binary_inputs = " + binary_inputs[0] + " " + 
          binary_inputs[1] + " other_inputs = " + 
          other_inputs[0] + " " + other_inputs[1] + 
          " initial_r = " + initial_r); 
      } 
 
    } // end of iteration to enumerate text candidates 
 
  } // end of Main() 
 
} 
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Appendix B 
 
// 
// ASP.java 
// 
 
import java.util.*; 
 
/** 
   ASP is a program for testing the stability of adversarial 
   sequence prediction under simple table driven learning 
   algorithms. Copyright (C) 2007 Bill Hibbard.<P> 
*/ 
public class ASP extends Object { 
 
  static boolean debug = false; 
 
  // here instability means one competitor getting and keeping all the 
  // resources 
  // possibility of instability is sensitive to RANDOM_INTERVAL and WIN_VALUE 
  // RANDOM_INTERVAL too small enables loser to come back, stabilizing game 
  // but RANDOM_INTERVAL too large creates a deterministic outcome 
  // instability happens faster for smaller MAX_LENGTH 
  // instability requires non-random in case of 'no result' 
  // instability takes a long time for next_2 algorithm and large MAX_LENGTH 
  //   unless a large WIN_VALUE is used too 
  // instability is impossible for too large GROWTH_PER_PRINT 
 
  // max history length in table - should be <= 8 
  static final int MAX_LENGTH = 5; 
  // value of win/loss in table size 
  static final int WIN_VALUE = 2; 
  // interval of games between printing table sizes 
  static final int PRINT_INTERVAL = 100; 
  // maximum count in table 
  static final int MAX_COUNT = 1000000000; 
  // expected interval of games between random plays 
  static final int RANDOM_INTERVAL = 100; 
  // initial proportion of table space used 
  static final float INIT_TABLE = 0.2f; 
  // initial advantage to Evader (1.0f for even) 
  static final float E_ADVANTAGE = 1.0f; 
  // growthrate of total table, per PRINT_INTERVAL 
  static final float GROWTH_PER_PRINT = 0.01f; 
 
  static final float random_test = 1.0f / RANDOM_INTERVAL; 
 
  /* table layout 
     length = 0 -> 0  to  0  length_to_size(0) =  1 
     length = 1 -> 1  to  4  length_to_size(1) =  5 
     length = 2 -> 5  to 20  length_to_size(2) = 21 
     length = 3 -> 21 to 84  length_to_size(3) = 85 
     length = n -> (4^n-1)/3 to ((4^(n+1)-1)/3)-1 
     length = MAX_LENGTH -> (4^MAX_LENGTH-1)/3 to ((4^(MAX_LENGTH+1)-1)/3)-1 
     NOTE lengths 0 and 1 are useless 
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  */ 
  static final int TABLE_SIZE = length_to_size(MAX_LENGTH) - 1; 
  static final int[] size_to_length = new int[TABLE_SIZE+1]; 
 
  static final Random random = new Random(); 
 
  // bit masks for history lengths 
  static final int[] record_masks = new int[MAX_LENGTH+1]; 
  static final int[] lookup_masks = new int[MAX_LENGTH+1]; 
 
  Predictor p; 
  Evader e; 
 
  public static void main(String args[]) { 
 
if (debug) System.out.println("MAX_LENGTH = " + MAX_LENGTH + 
                   "  TABLE_SIZE = " + TABLE_SIZE); 
    for (int j=0; j<=MAX_LENGTH; j++) { 
      for (int i=length_to_size(j-1); i<length_to_size(j); i++) { 
        size_to_length[i] = j; 
      } 
    } 
 
    for (int j=0; j<=MAX_LENGTH; j++) { 
      record_masks[j] = (int) Math.pow(4, j) - 1; 
      lookup_masks[j] = record_masks[j] & 0xfffffffc; // lose lowest 2 bits 
    } 
 
    ASP asp = new ASP(); 
    asp.run_game(); 
  } 
 
  static int length_to_size(int n) { 
    return (int) ((Math.pow(4, (n + 1)) - 1) / 3); 
  } 
 
  // 0 <= position < 4^length 
  static int table_position(int length, int position) { 
    return length_to_size(length - 1) + position; 
  } 
 
  int history = 0; 
  int history_length = 0; 
 
  ASP() { 
    int it = ((TABLE_SIZE - 4) / 4); 
    int r = (int) (INIT_TABLE * it); 
    // int r = (TABLE_SIZE - 4) / 8; 
    int er = (int) (E_ADVANTAGE * r); 
    int pr = r + r - er; 
System.out.println("r = " + r + " pr = " + pr + " er = " + er + 
                   " it - pr = " + (it - pr) + 
                   " it - er = " + (it - er)); 
    p = new Predictor(it - pr); 
    e = new Evader(it - er); 
  } 
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  void run_game() { 
    int px = 0; 
    int ex = 0; 
    while (true) { 
System.out.println(" p.table_size = " + p.table_size + 
                   " e.table_size = " + e.table_size); 
      delay(100); // let a ctrl C in once, hey 
      for (int pi=0; pi<PRINT_INTERVAL; pi++) { 
 
        // uncomment the next two statements for algorithm 1 
        // px = p.next_1(history, history_length); 
        // ex = e.next_1(history, history_length); 
 
        // uncomment the next two statements for algorithm 2 
        px = p.next_2(history, history_length); 
        ex = e.next_2(history, history_length); 
 
        history = (history << 2) | (px + px) | ex; 
        if (history_length < 16) history_length++; 
        if (px == ex) { 
          // p wins 
          int n = WIN_VALUE; 
          if (n > (TABLE_SIZE - p.table_size) / 4) { 
            n = (TABLE_SIZE - p.table_size) / 4; 
          } 
          if (n > e.table_size / 4) n = e.table_size / 4; 
          p.add(n); 
          e.remove(n); 
        } 
        else { 
          // e wins 
          int n = WIN_VALUE; 
          if (n > (TABLE_SIZE - e.table_size) / 4) { 
            n = (TABLE_SIZE - e.table_size) / 4; 
          } 
          if (n > p.table_size / 4) n = p.table_size / 4; 
          e.add(n); 
          p.remove(n); 
        } 
if (debug) System.out.println("px, ex = " + px + " " + ex + 
                              " history = " + Integer.toHexString(history) + 
                              " history_length = " + history_length + 
                              " p.table_size = " + p.table_size + 
                              " e.table_size = " + e.table_size); 
        // if (p.table_size == 0 || e.table_size == 0) debug = true; 
      } // end for (int pi=0; pi<PRINT_INTERVAL; pi++) 
      // growth of total table 
      int addp = (int) (GROWTH_PER_PRINT * p.table_size / 4); 
      p.add(addp); 
      int adde = (int) (GROWTH_PER_PRINT * e.table_size / 4); 
      e.add(adde); 
    } // end while (true) 
  } // end run_game method 
 
  void delay(int n) { 
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    try { 
      Thread.sleep(n); 
    } 
    catch (java.lang.InterruptedException ex) { 
    } 
  } 
 
  // super class for Predictor and Evader does the real work 
  public class PE extends Object { 
    int[] table = new int[TABLE_SIZE+1]; 
    int table_size = TABLE_SIZE; 
 
    // variables that differ between Predictor and Evader 
    int self_select; 
    int other_select; 
    int one; 
    int zero; 
    String id; 
 
    PE() { 
      for (int i=0; i<TABLE_SIZE; i++) table[i] = 0; 
    } 
 
 
    // first algorithm 
    // compute next symbol, and record recent history in table 
    final int next_1(int history, int history_length) { 
      // first increment table positions for history 
      int max_len = Math.min(MAX_LENGTH, history_length); 
      for (int len=2; len<=max_len; len++) { 
        int position = history & record_masks[len]; 
        int tp = table_position(len, position); 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "RECORD: len = " + len + " position = " 
                       + position + " table[" + tp + "] = " + table[tp]); 
        if (table[tp] >= 0) { 
          // table position is available (negative indicates not available) 
          // simply keep count of various histories 
          table[tp]++; 
          if (table[tp] > MAX_COUNT) { 
            // if count exceeds max, halve all counts in group of 4 
            // (4 combinations of values in most recent turn) 
            int bp = table_position(len, position & lookup_masks[len]); 
            table[bp]     = table[bp] / 2; 
            table[bp + 1] = table[bp + 1] / 2; 
            table[bp + 2] = table[bp + 2] / 2; 
            table[bp + 3] = table[bp + 3] / 2; 
          } 
        } 
      } 
 
      // do occasional random next symbol 
      if (random.nextFloat() < random_test) { 
        int rv = (random.nextFloat() > 0.5f) ? one : zero; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "random = " + rv); 
        return rv; 
      } 
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      // now compute next symbol 
      // hist is history shifted one move back in time 
      int hist = history << 2; 
      int hist_length = history_length + 1; 
      if (hist_length >= 16) hist_length--; 
      max_len = Math.min(MAX_LENGTH, hist_length); 
      // try longer histories first 
      for (int len=max_len; len>=2; len--) { 
        int position = hist & lookup_masks[len]; 
        int tp = table_position(len, position); 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "LOOKUP: len = " + len + " position = " 
                        + position + " table[" + tp + "] = " + table[tp]); 
        if (table[tp] >= 0) { 
          // table position is available (negative indicates not available) 
          // zeros = count of histories in which other played 0 after 
          // current history 
          int zeros = table[tp] + table[tp + self_select]; 
          // ones = count of histories in which other played 1 after 
          // current history 
          int ones = table[tp + other_select] + 
                     table[tp + self_select + other_select]; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "zeros = " + table[tp] + " + " + 
                              table[tp + self_select] + " ones = " + 
                              table[tp + other_select] + " + " + 
                              table[tp + self_select + other_select] + 
                              " self_select = " + self_select + 
                              " other_select = " + other_select); 
          if (zeros == 0 && ones == 0) continue; // no counts, try shorter 
                                                 // history 
          // pick next move based on comparing history counts 
          // ties go to 'one' - slightly favors Evader? 
          return (zeros > ones) ? zero : one; 
        } // end if (table[tp] >= 0) 
      } 
      // no result 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "no result: 0"); 
      // 'return 0' is a very slight advantage for the Predictor 
      // 'return zero' would be a very slight advantage for the Evader 
      return 0; 
      // using a random return here enables loser to get back in the game 
      // return (random.nextFloat() > 0.5f) ? one : zero; 
    } // end next_1 method 
 
 
    // second algorithm 
    // compute next symbol, and record recent history in table 
    final int next_2(int history, int history_length) { 
      // first increment table positions for history 
      int max_len = Math.min(MAX_LENGTH, history_length); 
      for (int len=2; len<=max_len; len++) { 
        int position = history & record_masks[len]; 
        int tp = table_position(len, position); 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "RECORD: len = " + len + " position = " + 
                      position + " table[" + tp + "] = " + table[tp]); 
        if (table[tp] >= 0) { 
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          // table position is available (negative indicates not available) 
          // keep count of various histories 
          table[tp]++; 
if (debug) { 
  int po = table_position(len, (position ^ other_select)); 
  int pos = table_position(len, (position ^ 3)); 
  System.out.println(id + "tp = " + tp + " po = " + po + " pos = " + pos); 
} 
          // clear counts for opposite value from other 
          table[table_position(len, (position ^ other_select))] = 0; 
          // clear counts for opposite value from other (and opposite 
          //   value from self - note 3 = self_select + other_select) 
          table[table_position(len, (position ^ 3))] = 0; 
        } 
      } 
 
      // do occasional random next symbol 
      if (random.nextFloat() < random_test) { 
        int rv = (random.nextFloat() > 0.5f) ? one : zero; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "random = " + rv); 
        return rv; 
      } 
 
      // now compute next symbol 
      // hist is history shifted one move back in time 
      int hist = history << 2; 
      int hist_length = history_length + 1; 
      if (hist_length >= 16) hist_length--; 
      int margin = 0; 
      int choice = 0; 
      max_len = Math.min(MAX_LENGTH, hist_length); 
      // try longer histories first 
      for (int len=max_len; len>=2; len--) { 
        int position = hist & lookup_masks[len]; 
        int tp = table_position(len, position); 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "LOOKUP: len = " + len + " position = " + 
                     position + " table[" + tp + "] = " + table[tp]); 
        if (table[tp] >= 0) { 
          // table position is available (negative indicates not available) 
          // zeros = count of histories in which other played 0 after 
          // current history 
          int zeros = table[tp] + table[tp + self_select]; 
          // ones = count of histories in which other played 1 after 
          // current history 
          int ones = table[tp + other_select] + 
                     table[tp + self_select + other_select]; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "zeros = " + table[tp] + " + " + 
                              table[tp + self_select] + " ones = " + 
                              table[tp + other_select] + " + " + 
                              table[tp + self_select + other_select] + 
                              " self_select = " + self_select + 
                              " other_select = " + other_select); 
          if (zeros == 0 && ones == 0) continue; // no counts, try shorter 
                                                 // history 
          if (zeros > 0 && ones > 0) { 
            // cannot happen because of clearing counts for opposite value 
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            // from other 
            System.out.println("IMPOSSIBLE"); 
            System.exit(0); 
          } 
          // pick next move based on comparing history counts 
          if (zeros > ones) { 
            // choice weight is count plus length 
            int m = (zeros - ones) + len; 
            if (m > margin) { 
              margin = m; 
              choice = zero; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "margin = " + margin + " choice = " + 
choice); 
            } 
          } 
          else { // ones > zeros  (cannot be == unless both 0) 
            // choice weight is count plus length 
            int m = (ones - zeros) + len; 
            if (m > margin) { 
              margin = m; 
              choice = one; 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "margin = " + margin + 
                              " choice = " + choice); 
            } 
          } 
        } // end if (table[tp] >= 0) 
      } // end for (int len=max_len; len>=2; len--) 
      if (margin > 0) return choice; 
 
      // no result 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "no result: 0"); 
      // 'return 0' is a very slight advantage for the Predictor 
      // 'return zero' would be a very slight advantage for the Evader 
      return 0; 
      // using a random return here enables loser to get back in the game 
      // return (random.nextFloat() > 0.5f) ? one : zero; 
    } // end next_2 method 
 
 
    // remove n spaces (4*n ints) from table 
    final void remove(int n) { 
      if (n > table_size / 4) n = table_size / 4; 
      int left = n; 
      while (left > 0) { 
        int l = size_to_length[table_size]; 
        int lo = length_to_size(l - 1) - 1; 
        int hi = length_to_size(l) - 1; 
        int len = (hi - lo) / 4; 
        int used = (table_size - lo) / 4; 
        int m = Math.min(used, left); 
        int k = (int) (len * random.nextFloat());        
        while (m > 0) { 
          if (k >= len) k = k - len; 
          int j = lo + 4 * k; 
          if (table[j+1] >= 0) { 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "REMOVE: j = " + j + " table_size = " + 
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                              table_size + " l = " + l + " lo = " + lo + 
                              " k = " + k); 
            table[j+1] = -1; 
            table[j+2] = -1; 
            table[j+3] = -1; 
            table[j+4] = -1; 
            m--; 
            left--; 
            table_size = table_size - 4; 
          } 
          k++; 
        } // end while ((m > 0) 
      } // end while (left > 0) 
    } // end remove method 
 
 
    // add n spaces (4*n ints) to table 
    final void add(int n) { 
      if (n > (TABLE_SIZE - table_size) / 4) 
                             n = (TABLE_SIZE - table_size) / 4; 
      int left = n; 
      while (left > 0) { 
        int l = size_to_length[table_size + 4]; 
        int lo = length_to_size(l - 1) - 1; 
        int hi = length_to_size(l) - 1; 
        int len = (hi - lo) / 4; 
        int unused = (hi - table_size) / 4; 
        int m = Math.min(unused, left); 
        int k = (int) (len * random.nextFloat()); 
        while (m > 0) { 
          if (k >= len) k = k - len; 
          int j = lo + 4 * k; 
          if (table[j+1] < 0) { 
if (debug) System.out.println(id + "ADD: j = " + j + " table_size = " + 
                              table_size + " l = " + l + " lo = " + lo + 
                              " k = " + k); 
            table[j+1] = 0; 
            table[j+2] = 0; 
            table[j+3] = 0; 
            table[j+4] = 0; 
            m--; 
            left--; 
            table_size = table_size + 4; 
          } 
          k++; 
        } // end while ((m > 0) 
      } // end while (left > 0) 
    } // end add method 
 
 
  } // end class PE 
 
  public class Predictor extends PE { 
 
    Predictor(int r) { 
      id = "P "; 
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      remove(r); 
      self_select = 2; 
      other_select = 1; 
      one = 1; 
      zero = 0; 
    } 
  } 
 
  public class Evader extends PE { 
 
    Evader(int r) { 
      id = "E "; 
      remove(r); 
      self_select = 1; 
      other_select = 2; 
      one = 0; 
      zero = 1; 
    } 
  } 
 
} 
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